

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

**BUILDING AN ARMY IN A DEMOCRACY IN
HUNGARY AND POLAND**

by

Frank E. Fields and Jack J. Jensen

December, 1996

Thesis Advisor:
Co-Advisor:

Donald Abenheim
Roman Laba

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

19970514 039

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE December, 1996	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE BUILDING AN ARMY IN A DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY AND POLAND		5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) Frank E. Fields and Jack J. Jensen		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING/ MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.		
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis presents a refined treatise of civil-military relations and military professionalism which provides civilian and military personnel engaged in the reform process in Hungary and Poland with insights into the ongoing struggle to institutionalize the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier and democratic military professionalism. Infusing democratic military professionalism and the ideal of the citizen-soldier throughout the ranks of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) and the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) will help ensure that Hungary and Poland make a complete transition to democracy and achieve "human interoperability" with NATO. As Hungary and Poland democratize, they must create mechanisms of democratic political (civilian) control of the military, introduce society and the military to the concept of the democratic citizen-soldier; and institutionalize democratic military professionalism within the armed forces. Democratization programs such as NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP), and the United States' Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies must help the Hungarian and Polish armed forces to institutionalize the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier and democratic military professionalism. Without democratic military professionalism, the new armies of democratic citizen-soldiers in East Central Europe will not have the leadership, discipline, and morale necessary to be effective and reliable NATO partners.		
14. SUBJECT TERMS Civil-Military Relations, Military Professionalism, East Central Europe, NATO Enlargement, Hungarian Armed Forces, Polish Armed Forces, Democratization, Post-Cold War European Security, Military Reform, Armies of the Former Warsaw Pact.		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 190
		16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified
		20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

**BUILDING AN ARMY IN A DEMOCRACY
IN HUNGARY AND POLAND**

Frank E. Fields
Major, United States Air Force
B.A., Virginia Tech, 1983; M.A., 1984
and
Jack J. Jensen
Captain (P), United States Army
B.A., University of Texas at Austin, 1985

Submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1996

Authors:




Frank E. Fields




Jack J. Jensen


Approved by:



Donald Abenheim, Thesis Advisor



Roman Laba, Co-Advisor



Frank C. Petho, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

This thesis presents a refined treatise of civil-military relations and military professionalism which provides civilian and military personnel engaged in the reform process in Hungary and Poland with insights into the ongoing struggle to institutionalize the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier and democratic military professionalism. Infusing democratic military professionalism and the ideal of the citizen-soldier throughout the ranks of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) and the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) will help ensure that Hungary and Poland make a complete transition to democracy and achieve “human interoperability” with NATO. As Hungary and Poland democratize, they must create mechanisms of democratic political (civilian) control of the military, introduce society and the military to the concept of the democratic citizen-soldier; and institutionalize democratic military professionalism within the armed forces.

Democratization programs such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP), and the United States’ Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies must help the Hungarian and Polish armed forces to institutionalize the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier and democratic military professionalism. Without democratic military professionalism, the new armies of democratic citizen-soldiers in East Central Europe will not have the leadership, discipline, and morale necessary to be effective and reliable NATO partners.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN ASD AND NSWP STATES	7
A.	CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NSWP STATES	7
1.	Introduction	7
2.	Characteristics of Civil-Military Relations in Soviet-Communist States	7
3.	Mechanisms of Soviet Control	12
a.	<i>Main Political Administration (MPA)</i>	13
b.	<i>The Political Officers</i>	14
c.	<i>The Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Military Counter-Intelligence Service</i>	16
d.	<i>Militia Forces; Paramilitary Units of the Communist Party; Special Security Elements of the Armed Forces</i>	17
e.	<i>Economic and Military Mechanisms of Control in the Warsaw Pact (WP)</i>	18
f.	<i>Political Socialization Programs</i>	21
B.	CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN ATLANTIC-STYLE DEMOCRATIC (ASD) STATES	26
1.	Introduction	26
2.	The Western Conception of the Citizen-Soldier	33
3.	Modern Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in Atlantic-Style Democratic (ASD) States	37
4.	Conscription	46
III.	MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM IN ASD AND NSWP STATES	51
A.	INTRODUCTION	51
B.	PRIMARY FOUNDATIONS OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM	53
1.	The Armed Forces of Atlantic-Style Democratic (ASD) States	53
a.	<i>Authority</i>	53
(1)	Formal Authority - Authority of Legitimacy and Authority of Position	54
(2)	Functional Authority - Authority of Competence and Authority of Person	63
b.	<i>Leadership</i>	64
c.	<i>Discipline, Obedience, and Morale</i>	69
2.	The Armed Forces of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) States	74
a.	<i>Authority</i>	74
(1)	Formal Authority - Authority of Legitimacy and Authority of Position	74
(2)	Functional Authority - Authority of Competence and Authority of Person	79
b.	<i>Leadership</i>	81
c.	<i>Discipline, Obedience and Morale</i>	84

C. SECONDARY FOUNDATIONS OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM	88
1. The Armed Forces of Atlantic-Style Democratic (ASD) States	89
a. <i>Recruitment and Retention</i>	89
b. <i>Career Development</i>	92
2. The Armed Forces of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) States	96
a. <i>Recruitment and Retention</i>	96
b. <i>Career Development</i>	97
IV. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM IN POLAND AND HUNGARY, 1996	101
A. INTRODUCTION	101
B. DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY	102
1. Constitutional Provisions	104
2. The Role of the Legislature	105
3. Ministry of Defense (MOD)	106
C. DEMOCRATIC CITIZEN-SOLDIER	110
1. Democratic Citizen-Soldiers are Representative of Society	111
2. Democratic Citizen-Soldiers Serve out of a Sense of Duty and Civic Responsibility	114
3. Democratic Citizen-Soldiers Respect Democratic Civilian Control and Remain Non-Partisan	123
4. Democratic Citizen-Soldiers Retain their Rights	128
D. FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM	130
1. Primary Foundations of Military Professionalism in Hungary and Poland	132
a. <i>Authority</i>	132
(1) Formal Authority - Authority of Legitimacy and Authority of Position	132
(2) Functional Authority - Authority of Competence and Authority of Person	138
b. <i>Leadership</i>	138
c. <i>Discipline, Obedience, and Morale</i>	141
2. Secondary Foundations of Military Professionalism in Hungary and Poland	144
a. <i>Recruitment and Retention</i>	144
b. <i>Career Development</i>	147
V. CONCLUSION	153
APPENDIX - US AND NATO PROGRAMS	159
BIBLIOGRAPHY	167
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	175

I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTION

This thesis is based on the premise that the transformation of society and politics results in changed patterns of civil-military relations.¹ A communist political system is characterized by communist civil-military relations, and a democratic political system is characterized by democratic civil-military relations. When states change from one political system to another, they must also reorder their civil-military relations to ensure the military plays a role that is congruous with the principles, norms and values of the new political system.² In addition, a change in the political system transforms the nature of the military's relationship with society. To ensure that the military's role is congruous with changes in the political system and society, the state must change the mechanisms of political control, develop a new concept of the "citizen-soldier," and create a new form of military professionalism.

¹ Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, "Democratization and the Post-Communist Militaries: U.S. Support for Democratization in the Czech and Russian Militaries," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1996, p. 131; Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and Organization of the State," *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 180-183, Hintze notes that "All state organization was originally military organization, organization for war...But then there came a period, as agriculture expanded, as men took root in the soil they cultivated, as the population increased, as communications and technology advanced, as trade developed--in short, as the conditions of economic life changed when a separation of military and commercial activity set in, a division between the class that fought and the class that fed. The armed forces became a special part of the whole, and its organization a special aspect of the organization of the state. The questions that now arise are these: What place is occupied by the organization of the army in the general organization of the state? To what extent does it influence political institutions as a whole? How far do the economic requirements of the whole community or even of individual classes impose limitations on the demands of the warrior class to dominate public life? How in general do class contradictions interweave with the contradiction between military life and commercial life? What balance between the two does the state organization provide?"; Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War," *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Peter Paret, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) pp. 11-31.

² Ibid., and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 2; and Colonel Mark E. Victorson, U.S. Army, *Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States* (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, Newport Paper No. 7, June 1994), pp. 3-4.

As Hungary and Poland convert from a communist to a democratic political system, they must also change from a communist to democratic form of civil-military relations and military professionalism. Thus, Hungary and Poland are struggling *to create mechanisms of democratic political (civilian) control; introduce society and the military to the concept of the democratic citizen-soldier; and institutionalize democratic military professionalism* within the armed forces--all within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and possible NATO and Western European Union (WEU) membership.

This thesis goes beyond most studies of civil-military relations by providing a more detailed examination of military professionalism. The authors present a refined treatise of military professionalism which provides civilian and military personnel engaged in the reform process with insights into the ongoing struggle to institutionalize the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier and democratic military professionalism in Hungary and Poland. Infusing democratic military professionalism and the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier throughout the ranks of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) and the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) will help ensure that Hungary and Poland make a complete transition to democracy and achieve “human interoperability” with NATO. This study defines *democratic military professionalism* as the image and practice of the soldier in the state that allows the professional armed forces of a democracy to be effective, while at the same time, reflecting certain democratic values. Military professionals in a democracy are experts in their field who respect civilian control of the military, embody

the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier, are accountable to society, and maintain the unique “military ethic.”

Moreover, this study refines the concept of military professionalism by identifying three primary and two secondary foundations which form the basis of military professionalism in any military organization. The three **primary foundations** of military professionalism are (1) *authority*, (2) *leadership*, and (3) *discipline, morale, and obedience*, and the two **secondary foundations** are (1) *recruitment and retention*, and (2) *career development*. Defining military professionalism in this way provides a greater level of specificity to compare democratic military professionalism in the Atlantic-Style Democratic (ASD) states with communist military professionalism in non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) states.³ Comprehending the differences in military professionalism will help the members of East Central European (ECE) militaries to develop a new form of military professionalism to coincide with the reform of their formal civil-military relations.

Since the end of the Cold War, the former NSWP states of Hungary and Poland have attempted to transform their economies, political systems and military institutions from the Soviet model to that of the Atlantic democracies. As they shift to a free-market economy, develop closer ties with the European Union, and join Western security institutions, the Poles and Hungarians face the challenge of overcoming the legacy of

³ The ASD states include: U.S., Great Britain, France, Canada, Germany, The Netherlands, Denmark, Iceland, Belgium, and Norway. NSWP states included: Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania.

fifty years of communism and authoritarian rule before inculcating the principles of democracy and capitalism.

In addition to economic and political transformation, an outstanding challenge confronting the post-communist states is the reform of external and national security policy and military institutions. Prior to 1989, all aspects of national defense policy and strategy were subordinated to the Warsaw Pact. By 1992-93, the Polish and Hungarian desire to satisfy Western requirements for possible NATO membership led post-communist policy makers to reformulate their security policy and restructure and modernize the armed forces. Eager to join NATO, leaders in Budapest and Warsaw stated that they were committed to achieving the main objectives set forth in NATO's Partnership For Peace (PFP) Framework Document: ensuring democratic control of defense forces and developing interoperability with NATO.⁴ Since then, the Polish and Hungarian defense establishments have worked toward achieving democratic control of the military and NATO interoperability with the help of such US and NATO democratization programs as PFP, the U.S. military's Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), the U.S. State Department's International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (for a description of the programs, refer to the Appendix).⁵ This thesis recommends that U.S.

⁴ *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), pp. 265-268; *Partnership for Peace Guide, March, 1996*, U.S. DOD Publication, p. 3.

⁵ Ibid., PFP is a NATO program; the other three listed are US programs. Other US and NATO programs address specific functional and technical needs of the Partnership for Peace member state defense establishments. For example, the Defense Resource Management Study Program (DRMS) of the US Office of the Secretary of Defense, helps civilian Ministries in Partner nations develop effective defense resource and budget systems. In addition, other NATO countries conduct their own bilateral and multilateral programs.

and NATO programs help the Hungarian Defense Force (HDF) and the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) institutionalize the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier and democratic military professionalism to ensure the military's proper role in society and enhance "human interoperability" with NATO.

B. METHODOLOGY

Chapter II of this study treats the dynamics of civil-military relations in the ASD and NSWP states, including thereby the concept of the democratic and communist citizen-soldier. Chapter III examines the foundations of military professionalism with respect to ASD and NSWP states. In chapter IV, the authors use the *dialectical* discussions in the first chapters as a framework to analyze the current status of civil-military relations and military professionalism in Hungary and Poland. Finally, chapter V summarizes the current status of civil-military relations and military professionalism in Hungary and Poland and makes recommendations concerning reform efforts.

Authors' note: A "dialectic" is the method of logic used by Hegel and adapted by Clausewitz and Marx to explain social, political, military and economic processes: it is based on the principle that an idea or event (thesis) is followed by its opposite (antithesis); the characteristics of one phenomenon are clarified by analyzing its opposite.⁶ For example, in *On War*, Clausewitz's thesis of total war as the ideal war is followed by the antithesis that war, even in theory, is always influenced by forces external to it.⁷ Similarly, this study uses a dialectical approach to clearly identify the

⁶ *Webster's New World Dictionary*, Victoria Neufeldt, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1994); Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," *Makers of Modern Strategy*, p. 198.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

differences between *democratic* civil-military relations/military professionalism (thesis), and *communist* civil-military relations/military professionalism (antithesis), to provide a useful framework for analyzing military reform in Hungary and Poland. As part of the dialectical approach, the authors describe the “ideal” models of democratic civil-military relations/military professionalism, and the “ideal” models of Soviet-communist civil-military relations/military professionalism. The use of “ideal,” or “absolute,” models in a dialectic format allows the authors to clearly organize ideas and identify the distinctive features of civil-military relations and military professionalism in each political system. However, the use of a dialectical approach and “ideal” models glosses over some of the exceptional events and aberrant characteristics of civil-military relations which, together with the ideal models form an aggregate picture of the reality of civil-military relations and military professionalism in each political system. The authors footnote many of these exceptions in an effort to present a balanced and realistic analysis throughout the study.

II. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN ASD AND NSWP STATES

A. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN NSWP STATES

1. Introduction

The relationship between the Soviet Union, the East European Communist Parties and the armed forces formed a unique pattern of civil-military relations in the NSWP. The Soviet Union exercised control over the NSWP through political, economic, cultural, and military mechanisms at the domestic level, the bilateral level, and the multinational level.⁸ Each state's domestic communist party apparatus had to submit to Soviet authority through bilateral political and economic agreements. In addition, the mechanisms of the multinational WTO controlled the armed forces of the Eastern European states.⁹ Strong Soviet mechanisms of control guaranteed Soviet hegemony and the existence of the illegitimate communist regimes of Eastern Europe. However, to understand the dynamics of civil-military relations in the NSWP states, one must examine the characteristics of civil-military relations in Soviet-communist political systems in general. The structure and functions of the Party and the organs of government in the NSWP were identical to those in the Soviet Union.

2. Characteristics of Civil-Military Relations in Soviet-Communist States

Civil military relations in communist political systems, to include those of NSWP states, can best be understood by examining the nexus between the military, the

⁸ Theresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Warsaw Pact: Question of Cohesion Phase II, Vol. I The Greater Socialist Army: Integration and Reliability* (Ottawa: Department of Defense, Canada, 1984), p.iii; and Bradley R. Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 51.

⁹ Bradley R. Gitz, p. 51.

government, and the hegemonic Communist Party--the institution that controlled all government institutions and every facet of life in society. The Communist Party's vanguard role created a political system in which the Party reigned supreme, and its hegemony depended on its ability to control the non-party institutions of the state.¹⁰

The Communist Party ensured its supremacy through the use of a dual party-government structure which consisted of two parallel hierarchies: the party apparatus, run by officials of the Communist Party, and a larger state structure of government bureaucrats, military officers and members of the security forces.¹¹ The party and the government structures were interconnected in two ways: First, all important government officials, generals, and most of the officer corps were party members, subject to party discipline and directives; and second, joint party-government committees developed national policies and served as institutional links between the two structures.¹² In addition, the party leadership had the authority to make policy and to oversee its execution, while government institutions, to include the Defense Council and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) ratified (rubber stamped) and implemented all party policies.¹³ Thus, the relationship between the Party and the government can best be described as a partnership, in which the Party was the undisputed senior partner.¹⁴

The government institutions concerned with the formulation and implementation of defense policy in the Soviet system were the Defense Council and the Ministry of

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 8.

¹¹ Ellen Jones, *Red Army and Society*, (Boston: Allen and Unwin Publishers, 1985), p. 2.

¹² Ibid., p. 2.

¹³ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 2.

Defense.¹⁵ As a joint party-military committee, the Defense Council provided top-level coordination for the defense-related activities of government bodies to ensure that non-military agencies were responsive to military needs.¹⁶ Its membership consisted of the Minister of Defense, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Chief of the General Staff, the Foreign Minister, and other Central Committee functionaries with military duties.¹⁷ Party leaders entrusted the Defense Council to review all major national security issues, direct military development programs, and coordinate the work of the entire state apparatus in support of military requirements.¹⁸

The MOD in the Soviet system had the responsibility for the direct management of the armed forces.¹⁹ The officers in the MOD held a monopoly of expertise on defense issues and military matters which enabled them to directly influence the policymaking process, although they were not autonomous actors in that process.²⁰ Despite the Communist Party's predominance in policy making, over which the armed forces had no control, civilian party and government leaders did not have an extensive network of non-military sources of military information. There were no Soviet equivalents for the Central Intelligence Agency or private consulting firms like the RAND corporation.²¹ Rather, civilian leaders and bureaucrats relied on the monopoly of expertise held by the officers in the MOD. Officers alone possessed military expertise because the few civilians that

¹⁵ Ulrich, p. 141.

¹⁶ Ellen Jones, p. 7.

¹⁷ Ulrich, p. 141.

¹⁸ Ellen Jones, p. 7.

¹⁹ Ulrich, p. 141.

²⁰ Ellen Jones, p. 23.

²¹ Timothy J. Colton, *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 244.

were employed in the Ministry of Defense held low level, less-skilled, non-professional positions.²² By contrast to ASD defense establishments, the Soviet-style MODs did not integrate civilians into high-level, professional posts. And those few civilians who were assigned to top positions within Soviet-style MODs, such as former Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, were given military rank commensurate with their position and wore a military uniform.²³

The Party charged the MOD with the responsibility for defense planning, military research and development, and the management of personnel issues.²⁴ To implement the vast amount of responsibility assigned to it, the MOD relied on the General Staff to consolidate and coordinate its activities. The General Staff acted as an extended personal staff of the Defense Minister, charged with strategic planning and with coordinating the activities of the service staffs.²⁵ Together, the MOD and the General Staff served as the executive agency for basic policies forged at the higher levels of the civilian bureaucracy.²⁶

As the “senior partner” in a one-party system, the Communist Party exercised a form of civilian control over the Defense Council, the MOD, and the General Staff which differed sharply from the democratic civilian control exercised in ASD states. The ASD states have transparent, accountable political processes, in which it is relatively easy to delineate the goals and interests of the various actors who attempt to influence defense

²² Ellen Jones, p. 104.

²³ Ibid., p. 105.

²⁴ Ellen Jones, p. 14.

²⁵ Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1984), p. 117.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 244.

policy: the legislature; the executive; the military leadership; political parties and the numerous pressure groups, ranging from military industrial lobbies to associations of retired veterans.²⁷ The Soviet and NSWP states lacked such transparency in their political processes. In the Soviet system, the omnipresence of the Communist Party in the organs of government made it difficult to separate the aims and interests of the institutions vying to influence defense policy from the agenda of the Party.²⁸ This lack of transparency often created obscure, informal, and “hidden” policy-making processes in which the Party ensured its hegemony through centralized institutional mechanisms of control.²⁹

The Party ensured that it would remain the senior partner in the dual party-government structure, retain its hegemony over the people, and protect the state from external threats by forging a close relationship with the armed forces. Communist rulers throughout the Soviet Imperium, but in particular, those in the NSWP states, relied on the Soviet military to keep them in power because their communist regimes lacked legitimacy.³⁰ Without the mandate of the people to legitimize their rule, the communist parties needed the support of the only institution that possessed the instrument of coercive power: the military. Although the Party maintained a monopoly of power within the political system, they did not have a monopoly of force to preserve that power, thus, the

²⁷ Rudolf Joo, “The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces,” *Challiot Paper 23, Feb 1996* (Paris: Institute for Security Studies Western European Union), p. 13.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 13; and Ellen Jones, p. 23.

³⁰ A complete discussion of why the communist parties lacked legitimacy is presented in the authority section of Chapter III in this thesis.

Party depended on the indigenous military and the Soviets as instruments to protect the Communist regime from its *internal* as well as its external enemies.³¹

3. Mechanisms of Soviet Control

One must view the above discussion on the nature of communist civil-military relations in the NSWP states in the context of Soviet hegemony in the region. Determined to maintain the dominant role as leader of the “socialist community of nations,” the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) relied on a variety of mechanisms to ensure the loyalty of the Communist Parties and the armed forces of NSWP states. To maintain its hegemony over Eastern Europe, the CPSU sought the *functional* and *attitudinal* integration of the NSWP states³² According to Soviet scholar Theresa Rakowska-Harmstone, functional integration is “conformity to the official norms and obedience to the policy directives of the ruling parties and Warsaw Pact command structures; and attitudinal integration is the internalization of the official value system and political loyalty to the Soviet or East European communist parties and the Warsaw Pact alliance system.”³³ The CPSU *successfully* obtained the functional integration of the NSWP through the use of the following institutional mechanisms of control: the Main Political Administration (MPA) and its political officers; the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the military counterintelligence service; the para-military units of the Communist party, and economic and military mechanisms of the WP alliance. However,

³¹ Ulrich, p.133.

³² Rakowska-Harmstone, *Phase II*, Vol. 1, pp. iv-v.

³³ Ibid.

the CPSUs political socialization programs *failed* to gain the attitudinal integration of servicemembers--except for the senior cadre--in NSWP armies.³⁴

a. Main Political Administration (MPA)

The Communist Parties of the Soviet Union and NSWP states guided party-political work in the armed forces through the Main Political Administration.³⁵ Accountable to the Central Committee and the Defense Council, the MPA provided a channel through which the Party influenced all aspects of military activity, enhanced combat readiness, strengthened military discipline, boosted morale, increased political awareness, and indoctrinated Eastern European youth.³⁶ In addition, the MPA attempted to ensure the “ideological purity” of the NSWP armies through a process of political socialization--instilling military personnel with approved values and attitudes.³⁷ The MPA accomplished these tasks through the military’s political organs, party organizations, and Komsomol organizations.

The MPA organized its administrative bodies to parallel the military’s command hierarchy.³⁸ From the Ministry of Defense, the chief of the MPA directed political operations for the entire armed forces. At each of the service headquarters, the political administrations of the Navy, Air Forces, and Ground Forces conducted MPA operations.³⁹ The MPA employed political administrative apparatuses in the military districts, fleets, and groups of forces, and used smaller political “departments” to carry

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Scott and Scott, p. 288.

³⁷ Ellen Jones, p. 114.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 118.

³⁹ Ibid.

out its mission within Army divisions, military schools, and other MOD institutions.⁴⁰

Finally, HQ MPA assigned political officers with a small, full-time staff to carry out political duties at the regiment, battalion, and company levels of command.⁴¹

b. *The Political Officers*

The Party leadership relied on political officers to discharge the duties assigned to the MPA and its subordinate organs within the military hierarchy. Political officers were responsible for political socialization, ideological standardization, and management of the military's party and Komsomol organizations.⁴² They also filled the role of personnel officer, educational or orientations officer, and chaplain at the lower levels of the chain of command.⁴³ In addition, the political officers were charged with promoting the military effectiveness of individual units. As a deputy to the unit commander, the political officer kept soldiers motivated and focused by reinforcing the importance of their mission through the use of formal political classes, evening lectures, and informal group discussions.⁴⁴ The political officer also maintained unit discipline by enforcing regulations, prosecuting criminals, and rewarding exemplary behavior.⁴⁵ Moreover, the political officer maintained morale among the troops. He ensured that living conditions conformed to regulations and monitored the quality of the food, housing facilities, medical and laundry services, and clothing supplies.⁴⁶ If he discovered a

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid. p. 114.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 128.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

shortfall in any of these or other areas he would notify the unit commander of the need for immediate action to remedy the situation.⁴⁷

The political officer and the commander worked together to ensure their unit maintained full combat readiness. Both men were held accountable if their unit failed to meet training standards or mission requirements. In short, the commander and the political officer functioned more as partners than as adversaries.⁴⁸ According to Sovietologist Ellen Jones, the military commander and the political officer were so thoroughly interconnected that the MPA's role as an "autonomous source of information and control gradually atrophied."⁴⁹ Jones goes on to comment on the nature of the commander/political officer relationship, and its relevance to civil-military relations in the Soviet system:

MPA activities within the armed forces were basically irrelevant to the issue of civil-military conflict. The relationship between the commander and the political officer could not be used as a measure of party-military relations. Political control in the sense of ensuring political reliability of military professionals, is one of only a broad array of MPA responsibilities; and by the 1980s, it was one of the least significant of the MPA's missions.⁵⁰

Despite the importance of the political officer's role in the eyes of the Party, many officers regarded the entire MPA infrastructure as an "alien body" invading the ranks of the professional military, and viewed the activities of the political officers with great suspicion.⁵¹ For many, the existence of political officers at every level in the chain of command created a system of "dual command," in which ultimate authority

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 130.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 140.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 141.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 142.

⁵¹ Joo, p. 17.

belonged to the Party's political officers, rather than the military's commanders.⁵² To further strengthen its authority, the Party relied on two other organizations: the KGB and the military counterintelligence service. These agencies helped the party to control the military by ensuring the reliability of personnel in the armed forces.

c. The Committee for State Security (KGB) and The Military Counter-intelligence Service

As the role of the military's political organs shifted from political control to military-oriented functions, the Party energized another mechanism for exerting control over the military, the “special departments” of the KGB and indigenous secret police agencies linked to the KGB.⁵³ KGB officers gathered personal information on individual soldiers through a network of informers at every level in the hierarchy of military command.⁵⁴ Thus, the Party used the KGB as a primary means of conducting political surveillance of the military. At the same time, the military counter-intelligence service, part of the Ministry of the Interior, ensured party loyalty in the officer corps, eliminated internal enemies, and combated anti-socialist forces.⁵⁵ In addition, the KGB assigned permanent representatives in the NSWP states to ensure that the indigenous

⁵² Ibid. In contrast to views held by Jones, Colton, and other Western scholars, that the political officers made a positive contribution to military efficiency; Professor Joo, a former Deputy Defense Minister in Hungary, states that Eastern Europeans regarded the role of the political officer as counterproductive. He states that “very often the professional military considered the activity of political officers as a useless exercise, diverting time and energy from the real duty, or simply violating the privacy of servicemen. Commanders worried about the unity of command, because political officers were quite often outside their control.” A few Polish and Hungarian officers interviewed by the authors’ viewed political officers as assets, rather than liabilities. They said political officers were particularly helpful in enforcing discipline. However, most of the officers interviewed agreed with Dr. Joo’s assertion that political officers were counterproductive.

⁵³ Ellen Jones, p. 123.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Joo, p. 19.

security and intelligence services remained loyal to Moscow.⁵⁶ Moreover, key personnel from the satellite states were trained in the Soviet Union.⁵⁷ Apart from the surveillance activities of the KGB, its indigenous counterparts, and the military intelligence service, the Party relied on other organizations such as militia forces, paramilitary forces, and special security elements within the armed forces to help control the military.

d. Militia Forces; Paramilitary Units of the Communist Party; and Special Security Elements of the Armed Forces

The Communist Parties of the NSWP employed militia forces, such as Poland's "People's Militia," and Hungary's "Worker's Militia," to provide their citizens with the basic military skills necessary to augment the regular armed forces in times of crisis.⁵⁸ According to Dr. Joo, "The militia units contributed to the militarization of society, as part of the general oppressive structure, and exerted a kind of counterbalance to the regular armed forces by separating those bearing arms into competing units."⁵⁹ Regime leaders also used them as "bodyguards," or instruments to guarantee the supremacy of the Communist Party.⁶⁰ In sum, militia units augmented the wider political socialization efforts of the Communist regimes by promoting militarism and fostering respect for the military institution in society.⁶¹

In addition, the NSWP regimes depended on the security elements within the armed forces and paramilitary special security units to offset the inferior reliability of

⁵⁶ Amy Knight, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 135.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid., and Barany, *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-90*, p. 9.

⁵⁹ Joo, p. 19.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ulrich, p. 147.

conscript forces and ensure that internal suppression would be carried out in times of crisis.⁶² In fact, security forces were upgraded and enlarged as the regimes' level of distrust in conscripts increased.⁶³ For example, after the Polish army's bungled suppression of rioting workers along the Baltic Coast in 1970, the regime rapidly expanded its number of special security troops.⁶⁴ In addition to these indigenous military and paramilitary mechanisms of control, the NSWP states were controlled by political, economic, and military ties to the Soviet Union.

e. Economic and Military Mechanisms of Control in the WP

The Soviets exercised political and economic control through the Cominform, bilateral economic and cultural treaties, and mechanisms of the WP. Stalin created the Cominform in 1947 to emphasize the USSR's role as leader of the socialist bloc, ensure that the patterns of development in Eastern European states were consistent with orthodox Leninist ideology, and promote class unity, the greater struggle against capitalism, and socialist internationalism.⁶⁵ In addition, the Soviets established bilateral economic treaties that initially forced the Eastern European states to become economically dependent on the Soviet Union by prohibiting them from trading with the West.⁶⁶ The Soviets also instituted a series of informal mechanisms to ensure the loyalty of the Eastern Europeans. For example, the KGB penetrated East European government

⁶² Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Phase II - Vol. 1*, Dr. Harmstone and her colleagues refer to the phenomenon as the "ratio of distrust," defined as the combined total of professional cadre and special security troops to conscripts. Rakowska-Harmstone noted that the ratio was highest in East Germany and Poland.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Roman Laba, *The Roots of Solidarity*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 91.

⁶⁵ Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 58-59 and pp. 83-85.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 112-129.

institutions, ensured that Moscow-loyalists were placed in key positions, and purged unreliable elements from society.⁶⁷

In addition, the Soviets created the Warsaw Pact to integrate the military institutions of East European states with the Soviet armed forces. In 1954, Kruschev formed the Warsaw Treaty Organization, in part as a response to the formation of NATO, but also to offset the danger of non-unity among the increasingly domestic-oriented East European regimes.⁶⁸ However, the anti-Soviet revolts in East Germany, Poland and Hungary, and the successful assertion of national sovereignty by Rumania and Albania exposed weaknesses in Soviet-East Europe relations. The events of the "Prague Spring" in 1968 finally convinced the Soviets to strengthen their grip, not only on the recalcitrant Czechs, but the entire Eastern Bloc. Introduced during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Brezhnev Doctrine stressed the "common internationalist duty of all countries to support, strengthen, and defend socialist gains."⁶⁹ Moreover, the doctrine prohibited secession from the socialist community and precluded "any divergence from an orthodox communist government and society of the communist type."⁷⁰ Thus, throughout the Soviet era, Moscow attempted to prevent Eastern European regimes from developing truly *national* armed forces in Eastern Europe.⁷¹

Throughout the Soviet period, the CPSU and Red Army attempted to ensure the political reliability of the members of the NSWP by detaching components of

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 174.

⁶⁹ Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, *Phase II, Vol. I*, p. 51.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 52.

⁷¹ Barany, *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-90*, p. 19.

national military forces from the control of national MODs and attaching them to a “Greater Socialist Army” built around the Soviet army and under the operational control of the Soviet General Staff.⁷² The Soviets were determined to create a reliable multinational force capable of satisfying the Soviet requirements for defense from external and internal enemies of socialism. According to Rakowska-Harmstone there were three requirements for the internal role: First, maintaining a visible Soviet military presence within each NSWP state to crush anti-communist movements or national regimes seeking independence from the Soviet Union; Second, deterring a NATO offensive in response to Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe; and Third, denying NSWP MODs the capability to defend either national communist regimes or anti-communist successor regimes.⁷³ National-level Communist Party leaders supported the Soviet policy of fragmentation of national control over the NSWP militaries because the illegitimate regimes’ survival depended on the ability of the Soviets to intervene on their behalf.⁷⁴

Like other NSWP armies, the Polish military fulfilled its role as a Soviet tool to maintain internal security during times of crisis. Throughout the communist era, the Polish armed forces successfully performed their duty to defend against internal enemies of socialism: From the civil war of 1945-47, the Poznan worker’s riots in 1956, and the Baltic shipyard strikes of 1970, to the military takeover in 1981, the Polish military displayed the extent of its functional integration.⁷⁵

⁷² Rakowska-Harmstone, *Phase II Vol. I*, p. vi, 165.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. vii.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Christopher D. Jones, and Ivan Sylvain, *Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion Phase II, Vol. 2--Poland, German Democratic Republic and Romania* (Ottawa: ORAE, 1984), p. 234.

In sum, through various political, economic, cultural, and military mechanisms, the Soviet Communist Party and the Red army ensured the functional integration of the NSWP armed forces. The above mentioned integration mechanisms fragmented potentially autonomous structures and reintegrated their components into a force that would be reliable in a conflict with NATO.⁷⁶ However, the attitudinal reliability of citizen-soldiers in the NSWP is an altogether different matter.

f. Political Socialization Programs

Like their counterparts in the West, political and military leaders in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe shared the belief that the experience of military service had a measurable impact on the social and political attitudes of citizen-soldiers.⁷⁷ Supporting this view, former General Secretary of the USSR, Konstantin Chernenko referred to the Soviet military as a “school of patriotic growth”—an excellent training ground to instill discipline and patriotism, and mold young men with little “life experience,” into responsible, upright citizens.⁷⁸ Accordingly, the Soviet and NSWP militaries directed much of their resources toward controlling and socializing the citizen-soldiers who comprised the majority of their personnel.⁷⁹

Communist leaders throughout the Soviet Imperium relied on the military’s formalized, intensive, and centralized political socialization effort, historically known as the “school of the nation,” to generate support for the Communist Party, its

⁷⁶ Rakowska-Harmstone, *Phase II - Vol. 1*, p. v.

⁷⁷ Jones, *Red Army and Society*, p.149. Jones points to the socialization programs of the German Bundeswehr and the Israeli Defense Forces as examples of Western efforts to inculcate soldiers with a set of certain values and beliefs.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 148. Also see footnote 4 on page 171 of Jones, chapter 6.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 105.

leadership, goals and policies.⁸⁰ During the process of political indoctrination, commanders, political officers and unit activists attempted to transform young conscripts into an ideal “New Socialist Man”—a hard-working, patriotic, morally upright defender of the nation.⁸¹ This New Socialist Man was expected to fulfill his role as the ideal soldier as well as the ideal *communist* citizen—one who believed in the Marxist-Leninist world view and socialist internationalism, and who took an active interest in civic affairs, hated his enemies, obeyed the party, and scorned bourgeois ideology.⁸²

Upon entering the military, draft age youths had already received a large dose of political socialization at home, in school, and in communist youth organizations such as the Young Pioneers and the Komsomol.⁸³ The Party continued the socialization process after compulsory military training through adult socialization programs. By providing political socialization programs throughout one’s lifetime, the Communist Party continuously reinforced the ideal of the New Socialist Man in an attempt to ensure the loyalty of its citizens.

⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 148-179, and Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), p.15, 243. Prussian King William II introduced the concept of the “school of the nation,” in the late 1800’s. According to Abenheim, the political education program, *Die Schule der Nation* empowered the German officer corps to “freely impose its will upon the Reich because of universal military service, an institution that its proponents lauded as the “people in arms” and the “school of the nation.” Millions of men passed through the gates of the barracks, where, by donning the blue wool tunic of the king and emperor, they cast off their few civil rights.”

⁸¹ Ellen Jones, pp. 148-179; and Eliot A. Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service* (London: Cornell University Press, 1985), p. 33. Cohen notes that conscription is especially useful for political socialization programs in totalitarian states. According to Cohen, conscription offers totalitarian states “one more tool to organize and regiment the lives of their subjects, and it may help create the sense of constant and potent foreign threat against which one must always be on guard.”

⁸² Ellen Jones, pp. 148-179.

⁸³ Ibid.

The Communist Parties of East Central Europe faced an additional challenge in their efforts to develop a patriotic and politically reliable New Socialist Man. NSWP states were forced to emphasize loyalty to Moscow as well as loyalty to the state's own communist regime.⁸⁴ The Soviets expected the NSWP armies to instill the values of nationalism and socialist patriotism and, at the same time, promote the value of socialist internationalism--obedience to Soviet authority.⁸⁵ In "The Military and Political Socialization: Hungary," Professor Ivan Volgyes explains how this dichotomy of loyalties created an enormous conflict of values within the ranks of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. Writing in the late 1970s, he notes that, in Hungary:

The dual task [of inculcating soldiers with the spirit of nationalism and socialist internationalism] poses several serious problems for the political education process. First and foremost, the very composition of the armed forces represents a high coalescence of nationalist values--both the officer corps and the draftees are largely of worker and peasant origin, where the value of nationalism has always been very strong...Within the mind of the Hungarian officer, this nationalism must be contrasted with the tasks of socialist internationalism. The conflict of values is obvious. The memories of 1956 [the Hungarian uprising] are perhaps not so strong as they were even a few years ago. Hungarian participation in the joint exercises of the WTO forces was intended to heighten the personal commitment of Hungarian troops to the concepts of socialist internationalism and anti-imperialism. But the use of the Warsaw Treaty forces against one another in combat, instead of in joint operations, and Hungary's unwilling participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 tend to reemphasize the importance of the only permanent value--nationalism--as contrasted to the continually changing interpretation of the theory of socialist internationalism.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Ivan Volgyes, "The Military as an Agent of Political Socialization: The Case of Hungary," in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, *Civil Military Relations in Communist Systems* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 145-164.

⁸⁵ Bradley R. Gitz, *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 89-94.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 160-161.

Thus, Hungarian officers and conscripts, like most of their counterparts in the WTO, were far more reliable inculcators of national values than they were convinced advocates of the fraternal socialist-internationalist order.⁸⁷ According to Dr. Zoltan Barany, the Hungarian political socialization process did not mold a “New Hungarian Socialist Man.” “It has clearly failed to indoctrinate the population in general and youth in particular with socialist and proletarian internationalist values.”⁸⁸

Like the Hungarians, the Poles refused to be “attitudinally integrated” into the Soviet socialist international system. With the exception of top-level military and political leaders, most Poles were firmly committed nationalists. Polish generals “presided over a schizophrenic army” composed of soldiers who were openly and unequivocally hostile to the Soviet Union.⁸⁹ The extent of the lack of attitudinal integration is exemplified by the following incident. According to Rakowska-Harmstone, conscripts flashed the “V” sign as they were sworn in and refused to repeat the part of the pledge concerning the “alliance with the USSR,” instead “the conscripts hummed.”⁹⁰

Thus, despite the use of joint exercises, common doctrine, consolidated political administrations, and an integrated system of political socialization, the Soviets failed to affect genuine attitudinal integration of East European armed forces.⁹¹ However, the successful functional integration of NSWP states ensured Soviet hegemony because,

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 161.

⁸⁸ Zoltan D. Barany and Ivan Sylvain, Hungary, in Rakowska-Harmstone, *Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase II - Volume 3: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary*, p. 455.

⁸⁹ Rakowska-Harmstone, *Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase II - Volume 2: Poland, German Democratic Republic and Romania*, p. 236.

⁹⁰ Ibid., 209.

⁹¹ Barany, *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe*, p. 18.

in the final analysis, most NSWP soldiers and officers followed Soviet orders whether or not they believed in the ideal of the communist citizen-soldier.

In addition, such strong Soviet mechanisms of political, economic, and military control guaranteed the existence of the illegitimate communist regimes of Eastern Europe. Upon examining the nexus between the hegemonic communist party, the military, and the government in the NSWP states, it is clear that the communist parties could not have maintained their hegemony without Soviet support. In *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-90*, Professor Zoltan Barany aptly describes the effect of external Soviet domination on Eastern European civil-military relations:

East European regimes were not reliant on the benevolence of their respective military establishments to the degree we have seen in the Soviet example, because in a worst-case scenario the regime's last line of defense was not its own army but that of the Soviet Union. As a result, the typical East European military's intra-party role was of significantly lower profile than in the cases of the Soviet Union of other Communist countries where the military was not subordinated to an external force. It is fair to say that aside from a few exceptions from the rule, **the military was not a significant actor in East European politics.**⁹²

The next section of this chapter discusses civil-military relations in ASD states, to include the concept of the *democratic* citizen-soldier. This dialectic then provides the civil-military relations context for examining postcommunist civil-military relations with respect to Hungary and Poland in Chapter IV.

⁹² Ibid., p.19. Barany points to the example of the Polish military's political involvement in the 1980s as an important exception.

B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN ATLANTIC-STYLE DEMOCRATIC (ASD) STATES

1. Introduction

To understand civil-military relations in a democracy, one must analyze in overview the concepts of *democratic political control* and *democratic military professionalism*.⁹³ According to Samuel Huntington's classic definition, a profession is characterized by its particular expertise, responsibility to society, and corporateness.⁹⁴ The military profession is unique because its expertise lies in the management of a state's instrument of violence and its members are responsible for the protection of society.⁹⁵ According to Huntington, the military professional "is not a mercenary who transfers his services wherever they are best rewarded, nor is he the temporary citizen-soldier inspired by intense momentary patriotism and duty but with no steady and permanent desire to perfect himself in the management of violence....The motivations of the officer are a technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize this craft for the benefit of society."⁹⁶ By this standard, military professionalism arose out of the

⁹³ The following theoretical discussion of democratic military professionalism and political (civilian) control of the military is based upon the authors' examination of the following sources: Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957); Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: The Free Press, 1971); S.E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New York, Praeger, 1962); Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Jacques van Doorn, *The Soldier and Social Change* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1975); Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1972); Gerke Teitler, *The Genesis of the Professional Officers' Corps* (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1977); Richard A. Gabriel, *To Serve with Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier* (London, Greenwood Press, 1982); Michel Louis Martin and Ellen Stern McCrate, eds., *The Military, Militarism, and the Polity: Essays in Honor of Morris Janowitz* (New York: The Free Press, 1984); Morris Janowitz, ed., *The New Military: Changing Patterns of Organization* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1964); Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Volume II (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), and Claude E. Welch Jr., *Civilian Control of the Military* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976).

⁹⁴ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 8.

⁹⁵ Ibid., pp. 11-14.

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 15.

emergence of the professional officer corps at the beginning of the 19th century.⁹⁷ And, the problem of civil-military relations came to light throughout Europe and North America.⁹⁸

The primary focus of civil-military relations is the relationship between the officer corps and the state.⁹⁹ For years, scholars have advanced different theories on the relationship between professionalism and political control of the military. In his classic work on civil-military relations, *The Soldier and the State*, Samuel Huntington contends that “a highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state.”¹⁰⁰ By contrast, S.E. Finer asserts that a high level of military professionalism alone does not guarantee that the military will respect civilian control. Finer argues that Huntington’s contention does not account for cases in which highly professional militaries have violated the principle of civilian control.¹⁰¹ According to Finer, the military must make a firm commitment to the “principle of the supremacy of civil power.”¹⁰²

Morris Janowitz offers another perspective. He argues that if the military profession reflects societal values, democratic political control is enhanced because the profession is not brought into conflict with society.¹⁰³ However, like Huntington,

⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 19-20. Huntington states that, prior to the 19th century, officers were generally either mercenaries or aristocrats, and did not comprise a professional officer corps.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 84.

¹⁰¹ S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2nd, enlarged edition, 1988), pp. 21-23. Finer mentions the German and Japanese cases prior to the outbreak of World War II, and the case of the French army during the Dreyfus period as examples of highly professional militaries that refused to accept civilian control.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 26.

¹⁰³ Morris Janowitz, “From Institutional to Occupational: The Need for Conceptual Continuity,” *Armed Forces and Society*, No. 4, Fall 1977, p. 53.

Janowitz recognizes that the military profession must retain certain core values to remain effective.¹⁰⁴

The balanced, equitable relationship between a free society, the military, and a democratically-elected civilian government forms the essence of democratic civil-military relations. In ordering these relations, the state must ensure democratic political (civilian) control of the armed forces to prevent the military from challenging the state's political authority and dominant values.¹⁰⁵ Huntington's emphasis on military professionalism, Finer's warning that the military must firmly accept the principle of civilian control, and Janowitz's focus on the military's relationship with society all point to important factors in maintaining democratic political (civilian) control of the military.

ASD states ensure *democratic political control* of the armed forces through the following political, social, and military arrangements and conditions: First, clear legal and constitutional provisions that define the basic relationship between the state and the armed forces;¹⁰⁶ Second, a legislature with significant power in defense and security matters, including control over the budget;¹⁰⁷ Third, a civilian ministry or department of

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Rudolf Joo, *The democratic control of armed forces: The experience of Hungary*, Chaillot Paper 23 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies - Western European Union, February, 1996), p. 5. In *The Man on Horseback*, pp. 22-23, Finer gives three reasons why the military might be inclined to challenge the state's political authority: First, "the military's consciousness of themselves as a profession may lead them to see themselves as the servants of the state rather than the government in power." In other words, if the civilian government is not performing well, the military might be inclined to take over. Second, "as specialists in their field, the military leaders may feel that they alone are competent to judge on [defense] matters." And third, the military's reluctance to be used to coerce the government's domestic opponents."¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁶ Douglas V. Johnson II and Steven Metz, *American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, April 24, 1995), p. 3; Drs. Johnson and Metz discuss the US example: "the framers of the US Constitution crafted a compromise between military effectiveness and political control. They trusted balance, the diffusion of power, and shared responsibility-- all basic elements of the new political system -- to control the military."

¹⁰⁷ The armed forces of democratic states have the unique challenge of exercising fiscal responsibility. This stems from the fact that the states' political leadership is accountable to the people for government

defense that provides civilian supervision and administrative oversight of the military; Fourth, an armed forces that, as part of its professionalism, respects the principle of civilian control; Fifth, the existence of a civil society with a mature democratic political culture that includes institutionalized democratic political behavior and a consensus on the role of the military; And Sixth, non-governmental involvement in the defense community that generates public debate on defense and security issues.¹⁰⁸

In addition, democratic political control is enhanced when the military is given a stable, legitimate, institutionalized status within the state.¹⁰⁹ To achieve this status, democratic states must order their civil-military relations to satisfy three conditions: First, the military must realize that it is not the ultimate guardian of the state's social/political order, nor is it the exclusive definer of the national interest; Second, the state must assign to the military a credible and honorable role in the defense of the state and the accomplishment of national goals; and Third, the state must prevent civilian politicians and military officers from misusing the military's monopoly of force to attain political goals or resolve partisan political disputes.¹¹⁰ In other words, the military must remain neutral and non-partisan so that the military officer can serve several successive governments.¹¹¹ In support of this notion, Samuel Finer states:

The armed forces have to serve a succession of ministers and governments, and official neutrality is a precondition of their being able to

spending. To exercise this accountability, the political leadership imposes fiscal spending limits and approves budgets for government institutions, such as the military. The political leadership weighs the needs of the military with other national priorities and fiscal constraints, then, through a democratic political process which includes open debate, approves an appropriate defense budget.

¹⁰⁸ Joo, pp. 5-7, Professor Joo describes all 6 conditions in some detail.

¹⁰⁹ Constantine P. Danopolous and Daniel Zirker eds., *Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States*, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1996). p.xiv.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. xii, xiv, and Joo, *The Democratic Control of Armed Forces*, p. 5

¹¹¹ Joo, p. 21.

do so; the party-affiliated members might be dismissed by a hostile party in power, with serious effects on discipline and training; party disputes in the force could impair its fighting efficiency by breaking up its carefully fostered *esprit de corps*.¹¹²

In fact, ASD militaries *strive* to prevent their soldiers from actively participating in political parties, as reflected by the U.S. Army Officer's Guide's warning to "avoid the political":

Be somewhat guarded in your political comments, Officers are entitled to have as firm opinions on matters of politics and national policy as any citizen. They have the same right and duty to vote and record their convictions. But it is unwise for officers to become too outspoken in approval or disapproval of either political party, or of the leading members of either party...Army officers serve in turn Democrat and Republican administrations. Soldiers must be non-political and serve each with equal zeal.¹¹³

Society's participation in the democratic process further enhances democratic political control of the armed forces. In representative democracies, politicians answer to their electorate within society.¹¹⁴ Through their political representation in the legislature and their individual right to vote, the people influence political decisions that effect the military. Thus, there is a tendency for society to impose its liberal values and norms on the military through the political process. On the other hand, the military must retain its "conservative" values and norms to be effective.¹¹⁵ ASD states attempt to reconcile this

¹¹² Finer, p. 29 - footnote number 24.

¹¹³ Lawrence P. Crocker, LTC USA ret., *The Army Officers Guide 44th Edition* (Harrisburg, Pa: Stackpole Books, 1988), p.53. ASD officers are "apolitical" in the sense that they respect democratic civilian control of the military, refrain from intervening in partisan political disputes, and do not use the military's monopoly of force to attain political goals or conduct a coup d'état. However, the authors are not suggesting that military officers (especially high-ranking ones) are totally indifferent to politics. In Johnson and Metz (pp. 9-10), former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell is quoted, "There isn't a general in Washington who isn't political, not if he's going to be successful, because that's the nature of our system."

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

¹¹⁵ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Military Mind: Conservative Realism of the Professional Military Ethic," *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, Malham M. Wakin, ed., (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,

“tension” between the military’s conservative requirements for effectiveness and society’s liberal demands by maximizing military security at the least sacrifice of other social values.¹¹⁶

The way in which a state orders its civil-military relations determines how effectively it manages this “tension.”¹¹⁷ First, fully to understand this “tension,” it is useful to examine the concept of the “citizen-soldier.” This section examines the *western* conception of the “citizen-soldier” vis a vis the “professional” through some historical, then contemporary perspectives. Throughout the discussion, the following terms and definitions apply:

Citizen-soldier - A soldier who is a citizen of the nation/state he serves, is broadly representative of society, and who serves because he feels a sense of civic responsibility to defend his country, its laws, and its dominant ideology.¹¹⁸ The previous section on NSWP civil-military relations described the ideal *communist citizen-soldier* as the “New Socialist Man.” The ideal *democratic citizen-soldier* is a soldier who meets the following criteria: First, he is broadly representative of

2nd edition, 1986), pp. 35-52. Huntington believes that to function appropriately, the military profession should be made up of officers who embrace a “conservative, realistic” ethic, which includes: a commitment to military security of the state, a pessimistic view of human nature (war is inevitable), subordination of the individual to the group, loyalty, obedience, civilian control, alienation from political activity, and the military’s instrumental function in the state.

¹¹⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 2-3.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Thus, the ideal of the citizen-soldier does not apply to professional mercenaries. See Jacques Van Doorn, “Continuity and Discontinuity in Civil-Military Relations,” *The Military, Militarism, and the Polity*, Michel Louis Martin and Ellen Stern McCrate, eds., (New York: The Free Press, 1984), p 37, Van Doorn states: “Whereas the military professional is an expert, serving the nation as a specialist, the *citizen-soldier* is an active member of the political community, who puts his efforts at the service of this community because his political rights include the right to bear arms.” In other words, for the citizen-soldier ideal to work, citizens must be willing to serve the nation out of a feeling of duty and civic responsibility.

society;¹¹⁹ Second, he serves the nation primarily out of a feeling of duty and civic responsibility; Third, he respects democratic political (civilian) control of the military and remains non-partisan; and Fourth, he retains the rights of a democratic citizen, limited only to the extent required to perform his military duties.¹²⁰

Military Professional - Narrowly defined, a military professional is a full-time military specialist (soldier). This narrow definition applies to the professional mercenaries and aristocratic officers who made up professional armies prior to the emergence of the professional officer corps between the late 18th and early 19th centuries.¹²¹ The modern military professional came to light with the emergence of the professional officer corps. Huntington defines the modern military professional as a member of the military profession -- a profession characterized by: its expertise in the management of the state's instrument of violence; a sense of corporateness and responsibility to society among its members; and a "conservative, realistic" military ethic.¹²² Modern *standing armies* consist of military professionals. In the case of the states that maintain peacetime conscription, the standing army consists of a core of professional officers and NCOs, and a rank-and-file of conscripts.

¹¹⁹ For example, the officer corps is not elitist, like the aristocratic officer corps' of the early 19th and pre-19th century European armies.

¹²⁰ Conscripts and reserve component soldiers have been referred to *traditionally* as citizen-soldiers, but the professional soldiers of ASD armed forces also embody the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier.

¹²¹ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 19-39.

¹²² Ibid., pp. 8-18 and pp. 59-79. On page 79, Huntington summarizes the military ethic as being both "realistic and conservative."

Militia - a military unit comprised of non-professional citizen-soldiers, called up by their government for military service in a time of emergency.¹²³

Conscription (or draft) - the process by which a government levies citizens for military service, normally for a given period of time.

Conscript - a citizen who has been conscripted to serve in the military.¹²⁴

2. The Western Conception of the Citizen-Soldier

Citizen-soldiers date back to Antiquity, when great citizen-armies were used to fight the early wars of the Greek, Persian, and Roman empires. These states conscripted male citizens to serve as needed for a single military action.¹²⁵ As war became more frequent, some citizen-soldiers, enticed by the prospect of receiving booty and other material incentives, served beyond their commitment and became full-time professional soldiers.¹²⁶ Eventually, the superior discipline and combat effectiveness of professional soldiers, coupled with a perpetual state of war, led to the formation of professional armies.¹²⁷ For example, during the Second Punic War, the Roman army gradually evolved from a citizen-army into the highly disciplined professional army that defeated

¹²³ Militias include reserve units, such as those of the US Reserves and National Guard. For a discussion, see Allan R. Millett, "The Constitution and the Citizen-Soldier," in Kohn, pp. 104-115.

¹²⁴ Traditionally, conscripts have been considered citizen-soldiers. However, due to a declining sense of civic responsibility in liberal democratic societies, ASD peacetime conscripts have not always embodied the ideal of the citizen-soldier. This is due to the fact that many served only because the state compelled them to do so, rather than out of a sense of civic responsibility to serve the nation. According to Eliot Cohen, in *Citizens and Soldiers*, p. 136, People of western democracies typically reject the idea of being compelled by the state to serve in the military during *peacetime*. In fact, this contributed to the decision by some ASD states to implement the peacetime All-Volunteer Force. (For this last point, see Cohen, p. 166.)

¹²⁵ Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War: Within the Framework of Political History*, Volume 1, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975), translated from German by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr., original title: *Gesichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte*, p. 144.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 417.

¹²⁷ Ibid., pp. 149-150.

Hannibal.¹²⁸ In fact, the experience of the Second Punic War and the subsequent expansion of perennial military commitments prompted Rome to maintain a standing army of professional soldiers, despite the Republic's constitutional dictum of universal military service.¹²⁹ Operationalized through conscription, the egalitarian principle of universal military service required the Republic to distribute the burden of military service among all eligible citizens.¹³⁰ The expansion of the Roman Empire and simultaneous decline in the civic and military virtues of Roman society undermined the conscription process.¹³¹ The expanding population and geographical breadth of the empire, along with the Roman people's growing prosperity and their apathy toward fulfilling civic and military duties, made universal conscription difficult to enforce.¹³² The breakdown of the conscription system forced Rome to rely more heavily on mercenaries, thus contributing to the trend toward professionalization of the army.¹³³ In addition, as Rome's military commitments broadened, soldiers were needed for extended periods to fight in such places as Spain, Asia, Africa, and the Alps.¹³⁴ Only professional soldiers, who had no other form of livelihood, could meet these commitments on a regular basis.¹³⁵ Moreover, the existence of professionally-trained warriors to lead

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 414.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 412.

¹³⁰ R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History*, 4th ed. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), p. 105.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 106.

¹³² Hans Delbrueck, *History of the Art of War*, p. 417. Roman men found excuses to not perform their military service. "Substitution" was also common -- whereby men would compensate someone else (a mercenary) to serve in their place. This led to an increase in the proportion of "professionals" in the Roman army.

¹³³ Ibid. Professionalization in this sense means an increase in the proportion of professionals (or mercenaries). These were professionals in the narrow sense -- not the true military professional of Samuel Huntington, which did not emerge until the 19th century.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 413.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

citizen-soldiers in battle enhanced the effectiveness of the Roman army.¹³⁶ Thus, from a military perspective, a professional army was desirable, despite the fact that its existence contradicted the egalitarian principle of universal military service.¹³⁷ The contradiction between Rome's egalitarian principles and the existence of its standing army of "professionals" provides an early example of the kinds of tensions that continue to exist in democratic states with professional militaries.¹³⁸

After the fall of the Roman empire, a trend toward feudalism in Western Europe led to a different kind of military system -- a system that prevailed throughout most of the Middle Ages. In this medieval system, each land-owning noble maintained a small element of cavalry soldiers for the defense of his property. By order of the King, the land-owning noble would contribute his personal cavalry to serve in the royal army for a given period each year -- usually forty days. The royal army had no common loyalty to king and nation, no cohesiveness based upon a common organization and integrated training, and no effective unity of command. The one common social force was their strong devotion to Christendom, which served as the basis for a moral bond of knightly honor.¹³⁹

As the agricultural economy of medieval society yielded to the rapid expansion of money-based economies, the morally-grounded qualities of the feudal armies capitulated to the self-serving interests of mercenaries.¹⁴⁰ In the Italian city-states, where the spread

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid., p. 418.

¹³⁸ Ibid. Of course, most of the "professionals" in the ancient Roman empire were mercenaries.

¹³⁹ R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, pp. 264-265.

¹⁴⁰ Felix Gilbert, "Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War," *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Peter Paret, ed., (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 13.

of Christianity had pacified society, the city-state governments relied entirely on mercenaries for military service.¹⁴¹ It was during this period, in the early 16th century, that Machiavelli demanded the development of a militia system in the city-state of Florence. He blamed Italy's reliance on mercenaries for its decline as a world power, describing mercenaries as "disunited, ambitious, without discipline, disloyal, overbearing among friends, cowardly among enemies...."¹⁴² Machiavelli insisted that only a conscript militia, comprised of inhabitants of the state, would have the necessary foundation to develop the confidence and discipline for success in war.¹⁴³ In addition, Machiavelli argued that the state should create the conditions in society necessary to inspire the will of its citizens to fight and die for their government. He observed that "there is a great difference between an army that is well content and fights for its own reputation and one that is ill disposed and has to fight only for the interests of others."¹⁴⁴ Such insights into the nature of the relationship between the state, society, and the military are equally relevant in the democratic civil-military relations of today.

For the next two centuries, rulers continued to rely on mercenary armies rather than conscript militias.¹⁴⁵ Under absolutism, the dominant form of government during this period, rulers relied on standing armies of mercenaries to expand their territory by forcing smaller neighbors or estates to submit to their control.¹⁴⁶ Standing armies continued to predominate until the latter part of the 18th century, when conscript militias

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 26.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 29.

emerged as a viable alternative to the standing army.¹⁴⁷ In fact, the ideological appeal of conscript militias led the framers of the US Constitution to adopt the militia system in the fledgling American Democracy.

3. Modern Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in Atlantic-style Democratic (ASD) States

Prior to the American Revolution, the militias of the English North American colonies served primarily as a recruiting base for the regular professional forces, which conducted most of the fighting.¹⁴⁸ During the American Revolution, colonial militias actually fought as units and directly contributed to American victory, along with the regulars. The strong performance of the colonial militias during the revolution pacified opponents of the militia system, including General George Washington, who had favored a standing professional army.¹⁴⁹ The war record of the militias helped to convince the framers of the Constitution--who were predisposed to the idea of a militia system because of its ideological appeal--to adopt the militia system to meet the nation's military requirements.¹⁵⁰ One proponent of the militia system, Thomas Jefferson, so strongly favored the militia concept that he criticized the constitution's omission of "protection against standing armies."¹⁵¹

Writing in the late 18th century, Jefferson was unable to foresee how advances in technology and changes in societal values engendered by the Industrial Revolution would

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹⁴⁸ Allan R. Millett, "The Constitution and the Citizen-Soldier," *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989*, Richard H. Kohn, ed., (New York: New York University Press, 1991), pp. 98-99.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ Richard H. Kohn, "The Constitution and National Security," *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989*, p. 86.

strain the militia system. Jefferson, like the framers of the constitution, cared about the preservation of democratic ideals. Until proven otherwise, the militia system seemed appropriate and adequate for meeting the military requirements of the new nation-state.

The US Army's dismal performance in the War of 1812 proved that the militia system could not adequately meet America's military needs. In 1821, a reform bill created a permanent professional core in the US Army in an effort to prevent a recurrence of the debacle of 1812.¹⁵² By the start of the Civil War, the US militia system had largely disintegrated as a result of the societal and technological changes stimulated by the Industrial Revolution. The greater specialization of skill required by industry led to the formation of professional workingmen's associations, which applied political pressure on states to relieve skilled workers from their military obligation. Church-based peace societies and local political coalitions also applied political pressure on states to exempt their members or constituents from military service. The army, too, had its own reasons for opposing the militia system. First, the military required more full-time professionals to perform the specialty skills required by advances in military technology. And second, numerous professional army officers, like General George B. McClellan, developed a feeling of ambivalence toward citizen-soldiers due to the inconsistent performance of militia units during the Civil War.¹⁵³

Thus, less than one hundred years after the signing of the constitution, the U.S. adopted a standing army. Yet, in spite of the concern of Thomas Jefferson and others that

¹⁵² Edward Hagerman, *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command*, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 32.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 38.

a standing army posed a threat to the nation, the professional armed forces of the United States have never threatened the constitution and have remained loyal to the principle of democratic civilian control.¹⁵⁴ The peaceful demobilization of Union troops after the conclusion of the Civil War and the assassination of President Lincoln demonstrated a firm commitment to the principle of civilian control.¹⁵⁵ Similarly, President Truman's relief of General MacArthur during the Korean War--an action that MacArthur did not challenge, demonstrated respect for civilian authority, and also underscored the power of the President as commander-in-chief.¹⁵⁶

In addition to respect for civilian authority, a professional military must maintain a good relationship with society in order to exist peaceably in a democracy. The importance of the military's relationship with society is expressed in political philosopher Ralph Barton Perry's 1921 warning that "the American military system must be popular."¹⁵⁷ The "tension" between the professional armed forces and democracy arises from the military's need to be effective, while, at the same time, maintaining the popular support of a liberal democratic society. In order to be effective, the military must retain its ethos -- a set of conservative values and norms necessary for discipline, morale, and obedience. On the other hand, the military must reflect liberal values and norms of society in order to maintain popular support in a liberal democratic society. Thus, ASD states must strike a balance between the needs of a conservative military and the demands

¹⁵⁴ Richard H. Kohn, "The Constitution and National Security," p. 87.

¹⁵⁵ Harold M. Hyman, "Ulysses Grant I, Emperor of America?," *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989*, p. 180.

¹⁵⁶ Roy K. Flint, "The Truman-MacArthur Conflict: Dilemmas of Civil-Military Relations in the Nuclear Age," *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989*, p. 225.

¹⁵⁷ Cohen, p. 188 - cited from Ralph Barton Perry's notable work *The Free Man and the Soldier*, (1916).

of a liberal society in order to minimize the “tension” between the armed forces and democratic society. Politicians and military leaders must weigh contemporary societal norms and values against the requirements for military effectiveness to manage this “tension.”

Samuel Huntington states that the goal of democratic civil-military relations is to manage this “tension” in the most effective way possible. According to Huntington, “The ordering of [a state’s] civil-military relations...is basic to a nation’s military security policy. The objective of this policy on the institutional level is to develop a system of civil-military relations which will maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other social values.”¹⁵⁸ Most western democracies have developed this system of civil-military relations, and a military tradition that supports it, through the course of an extended and unbroken national history.¹⁵⁹ By contrast, the Federal Republic of Germany, successor state of the Third Reich whose army was abolished after World War II, developed its current system of civil-military relations through the concerted effort of scholars, military officers, and policymakers from West Germany and other western states during the 1950s.¹⁶⁰

The founders of the Bundeswehr wanted to create a military that consisted of “citizens in uniform.”¹⁶¹ One of the founders, Count Wolf von Baudissin, envisioned the new West German soldier as “a free person, a good citizen, and an effective soldier.”¹⁶²

¹⁵⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 2.

¹⁵⁹ Mark E. Victorson, Colonel, U.S. Army, *Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States*, p. 4.

¹⁶⁰ Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 88-120.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 98.

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 128.

According to Baudissin, the new traditional values for the Bundeswehr should be “a desire for peace, humanity, a chivalrous attitude, loyalty, and above all, a sense of moral responsibility for one’s fellow man.”¹⁶³ He compared the new German soldier to the original image of the western soldier: “the knight who also embodied the values of the Christian tradition.”¹⁶⁴ In order to operationalize the “citizen in uniform ideal” in the new armed forces, Baudissin and his several colleagues developed *Innere Fuehrung*, a modern leadership style that enables soldiers to carry out the mission while assuring their rights as citizens.¹⁶⁵ The fact that this leadership style applies to German officers and NCOs alike is clearly revealed in a statement made in 1950 to German citizens by national security adviser, Theodor Blank, who said: “Whoever is unable as an officer, NCO, or reserve officer to impart his military skills and knowledge to recruits without treating them as free citizens will have no place with us.”¹⁶⁶ As the German conception of *democratic military professionalism*, *Innere Fuehrung* enables the Bundeswehr to retain the popular acceptance of Germany’s contemporary liberal democratic society while performing its military functions, even after 1990.

Recently, the East German armed forces (NVA) faced a similar challenge after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The demise of the communist system created a situation in which NVA officers and NCOs, accustomed to relying on the authority of the Party and the state, were suddenly challenged with trying to maintain an effective military while

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 154.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 155.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 45.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 82.

simultaneously meeting the approval of a democratizing society.¹⁶⁷ As a result, NVA officers and NCOs had difficulty in maintaining discipline among their soldiers.¹⁶⁸ The NVA leaders were used to Soviet-style discipline, obedience and morale.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, like West German society in the 1950s, the East German population had learned to distrust the military.¹⁷⁰ Thus, as part of German reunification, the Bundeswehr faced the dual challenge of: First, convincing the East Germans that the armed forces are legitimate; and Second, teaching a new style of professionalism to the former NVA officers and NCOs.¹⁷¹ The Bundeswehr met these challenges by educating the former NVA officers and NCOs on the tenets of *Innere Fuehrung*.¹⁷² *Innere Fuehrung*'s role in German reunification provides a strong precedent for instituting democratic forms of military professionalism in the other post-communist armed forces of the region. Democratic states require democratic forms of military professionalism so that the military can perform its role while meeting the demands of democratic society. And, as noted in the introduction to this thesis, *democratic military professionalism* is the form of military professionalism that allows the professional armed forces of a democracy to be effective while, at the same time, reflecting democratic principles, norms, and values. Military professionals in a democracy are experts in their field who respect civilian control of the military, embody the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier, who are accountable to society and maintain the unique “military ethic.”

¹⁶⁷ Mark E. Victorson, *Mission in the East*, pp. 20-21; also Joerg Schoenbohm, *Two Armies and One Fatherland: the end of the National Volksarmee* (Providence, Rhode Island: Berghahn Books, 1996).

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 25-26.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² Ibid.

Other ASD militaries have institutionalized similar styles of democratic military professionalism to deal with the “tension” between the military and civil society. Like the Republic of Germany, these states subscribe to the principle that the soldier should retain the rights of a citizen, narrowed only as necessary for military effectiveness.¹⁷³ However, the *degree* to which soldiers rights are narrowed varies among the ASD armed forces. Each state determines the scope of soldiers’ rights by balancing the needs of its military with the demands of its society. For example, the conservative American society of the 1940s and 1950s was far more tolerant of strict disciplinary practices in the armed forces than the liberal society of the 1960s and beyond.

The military requires a certain narrowing of soldiers’ rights in order to maintain discipline, obedience, and morale -- indicators of effectiveness and reliability, among servicemembers. Variations in levels of discipline, morale, and obedience among armed forces can be traced often to particulars surrounding the state’s civil-military relations. The degree to which the military accommodates values and norms of liberal society can impact military effectiveness.¹⁷⁴ For example, some question the effectiveness of the Bundeswehr, which accommodates more of civil society’s norms and values than other ASD militaries.¹⁷⁵

One must realize that each state faces its own unique political, social, and military circumstances which require a different solution to the military’s relationship with civil society. For example, when West Germany organized the Bundeswehr,

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁷⁴ In other words, less “narrowing” of the soldiers rights.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 33.

German citizens were filled with anxieties about the military profession, which they associated with the political and social abuses of the past.¹⁷⁶ Theodor Blank described the task of constructing the new West German army: “the young German democracy, though still in the Nazi shadow, must create new soldiers without having yet won the full faith of the West German people.”¹⁷⁷ German society which, only after considerable convincing, accepted the ideal of the “German citizens in uniform,” would have been reluctant to accept any further narrowing of a soldier’s rights, regardless of its benefit to military effectiveness.¹⁷⁸

Through a continuous process of democratic political debate, each ASD state determines the degree to which the rights of soldiers will be narrowed from their rights as citizens. The two extremes in the debate are well represented by Alexis De Tocqueville on the one hand, and political scientist T.R. Fehrenback on the other. De Tocqueville, who opposed the idea of standing armies, believed in the citizen-soldier in its purest form -- a soldier who served as a citizen, and retained all of the rights of a citizen.¹⁷⁹ In contrast, T.R. Fehrenback favored a wholly professional military, reflected in his statement that “by the very nature of its mission, the military must maintain a hard and illiberal view of life and the world. Society’s purpose is to live; the military’s is to stand ready, if need be, to die.”¹⁸⁰ Thus, one side of the debate (the liberal side) is focused on the preservation of democratic principles and the other side of the debate is focused on

¹⁷⁶ Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, pp. 6-7.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 81.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1945), vol. II, book III, p. 272 (original publication: New York: Langley, 1840).

¹⁸⁰ Mark E. Victorson, *Mission in the East*, p. 6.

the requirements for military effectiveness (the conservative side).¹⁸¹ This debate forms the crux of the problem of civil-military relations in a democracy.¹⁸²

The debate over the need for conscription flows from the larger problem of democratic civil-military relations. The rise of nationalism and the spread of democracy in Europe during the late 18th and early 19th centuries produced the concept of the “nation in arms.”¹⁸³ This concept led to the development of the “national army,” with a rank and file conscripted in accordance with a system of universal service.¹⁸⁴ The development of the “national army” coincided with the professionalization of the officer corps.¹⁸⁵ The mass national armies that emerged were much larger than the previous professional armies and required far more capable and experienced leadership than had been provided by the old aristocratic officer corps.¹⁸⁶ Prussia, the first state to professionalize its officer corps, was also the first state to adopt a permanent system of universal service.¹⁸⁷ After Prussia’s victory over France in 1870, the French professionalized their officer corps and introduced a permanent system of conscription as

¹⁸¹ The liberal and conservative viewpoints expressed here reflect Huntington’s *societal imperative*, in which social forces and ideologies are dominant within the society; and the *functional imperative*, in which the threat to society’s security is dominant. See Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 2-3.

¹⁸² Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 2.

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 37.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., Universal service meant that all eligible citizens were conscripted for a brief period of years.

¹⁸⁵ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 37-39. According to Huntington, the professionalization of the officer corps included the following steps: 1) the elimination of aristocratic prerequisites for entry; 2) the requiring of a basic level of professional training and competence; 3) the requiring of a minimum general education and the provision of this education in institutions not operated by the military.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 38. Prior to the professionalization of the officer corps and the development of “mass” national armies, the “amateur” *aristocratic* officers relied on the experienced regular troops who made up the rank-and-file of much smaller armies. The mass armies that emerged in the 19th century were made up largely of inexperienced conscripts who required the superior leadership that only a *professional* corps of officers could provide. As a result, demonstrated potential replaced the prerequisite of aristocrat status for entry into the officer corps.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. Prussia abolished class restriction on entry into the officer corps in 1808 and introduced permanent universal service in 1814. “Permanent” universal service requires *peacetime and wartime* conscription.

well.¹⁸⁸ Britain and the US, due in part to their geographical security, did not introduce peace-time conscription until the 20th century.¹⁸⁹

4. Conscription

Today, Germany and France continue to maintain conscription for their rank and file, while Britain and the United States rely on all-volunteer forces (AVF).¹⁹⁰ The collapse of the British empire and corresponding force reductions led to the decision to transition to an AVF in Britain.¹⁹¹ In the United States, the decision to institute an AVF came in response to popular discontent with the Vietnam War and the draft.¹⁹² Remarkably, according to Morris Janowitz, the citizen-soldier ideal continues to function in the American all-volunteer force despite the social upheaval of the 1960s and 70s.¹⁹³ Janowitz states that the citizen-soldier ideal remains viable in the AVF for three reasons. First, a steady flow of people from a broad cross-section of society into and out of the military continues in the all-volunteer force. Second, despite increased salaries and material gratification, there has been no significant trace of “mercenarisation.” And third, service to the constitution and the nation remain a dominant aspect of career motivation.¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ France is currently considering an all-volunteer force. Britain returned to an all-volunteer force beginning in 1957 (as a result of the 1957 British Defence White Paper) and the US returned to an all-volunteer force in 1973 (as a result of the Gates Commission report issued in February, 1970) See Eliot Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers*, pp. 166-171.

¹⁹¹ Cohen, p. 171.

¹⁹² Cohen, p. 166.

¹⁹³ Morris Janowitz, “The Citizen-Soldier and National Service,” *Air University Review* 31 (November-December 1979), pp. 2-16.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

Despite the success of the all-volunteer force, the debate over the pros and cons of conscription continues. Advocates of conscription have pointed to numerous benefits, to include: the inculcation of moral and ethical values, the opportunity for education and training, and the development of maturity in young people.¹⁹⁵ In *Citizens and Soldiers*, Eliot Cohen argues that US and British history has proven that “a patriotic and well-educated citizenry can flourish without military service;” and that “the sole purpose of military training or compulsory service must be the strengthening of the armed forces.... When the governments of liberal states stray into other purposes they find themselves subjected to furious criticism.”¹⁹⁶ In other words, unless the state’s military requirements warrant conscription, as in the case of war, Cohen believes that a liberal society will not support it. Cohen further states that “The proof of this contention, namely, that compulsory military service is fundamentally incompatible with, or at least antagonistic to, liberal doctrine is borne out by the history of conscription in the liberal Anglo-American states, those states most influenced by the views of Hobbes and Locke.”¹⁹⁷

In democracies, the absence of the political will to compel citizens to participate in peacetime military service, combined with the state’s need to have a capable military has induced ASD states to rely on professional forces for the bulk of their military commitments. Like Roman society after 50 BC, ASD societies do not widely reflect the civic virtues and martial spirit required to support a system of universal service. Cohen summarizes the problem: “The free man does not wish to become a soldier; the

¹⁹⁵ Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers*, pp. 128-129.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 132.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 136.

democratic man abhors unequal burdens; the military man would like to ignore their claims, but cannot. It is the task of the statesman to reconcile the three....”¹⁹⁸ The ASD system of civil-military relations provides a framework for reconciling the competing interests of the state, the military, and society. This system of civil-military relations, supported by law and traditions, ensures civilian control of the military and democratic accountability of the military to society.¹⁹⁹

The unique way that ASD states order their civil-military relations enables them to maintain the democratic “citizen-soldier ideal” in their professional armed forces. Citizens who enter the militaries of liberal democratic states bring the values and norms of society into the military with them. The freedoms and rights provided in democratic societies foster an environment in which individuals are allowed to display initiative, originality, and creativity in the conduct of their daily lives. Upon entering the armed forces, the citizen discovers that the military encourages its soldiers to display the same kinds of traits in the performance of their duties.²⁰⁰ Initiative, originality, and creativity are traits that ASD militaries expect their leaders to demonstrate in order to win on the battlefield.

To promote these traits, ASD militaries foster a command climate that is consistent with the environment that Clausewitz observed as conducive to success in battle and war. Clausewitz contends that military commanders and their subordinates are

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 188.

¹⁹⁹ Even covert operations are made accountable through a system of congressional oversight mandated by law; J. Kenneth McDonald, “Secrecy, Accountability, and the CIA,” in *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989*, Richard H. Kohn, ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1991), p. 399.

²⁰⁰ Even though soldiers are encouraged to exercise these traits, they do it within the context of a military environment that narrows the degree to which those traits can be exercised.

better able to realize their intellectual and psychological potential, and thus, display the “genius” necessary to overcome the inevitable frictions of war, in a command climate which encourages initiative, originality, and creativity, and allows leaders at all levels of command to freely exercise autonomy in decision making.²⁰¹ Through the medium of “genius,” Clausewitz examined the qualities of the commander, the army, and society that help to overcome the potentially devastating effects of friction.²⁰² Among these qualities are the intellectual and psychological strengths of the commander; the morale and esprit of the army; and the martial traits of society as reflected in its soldiers.²⁰³

De Tocqueville recognized the relationship between the traits of society and the army, noting that “the spirit that [men of democracies] bring to commerce and manufactures;...[is the same spirit that] carried with them to the field of battle, induces them willingly to expose their lives in order to secure in a moment the rewards of victory.”²⁰⁴ The modern professional armed forces of the ASD states aim to foster this same spirit and achieve a high level of professionalism in their ranks by illiciting the willing obedience of soldiers through styles of leadership and discipline that offer the best chance for each soldier to realize his utmost potential and thereby display the “genius” necessary to overcome the frictions of war. Thus, by practicing a form of military professionalism that reflects certain democratic societal values, the ASD armed forces

²⁰¹ Peter Paret, “Clausewitz,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Peter Paret ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). p.186-216. Clausewitz defines “friction” as the uncertainties, difficulties, and unforeseen events, and their effect on morale, decision-making, and mission execution

²⁰² Ibid., p. 203. Clausewitz discusses “Genius” in *On War*, Book one, Chapter 3.

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴ Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Volume II, p. 278.

strive to achieve a “Clausewitzian” command climate that will help them to be more effective in war.

ASD militaries maintain the Clausewitzian command climate that contributes to military effectiveness by relying on a form of military professionalism that is unique to democratic societies. Ideally, democratic military professionalism preserves the conservative military ethos and ensures that fundamental values and norms of the democratic society are reflected in the military, thus, minimizing the “tension” between civil society and the armed forces. In order to fully understand how democratic military professionalism helps to minimize the “tension” in democratic civil-military relations, one must examine each foundation of military professionalism.

The following chapter discusses each of the primary and secondary foundations of military professionalism with respect to ASD and NSWP armed forces. It is important to note how the disparate civil-military relations and citizen-soldier concepts of the Soviet-style communist system and atlantic-style democratic system described in the present chapter is reflected in the equally disparate forms of military professionalism described in the next chapter.

III. MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM IN ASD AND NSWP STATES

A. INTRODUCTION

Chapter II described the nature of communist civil-military relations in the NSWP and democratic civil-military relations in the ASD. This chapter describes military professionalism in the NSWP and in the ASD by examining three “primary foundations” of military professionalism: (1) *authority*; (2) *leadership*; (3) *discipline, morale, and obedience* and two “secondary foundations” of military professionalism: (1) *recruitment and retention*; and (2) *career development*. Defining military professionalism in this way provides a greater level of detail that better enables one to compare military professionalism in ASD states with military professionalism in the NSWP states. Comprehending the differences in military professionalism will help the members of Eastern European militaries to develop a new form of military professionalism to coincide with the reform of their formal civil-military relations. By developing democratic military professionalism, post-communist militaries can be effective instruments of national security in a democracy.

This chapter is divided into two parts, each of which is subdivided into two sections. The first part describes the three primary foundations of military professionalism with respect to the ASD and the NSWP. The second part describes the two secondary foundations of military professionalism with respect to ASD and NSWP states. Then, using the foundations discussed in this chapter as a framework for analysis,

chapter IV examines the current status of military professionalism in Hungary and Poland.

Authors' note: The description of the foundations of military professionalism presented in this chapter represent the “ideal” model of democratic military professionalism that ASD states strive to achieve today, as well as the “ideal” model of communist military professionalism that the NSWP attempted to attain in the years after Stalin and before the introduction of Gorbachev’s reforms in the late 1980’s.²⁰⁵

In the case of ASD militaries, this chapter offers not only an “ideal” but a “contemporary” model of military professionalism. The model reflects the contemporary ideal of democratic military professionalism so that the model can be used as a guide for post-communist military reform. History demonstrates that the ideal model of military professionalism evolves as democratic society changes. For example, the ideal model of military professionalism in the 1930’s differs from the ideal model today. The process of evolution continues as contemporary societal values and military requirements shape the current form of democratic civil-military relations and democratic military professionalism in each ASD state.²⁰⁶ The authors’ understand this process and attempt to explain the origin and evolution of each aspect of contemporary democratic military professionalism presented in this chapter.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵ The author’s realize that there are exceptions to every “ideal” definition and example presented in the discussions of the foundations of military professionalism. Throughout this chapter, the authors’ footnote examples that contradict the stated ideals.

²⁰⁶ For example, in the U.S. the integration of African-Americans and the introduction of women into combat roles demonstrates how changes in societal values force changes in the military. See the works of Charles Moskos.

²⁰⁷ It is important to use the contemporary “ideal” model of democratic military professionalism because the Eastern European states who desire NATO membership look to current models of civil-military relations and military professionalism used by US and NATO countries for guidance. States like Hungary

The description of communist military professionalism is based on the “ideal” model that the Soviets achieved on a “functional,” but not “attitudinal,” level in the armed forces of Eastern Europe, as discussed in chapter II. Despite the reforms initiated during the Gorbachev years and continued in the post-communist period, the legacy of the ideal communist model of military professionalism remains in the militaries of Eastern Europe.²⁰⁸

In addition, the authors’ use a dialectic approach to describe the ideal models of military professionalism. Dialectics help one to clearly identify the major characteristics of each form of military professionalism in order to provide a useful framework for analyzing the prospects of democratic military reform in Eastern Europe.

B. PRIMARY FOUNDATIONS OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

1. The Armed Forces of Atlantic-Style Democratic (ASD) States

a. Authority

To understand the differences in military professionalism in the ASD and the NSWP states at a fundamental level, one must first review basic organizational theory, focusing on how such professional, bureaucratic organizations as the state and the military organize systems of authority. According to the political theorist Max Weber, the structures of authority “designate the formal and informal patterns in which power is distributed and organized with regard to the authoritative making and implementing of

and Poland are interested in developing a form of military professionalism that is congruent with contemporary models of professionalism in NATO countries.

²⁰⁸ Based on the authors’ interviews with officers in the Hungarian and Polish armed forces in August, 1996.

decisions--the roles and relationships through which authority is distributed and exercised.”²⁰⁹

Weber advocated a “legal-rational form” of authority for bureaucratic organizations such as the modern armed forces. Based on the legally established impersonal order, the legal-rational form of authority “is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability.”²¹⁰ In contrast, other theorists defined authority in the context of the human-relations movement that began in the 1930’s.²¹¹ Theorist Robert Peabody combined the human-relations dimension with Weber’s concept of legal-rational authority to develop a comprehensive theory which classified authority into two types: *formal authority* and *functional authority*.²¹² Formal authority, which Peabody subdivides into authority of legitimacy and authority of position, is the impersonal legal-rational form of authority described by Weber. Functional authority, subdivided into authority of competence and authority of person, is the additional authority derived from the competence and leadership qualities displayed by an individual who possesses formal authority.²¹³ This thesis examines authority, as an element of military professionalism, in accordance with Peabody’s categories.

(1) Formal Authority - Authority of Legitimacy and Authority of Position. Unlike the related concepts of power and influence, the concept of authority has

²⁰⁹ Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 22.

²¹⁰ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 337.

²¹¹ Robert L. Peabody, *Organizational Authority* (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), pp. 23-24.

²¹² Ibid., pp. 117-119.

²¹³ Ibid., pp. 121-131.

implicit in it the notion of *legitimacy*.²¹⁴ For example, the authority inherent in an employee-employer relationship evolved out of the relationship between master and servant, and is predicated on the concept that those in authority (the master) have the right to demand obedience, and those subject to authority (the servant) have the duty to obey.²¹⁵ The type of authority that the master holds over the servant is based on the kind of claim to legitimacy made by the master.²¹⁶

Like the master in the master-servant relationship, the government in the government-society relationship acquires its legitimacy through processes that facilitate the acceptance of authority and generalized deference to authority by the individuals in the social group affected by that authority.²¹⁷ Civil-military relations theorist Amos Perlmutter explains why it is important for governments to acquire legitimacy:

Legitimacy is the foundation of governmental power. It is a source of support, exercised universally in modern times by rational and complex bureaucratic organizations. The regime that elicits obedience is an organization that regulates its authority relationships, that is the system which causes the people to accept the regime...The inculcation of the sense of legitimacy, along with the extension of its acceptance, is the most significant function of the regime.²¹⁸

The authority exercised by the governments in Atlantic style democracies is based on the legal-rational model, where the civilian organs of government, the military, and society display obedience to legally established

²¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 119-121.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, p. 22.

constitutions. ASD governments enjoy social approval and general deference to their authority because they function within the framework of a democratic system, where leaders are elected by the people, and theoretically, government exists to “serve the people.”²¹⁹ In democracies, there exists a political-social “contract” between the people and their government, such that the people empower the government with the authority of legitimacy.²²⁰ This “contract” is codified in constitutional provisions and operationalized through the processes of “political pluralism.”²²¹

In a democracy, legal-rational authority is neither legal nor legitimate without the willing deference of the people toward their government’s authority.²²² A democratic government gains the deference of its people by ensuring that it is representative of the people and it respects human and individual rights. By contrast, the communist governments of Eastern Europe gained the deference of their people by mechanisms of authoritarian control that sacrificed human and individual rights in order to ensure the power of the party, the state, and Soviet hegemony.²²³

In addition, Huntington notes that western democratic systems depend much less than authoritarian regimes on the government’s “performance” for

²¹⁹ The US Constitution provides a good example of this. See Kohn, p. 1-94.

²²⁰ Based on the works of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. See Locke’s *Second Treatise of Government*, Rousseau’s *The Social Contract*, and Kant *The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* for a discussion on the contract tradition.

²²¹ Ibid. Political pluralism is “a condition for the government to be representative of the diversity of public opinion.” It requires: the holding of free elections at regular intervals and in conditions of complete openness; the ability of citizens to establish political parties freely; the ability of the parties to campaign without fear of intimidation. (This definition was extracted from NATO Draft General Report “Democratization in Eastern Europe: An Interim Assessment,” May, 1994)

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Ibid.

legitimacy.²²⁴ In Atlantic-style democratic systems, Huntington explains, “performance failure is blamed on the incumbents rather than the system, and the ouster and replacement of the incumbents [through the electoral process] leads to a renewal of the system.”²²⁵ The ability to retain legitimacy through this renewal process provides the governments of western democratic systems with “procedural legitimacy.”²²⁶ Thus, the legitimacy of government authority in ASD states does not solely hinge on the “performance” of the particular political figure or party in power. Even if those in power fail to live up to society’s expectations, the government’s authority remains legitimate by virtue of the “procedural legitimacy” of the democratic system.²²⁷ In other words, the processes and procedures of the democratic political system, which includes all of the elements of political pluralism, allows the government to enjoy the authority of legitimacy, apart from the ability or inability of the persons in power to solve the country’s problems.²²⁸

Legitimacy is a condition of validity and acceptance enjoyed by systems of authority.²²⁹ In addition, legitimacy is a system of normative domination that ensures support for the government.²³⁰ The legitimacy of government institutions, such as the military, depends on the legitimacy of the government itself. ASD militaries enjoy the authority of legitimacy because they serve a legitimate civilian government; and

²²⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, 1991), p. 259. Huntington includes communist regimes among the authoritarian regimes with respect to this assertion.

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 306.

²²⁶ Ibid., pp. 258-259.

²²⁷ Ibid. Of course, this is assuming that those in power abide by the law and constitution.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Perlmutter, p. 23.

²³⁰ Ibid., p. 23.

operate within the legally-established framework of a constitution, defense act, service act, and military justice system that embody democratic values and the principle of democratic civilian political control.²³¹

Once a government establishes its legitimate right to rule, it must build structures of authority within government institutions to execute its power. Like other government institutions, the military is a bureaucracy consisting of an impersonal hierarchy of ranks and positions that serve to enforce obedience and ensure compliance among its members.²³² This hierarchy of “position authority” in government institutions facilitates the distribution of state power.

The *authority of position* is the power of control inherent in rank or office, not in the particular person who holds that rank or office.²³³ The laws of the state assign authority to the ranks or offices of government institutions such as the military. ASD militaries, like all military organizations distribute authority through an impersonal structure of position and rank to facilitate control at all levels of command. However, ASD militaries *widen* the scope of positional authority by allowing leaders to exercise *autonomy* in decision making. In addition, ASD militaries *extend* the impersonal positional structure of authority by relying on a professional corps of non-commissioned officers (NCOs).

Command and control in the armed forces of the ASD is predicated on the concept of trust between leaders and subordinates. Trust removes barriers to

²³¹ Ulrich, pp. 77-94.

²³² Perlmutter, p. 23.

²³³ Peabody, p. 121. The authors use “positional authority” and “the authority of person” interchangeably.

innovation, initiative, and independent thought, and allows officers at the lowest level in the chain of command to exercise *autonomy* in decision making. With trust as a guiding principle, ASD militaries use a system of command which gives subordinate leaders autonomy in accomplishing assigned missions. Autonomy is operationalized through the use of “*mission-type orders*”—orders which specify *what* tasks to accomplish, but not *how* to accomplish them.²³⁴ For example, a platoon leader is given an order that identifies his objective, but does not specify how he is to task organize his platoon, conduct movement, and assault the objective.

The concept of mission-type orders evolved from *Auftragstaktik*, the decentralized command system developed by the German army in the nineteenth century to give individual commanders a large degree of independence.²³⁵ First articulated clearly as a doctrine by Moltke and inspired by Clausewitz, *Auftragstaktik* allowed soldiers to demonstrate flexibility in all aspects of war so they could avoid being overwhelmed by unforeseen circumstances—the imponderables that create friction in warfare.²³⁶ *Auftragstaktik* constituted a key element the German army’s success in the Franco-Prussian War and the Second World War. Remarks by Wehrmacht General Herman Balck illuminate the importance of *Auftragstaktik* to the German Army:

Generally, the German higher commander rarely or never reproached their subordinates unless they made a terrible blunder. They were fostering the individual’s initiative. They left him room for initiative, and did not

²³⁴ John T. Nelsen II, “Auftragstaktik: Case For Decentralized Combat Leadership,” *The Challenge of Military Leadership*, Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown, eds. (New York: Pergamon-Brassey’s Publishers, 1989), p. 29.

²³⁵ Martin van Creveld, *The Training of Officers*, (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. 31

²³⁶ Based on the teachings of Professor Donald Abenheim; also Peter Paret, “Clausewitz,” *Makers of Modern Strategy*, p. 212.

reprimand him unless he did something very wrong. This went down to the individual soldier, who was praised for developing initiative.²³⁷

Cases from American and British history also demonstrate how the use of mission-type orders can lead to success in combat. During the American Civil War, General Grant's use of mission-type orders helped widely dispersed and isolated Union forces defeat the Confederacy. During the Second World War, Generals Marshall, MacArthur, Patton, Montgomery, and Slim also relied on mission-type orders to successfully conduct operations in large theaters of war.²³⁸

Today, mission-type orders are part of a broader command philosophy that emphasizes *centralized control and decentralized execution* in the conduct of military operations.²³⁹ The success of centralized control and decentralized execution depends on the junior officer's ability to clearly interpret the "commander's intent" with regard to the mission-type order he has been given by that commander. ASD commanders expect their subordinates to correctly interpret the commander's intent and exercise initiative to accomplish the mission in the absence of specific orders.²⁴⁰ The ability of officers and NCOs to successfully perform the mission based on the commander's intent allows commanders at all levels of the chain of command to cope

²³⁷ Charles G. Sutten, Jr., "Command and Control at the Operational Level," *The Challenge of Military Leadership*, p. 78. The example of the German Army in the Nazi era offered here is obviously not an example of how autonomy works in democratic military institutions. Rather, it provides an operational example of how autonomy can facilitate success in combat. The success of *Auftragstaktik* in the Second World War flowed from the acknowledgment and unreserved acceptance of mutual dependence that Germans inherited from traditional Prussian society. (See Sutten, p.80). The fact that the Bundeswehr still relies on *Auftragstaktik* today demonstrates that the concept is especially compatible with the requirements of a military in a democracy.

²³⁸ See Nelsen, pp. 26-39; and Sutten, pp. 74-83.

²³⁹ Not all commanders in ASD militaries issue broad mission-type orders; some commanders prefer to give detailed instructions that they want their subordinates to follow meticulously. However, the military officially encourages the use of mission-type orders whenever possible.

²⁴⁰ Nelsen, p. 36.

with uncertainty and ambiguity (Clausewitz's "frictions") that occur during military operations.²⁴¹ Initiative, aggressiveness, risk-taking, and willingness to assume responsibility are attributes prevalent in the soldiers from a democratic society, and are qualities that empower soldiers to successfully navigate through the "fog of war."²⁴²

Recent guidance from the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) exemplifies the importance of autonomy and mission-type orders. General Downing, former USCINCSOC, challenged his commanders to give their subordinates wide latitude to exercise their individual judgment and initiative. He provided simple guidance:

Is it the right thing for the country? Is it legal and ethical? Is it something you are willing to be accountable for? Is it consistent with your organizational values? If the answer is Yes to all of these questions, Don't ask permission, Just do it.²⁴³

A system of command that operates under the philosophy of centralized control and decentralized execution relies heavily on the existence of the *NCO corps* as the guarantor of mission success. An incident during a recent PFP peacekeeping exercise demonstrates why it is important to have a hierarchy of NCOs to interpret and execute mission-type orders. In that exercise, a platoon leader from an FWP military was given the task of ensuring the safe passage of refugees into a command post compound.

²⁴¹ John M. Vermillion, "The Pillars of Generalship," *The Challenge of Military Leadership*, p. 68. This is especially important when units suddenly find themselves cut-off and isolated from the chain of command during combat.

²⁴² Sutten, p. 80. In contrast, these attributes are not prevalent in soldiers from communist societies, because the tight controls of the totalitarian system stifled the development of initiative, risk-taking, and the willingness to assume responsibility.

²⁴³ David J. Scott, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, "The Air Force Special Operations Command Identity Crisis: An Assessment and Opinion," Air War College Paper, April, 1996.

Without any NCOs in his platoon, he relied on conscripts to interpret and execute the mission-type order he received from a NATO commander. The platoon failed to properly execute the mission-type order when one conscript-led squad misinterpreted their order and mistakenly shot at a group of refugees. If the FWP platoon would have had a trained NCO, rather than a conscript to interpret the mission-type orders, the mistake could have been avoided. In contrast, an American platoon leader who was given the same mission, gave a clear, concise, mission-type order to his NCO squad leaders, who then correctly interpreted and successfully executed the order.²⁴⁴

The NCO corps also provides a vital link in the chain of command by extending the lines of positional authority to the lowest levels of command.²⁴⁵ As part of the formal chain of command, NCOs ensure that orders are carried out and discipline is maintained within the ranks. Moreover, as experts in a specialty skill, NCOs train soldiers and ensure that soldiers properly execute individual and collective tasks. In addition, NCOs are responsible for the development of enlisted troops; setting and maintaining performance standards; supervision of unit operations within established guidelines; care of individual soldiers and their families; proper wearing of the uniform; appearance and courtesy of enlisted personnel; care of arms and equipment; care of living quarters; and operation of recreational facilities, to name a few.²⁴⁶ NCOs enhance unit effectiveness by spending most of their time among the troops, supervising the details involved in

²⁴⁴ Thomas A. Wuchte, MAJ, US Army, "NCOs: A model for the world," (Observations from Peace Shield 1996, a multinational peacekeeping exercise in L'viv, Ukraine), *Army Times*, July 22, 1996, p.54.

²⁴⁵ Lawrence P. Crocker, LTC, US Army (ret), *The Army Officers Guide, 44th Edition* (Harrisburg, Pa: Stackpole Books, 1988), p. 271.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

accomplishing the mission. And as noted above, NCOs perform leadership and supervisory roles necessary to ensure the execution of mission-type orders.

(2) Functional Authority - Authority of Competence and Authority of Person. According to Peabody, “formal authority flowing from legitimacy and organizational status [rank or position] must almost invariably be supported by authority based on professional competence and skill in human relations.”²⁴⁷ ASD militaries emphasize *competence* at each level of the military hierarchy and consider it a leadership principle.²⁴⁸ A leader’s competence helps to inspire the trust and confidence of his subordinates.²⁴⁹ ASD militaries develop competence through education programs and career development systems which help to ensure that each leader gains the appropriate mix of broad and specialized education and experience.²⁵⁰ In addition, the degree to which an individual possesses military competence is the focus of evaluation reports and determines, in part, a servicemember’s prospects for advancement. Along with competence, other personal qualities are relied upon by ASD officers and NCOs to enhance their formal authority. These qualities confer upon the leader the “authority of person,” which inspires subordinates to obey not only the impersonal rank or position, but also the “person,” of the leader.²⁵¹

²⁴⁷ Peabody, *Organizational Authority*, p. 122.

²⁴⁸ *The Armed Forces Officer*, p. 28., and FM 22-10 Leadership, US Dept. of the Army, p. 10.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁰ Scott and Scott, pp. 352 -353 state that professional military education in the U.S. produces officers who are “generalists,” whereas the military education program in the WP produced “specialists.”

²⁵¹ Peabody, pp. 124-125. Max Weber refers to two types of authority -- *traditional* and *charismatic* -- which are owed to a *person*. Weber’s “charismatic authority,” like Peabody’s “authority of person,” flows from the leadership qualities of the person in authority. Authority of person emphasizes the human element--the ability of leaders to use interpersonal skills to inspire their troops.

Authority of person (or personal authority) is critical to military professionalism in ASD armed forces.²⁵² Janowitz recognizes the importance of “personal authority” in his observation that western military establishments emphasize “interpersonal relations” as the basis of authority.²⁵³ Personal authority flows from the leadership qualities of the *person* in a position of authority. Thus, ASD militaries instruct their officers and NCOs to use leadership rather than formal authority to gain the followership of their soldiers. Through leadership, ASD officers and NCOs are able to enjoy the “authority of person,” which obviates the need to resort to their formal authority to attain discipline and obedience. Moreover, “personal authority” gains more than simple obedience because leadership, as the basis of “personal authority,” *inspires* subordinates to anticipate and enthusiastically carry-out orders.²⁵⁴ In addition, as the mechanism by which ASD officers and NCOs gain “personal authority,” leadership is one of the key foundations of democratic military professionalism.

b. Leadership

Leadership in all militaries is characterized by courage, competence, a sense of duty, ideas of class, honor, and a commitment to the mission. In a democracy, military leadership is also defined by a set of principles that represent the essence of democratic ideology: respect for individual rights, civil liberties, and human dignity; trust; accountability to societal values; and ethical behavior manifested in the honor code of the profession.²⁵⁵ These leadership traits are grounded in theories of social

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Ibid., p. 42.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 115.

²⁵⁵ Ulrich, p. 116.

organization derived from nineteenth century French and German social thought and are especially appropriate in democratic open societies due to the expectations of their citizens that human rights will not be unduly sacrificed and the existence of oversight procedures capable of monitoring violations of democratic norms and practices.²⁵⁶ An expert on military leadership, Dr. Sam Sarkesian notes that; “The exercise of leadership within a military that is part of a democratic system must reflect democratic values. This does not mean, of course, that leadership must consistently operate according to the followers’ consensus. But it does mean that leadership must be based on some minimum acceptance of democratic values.”²⁵⁷

Fundamental democratic principles are emphasized in the discussion of leadership in ASD military doctrinal manuals such as the US Army’s Field Manual 100-5, which states:

The nation expects its Army to adhere to the highest standards of professional conduct and to reflect the ideals of American values. The American people demand a high-quality Army that honors the core values of the Constitution it is sworn to uphold - a strong respect for the rule of law, human dignity, and individual rights....Leaders have a special responsibility to subordinates...trust is the basic bond of leadership. Good leaders occupy a position of special trust and confidence in the eyes of their soldiers. They return their soldiers’ trust with the greatest care for their well-being, while aggressively pursuing the accomplishment of the mission. Leaders treat subordinates with respect; never do they seek self-gain at the expense of their soldiers or their subordinate commanders. Leaders imbue soldiers with a sense of honor, share their hardships, and acknowledge their accomplishments...²⁵⁸

²⁵⁶ David R. Segal, “Leadership and Management: Organization Theory,” *Military Leadership*, James H. Buck and Lawrence J. Korb, eds. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981), p. 42.; and Ulrich, p. 115.

²⁵⁷ Sam C. Sarkesian, “A Personal Perspective,” *Military Leadership*, pp. 243-244.

²⁵⁸ Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5: Operations*, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 14 June 1993), Chapter 1.

The importance of attending to the needs of the individual soldier is a basic leadership principle in ASD militaries. For example, retired General Edward C. Meyer states that the American leadership style is “founded upon consideration and respect for the soldier; each soldier meaningfully assisted toward development as a whole man, a whole person, is more likely to respond with his or her full commitment.”²⁵⁹ Similarly, the German leadership style *Innere Fuehrung* calls for soldiers to be treated as thinking individuals who are worthy of respect and who are able to understand the purpose behind an order.²⁶⁰

By respecting the individual rights and human dignity of soldiers, military leaders are able to adhere to constitutional guidelines and, at the same time, earn the confidence, respect, and cooperation of their soldiers. The ideals espoused in democratic constitutions encourage a form of military leadership based on respect for a soldier’s human rights and individual needs. The Federal Republic of Germany’s democratic constitution, the “Basic Law,” states that “Human dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”²⁶¹ In Atlantic-style democracies human dignity is not lost when one becomes a soldier. For example, in the Bundeswehr, a soldier retains the rights of a citizen, narrowed only as required by his mission.²⁶² In other words, the soldier is a *democratic* “citizen in uniform.”²⁶³

²⁵⁹ Ulrich, p. 114.

²⁶⁰ Victorson, p. 5. The Germans believe that in a democratic society, a soldier must understand the purpose of an order if he is to carry out his duties.

²⁶¹ Article 1 (1), *Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany* (Wolfenbuettel: Roco-Druck, GmbH, 1990), p. 8, cited in Victorson, p. 5.

²⁶² Victorson, p. 5, and Joo, p. 54.

²⁶³ Victorson, p. 5. The Bundeswehr affords the same rights to conscripts as well as professional officers and NCOs. Thus, the German Army maintains the “ideal” of the citizen-soldier throughout the ranks or professional soldiers. The authors contend that this is also true in the other ASD militaries, although to

To earn the confidence, respect, and cooperation of their soldiers, ASD leaders rely on positive motivational techniques rather than fear and intimidation. By exercising a style of leadership derived from motivational theory, ASD militaries aim to inspire their soldiers to *want* to do their job.²⁶⁴ In his classic study on military leadership, *Nineteen Stars*, Edgar Puryear noted that, in World War II, “American generals could get their subordinates to carry out orders through fear, but never, under such conditions, would men give their all to a commander.”²⁶⁵ Today, as in 1945, ASD militaries do not tolerate motivation through fear or any form of physical abuse, to include hazing, beatings, and arbitrary physical punishments.

In addition, contemporary ASD military leaders rely on *trust*, which forms the basis for positive motivational leadership. Trust creates a command climate which promotes innovation, initiative, and motivates subordinates to excel. In addition, the ASD officer promotes the willing followership of his subordinates by inspiring trust and confidence in his leadership, thereby empowering the officer with “authority of person.”

Moreover, the soldier of a democracy can remain a moral agent ultimately responsible for his actions, and can at the same time obey the orders of a person he trusts, in the presumption that the orders are legally and morally correct.²⁶⁶ ASD military

varying degrees. In ASD states, respect for the dignity of the individual is a value that extends beyond international borders and political systems -- and even applies to the nation’s enemies in war. As recently as the Gulf War, ASD military members compassionately cared for surrendering enemy soldiers. In addition, the commitment of ASD states to human dignity has led, in part, to ASD military involvement in humanitarian missions around the world.

²⁶⁴ For a discussion on the relationship between motivational theory and leadership, refer to Laurie A. Broedling, “The Psychology of Leadership,” in *Military Leadership*, Buck and Korb, eds., pp. 71-94.

²⁶⁵ Edgar F. Puryear, Jr., *19 Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership*, 2nd Edition (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981), p. 397.

²⁶⁶ Michael O. Wheeler, “Loyalty, Honor, and the Modern Military,” *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, Malham M. Wakin, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), p. 178.

doctrine emphasizes trust as a key ingredient of leadership. For example, the US Marine Corps Warfighting manual, FMFM 1, states “trust is an essential trait among leaders - trust by seniors in the abilities of their subordinates and by juniors in the competence and support of their seniors.”²⁶⁷

Trust is enhanced by a leader’s ability to *communicate* effectively and honestly with subordinates. Leadership in ASD militaries requires this type of communications both up and down the chain of command. ASD militaries encourage the use of counseling to help officers and NCOs meet their prime responsibility of developing people and making the most of their talents. In addition, commanders in ASD militaries have “open-door” policies which allow soldiers to speak freely to any commander. Through candor and honesty, soldiers and leaders can solve problems together and enhance morale. At the same time, it is considered the subordinate’s duty to provide his honest, professional opinion, even if he disagrees with his superior.²⁶⁸ The importance of open communications is also reflected in US Marine Corps FMFM 1, which states “seniors must encourage candor among subordinates and must not hide behind their rank insignia.”²⁶⁹

In addition to the importance of trust within the military, there exists a bond of trust between the *military and society*.²⁷⁰ According to Huntington, people in professions, such as the military, must have a feeling of responsibility to society.²⁷¹ In a

²⁶⁷ US Marine Corps FMFM 1, p. 45.

²⁶⁸ However, once the superior announces that he has made a decision (gives a lawful order), it is the subordinate’s duty to put personal views aside and support the superior’s decision.

²⁶⁹ US Marine Corps FMFM 1, p. 46.

²⁷⁰ In ASD states, laws require the military to be transparent to society.

²⁷¹ Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 9.

democracy, this feeling of responsibility is reinforced by a political system that relies on societal support.²⁷² Society's demands provide a check against violations of democratic principles and violations against public trust. This particularly effects the military, because of its unique status as both a client of the state and the controller of the state's instrument of violence. As such, the military is entrusted with the lives of the state's citizens it employs, thus, with life or death hanging in the balance, military leaders are held even more accountable to society than other professions or institutions in a democracy.²⁷³ This responsibility to the society which they serve requires military commanders to exercise the kind of leadership that complies with national values and emphasizes the "human dimension" of military science.²⁷⁴ This kind of leadership is necessary for the development of highly disciplined units comprised of soldiers who possess high morale and enthusiastically obey their superiors -- the goal of leadership in ASD militaries.

c. Discipline, Obedience, and Morale

In armed forces throughout the world, discipline is the standard of personal deportment, work requirement, courtesy, appearance and ethical conduct that enables soldiers to perform the mission with optimum efficiency and sacrifice life and limb if necessary.²⁷⁵ For the armed forces of a democracy, discipline is primarily the product of morale and leadership and is supported by the formal authority vested in the

²⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 82.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁴ US Army FM 100-5, Chapter 14, The human dimension refers to the soldiers' spirit, initiative, intelligence, discipline, courage, and competence -- the foundations of an effective army.

²⁷⁵ *The Armed Forces Officer*, p. 49.

officer corps, NCO corps, and the military justice system. The goal of military discipline in democratic armed forces is to predispose soldiers to *willingly* obey the legitimate authority of the military and the state. Willing obedience is achieved through “positive means”, otherwise referred to by Janowitz as “manipulation”.²⁷⁶ In a democracy, the concept of “manipulation,” or the use of “positive means,” is rooted in Hobbes’ egoistic view of man and Locke’s emphasis on innate human rights.²⁷⁷ In the broadest sense, citizens of the Atlantic style democracies, generally motivated by Hobbesian self-interest, and accustomed to the concept of the “social contract” between the people and the government, have come to enjoy the Locke-inspired rights and protections afforded them by their constitutions. When the citizen becomes a soldier, he expects to retain many of the same rights he had as a civilian. At the same time, the citizen-soldier understands that the military system that operates in a free society must amend some of the basic rights of citizenship so that the military, with its demands and responsibilities, can function effectively as a military organization. Moreover, the professional officers and NCOs, who embody the democratic ideal of the citizen-soldier themselves, understand the expectations of the new recruit. Thus, military leaders have the same expectations and realize that the best way to achieve willing obedience is through “positive means.” The use of the Soviet-style “negative means” or “domination” is not effective and invites a negative response from individuals who are accustomed to life in

²⁷⁶ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, (Glencoe Ill: Free Press, 1960), Part II. Janowitz lists two modes that organizations use to exercise authority: domination and manipulation. Domination is characterized by “negative means” of motivation such as threat of punishment--the reliance on formal authority to ensure compliance. Manipulation is characterized by “positive means” of motivation such as respect for soldiers rights, and the reliance on principles of leadership to motivate soldiers to comply with rules and regulations.

²⁷⁷ Malham M Wakin, “Ethics of Leadership,” *Military Leadership*, Buck and Korb, eds., pp. 97-98.

modern democratic states. In *Democracy in America*, Alexis De Tocqueville noted that imposing “blind, minute, submissive, and invariable obedience” on soldiers of a democracy would be counterproductive, and that “among democratic communities military discipline ought not to attempt to annihilate the free action of the faculties.”²⁷⁸ De Tocqueville adds that “The obedience thus inculcated is less exact, but it is more eager and more intelligent. It has its root in the will of him who obeys; it rests not only on his instinct, but on his reason; and consequently it will often spontaneously become more strict as danger requires.”²⁷⁹

The importance of attaining discipline through “positive means” is best described by Major General John M. Schofield’s famous speech delivered to the West Point class of 1879:

The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army....The one mode or the other of dealing with subordinates springs from a corresponding spirit in the breast of the commander. He who feels the respect which is due to others, especially his subordinates, cannot fail to inspire in them respect for himself, while he who feels and hence manifests, disrespect for others, especially his subordinates, cannot fail to inspire hatred against himself.²⁸⁰

Similarly, General George C. Marshall’s view of discipline, as described by the general’s biographer, Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, supports the emphasis on “positive means.”

General Marshall believed in a discipline based on respect rather than fear; on the effect of good example given by officers; on the intelligent

²⁷⁸ Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Volume II, Book III, p. 279.

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

²⁸⁰ Virginia Tech Corps of Cadets, *Guide for New Cadets*, August, 1982.

comprehension by all ranks of why and order has to be and why it must be carried out; on a sense of duty, on esprit de corps.²⁸¹

To meet the expectations of soldiers in ASD militaries, *officers* pay attention to individual rights and human dignity and strive to develop in their soldiers a sense of self-esteem to help them actualize their fullest potential and to find meaning in their existence as soldiers.²⁸² It is important for officers to pay attention to the individual needs of the soldier because individuals can better develop and flourish in environments where their psychological, social, and physical needs are met.²⁸³ By using positive means in an attempt to meet the expectations and individual needs of the soldier, the officer bolsters morale, inspires trust and confidence in his ability as a leader, encourages self-discipline, and thus, creates an atmosphere in which the soldier *willingly obeys*.

In addition, ASD militaries rely on their *NCO corps* to ensure that positive means are used as a method for enforcing discipline and building morale. NCOs provide the continuity of leadership that bridges the gap between the commander and the individual soldier.²⁸⁴ NCOs further enhance the military's effectiveness by providing supervision at the lower levels of command. At the tactical level, they enforce discipline, build morale, and ensure obedience through direct, proximate leadership on a daily basis. Moreover, the presence of an NCO corps that embodies the standards of democratic

²⁸¹ Michael O. Wheeler, "Loyalty, Honor, and the Modern Military," *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, Malham M. Wakin, ed., p. 173.

²⁸² This is the ideal method in ASD armies--some Western commanders use "negative means" as a primary tool to acquire discipline and ensure obedience. However, ASD militaries discourage this practice and often punish officers and NCOs that rely on "domination," hazing, and fear to motivate troops. In addition, ASD militaries such as the U.S. armed forces are not immune to incidents of hazing, ethnic tension, sexual harassment, and other problems. But the system attempts to eliminate the conditions that lead to these problems by educating soldiers and emphasizing the "ideal" form of democratic military professionalism.

²⁸³ Crocker, *The Army Officers Guide*, p. 37.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., pp. 271-272.

military professionalism leads to the infusion of principles of democratic military professionalism throughout the entire chain of command in democracies.²⁸⁵

As stated above, officers and NCOs instill discipline and build morale by exercising a style of leadership that emphasizes individual rights and human needs. The formal authority inherent in rank, position, and in the system of *military justice* are used as secondary means to achieve discipline. In most cases, ASD militaries strive to achieve discipline without having to resort to formal authority. In reality, however, discipline cannot always be obtained through the positive forces of leadership and high morale. To bolster these informal mechanisms of discipline, ASD militaries depend on a system of military justice and a formal hierarchy of authority. ASD militaries use formal authority and a military justice system in a *supportive role* to reinforce the impact of leadership and morale in producing discipline.²⁸⁶ All militaries distribute formal authority through a hierarchy of ranks and position that define a leader's power to reward and punish subordinates. ASD commanders administer punishments through a military justice system that respects individual and human rights. For example, the Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) of the US military affords accused soldiers the right to remain silent and the right to counsel, two important rights afforded to US citizens by authority of the constitution.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁵ Ulrich, p.116.

²⁸⁶ For example, the *US Army Officers Guide*, pp. 280-281, states that "Where discipline is weak, leadership is faulty." In addition, the guide prescribes that a commander should always choose the lesser punishment (of punishments ranging from mild admonition to court-martial) for a soldier who has committed a disciplinary infraction, until convinced that the punishment will be ineffective.

²⁸⁷ Ellen Jones, *Red Army and Society*, p. 134.

The Armed Forces Officer provides a good description of the dynamic relationship between leadership, discipline, morale, and obedience.

Discipline and morale influence the inarticulate vote that is constantly taken by masses of men when the order comes to move forward--a variant of crowd psychology that inclines it to follow a leader. But the army does not move forward until the motion is carried. Unanimous consent only follows cooperation between the individual men in the ranks.²⁸⁸

In other words, discipline and morale lead to the multiplied individual acceptance of the leader's order that is necessary to gain the corporate obedience of his unit.²⁸⁹

2. The Armed Forces of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) States

a. *Authority*

(1) Formal Authority - Authority of Legitimacy and Authority of Position. *Legitimacy* requires a *political-social condition* in which the government is able to justify its power in terms other than the mere fact of holding power.²⁹⁰ The communist regimes in Eastern Europe did not come to power through legitimate means, but rather through Soviet occupation. Moreover, as one-party authoritarian governments, the communist regimes never had the "procedural legitimacy" that ASD governments enjoy as a result of the processes and procedures of the democratic system. Thus, NSWP regimes could only gain "performance legitimacy" -- which depended on the regime's ability to "deliver to the people," because no other *political-social condition* existed to justify the regime's power.²⁹¹

²⁸⁸ *The Armed Forces Officer*, p. 60.

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁰ Paul G. Lewis, "Obstacles to the Establishment of Political Legitimacy in Communist Poland," *British Journal of Political Science* (1982) XII, pp. 125-147.

²⁹¹ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 258. Also refer to Paul G. Lewis, "Obstacles to the Establishment of Political Legitimacy in Communist Poland," *British Journal of Political Science* (1982) XII, pp. 125-147.

According to Huntington, the legitimacy of the communist regimes relied almost entirely on performance.²⁹² Certain communist figures were able to gain brief periods of “performance legitimacy” for the regime through their ability to improve society’s quality of life. However, during most of the Soviet era, the communist regimes failed to deliver to the people and did not enjoy any legitimacy. The Communist Party’s inability to deliver economic and social well-being, and their repression of civil liberties created a situation in which the NSWP regimes depended on the coercive measures of Soviet occupation and internal oppression to maintain deference to their authority. The Soviet involvement in the quashing of popular revolts in Hungary and Poland in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968; and Poland’s own suppression of Solidarity in the 1970s and 80s, provide examples of the kinds of coercive measures that were necessary to ensure deference to communist authority.²⁹³

In the NSWP states, the bearers of state power administered their system of coercion through the hierarchy of *positional authority* in civilian and military institutions. However, NSWP states were reluctant to trust those in positions of authority in the lower levels of the military chain of command and did not widely delegate authority to them.²⁹⁴ Specifically, the NSWP did not allow officers at the lower echelons to exercise autonomy of command and, although the officers with a good “communist conscience” were in theory encouraged to display initiative, most officers were reluctant

²⁹² Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 258.

²⁹³ While Solidarity officially came to light in August, 1980, the movement actually began with the workers’ strikes in the Baltic coast cities in December, 1970, when the Polish communist leadership ordered Polish armored units to suppress the striking workers. For a detailed description, see Roman Laba, *The Roots of Solidarity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).

²⁹⁴ Paul G. Lewis, p. 125.

to put their conscience to the test while under the watchful eye of the political officers.²⁹⁵

According to British Air Commodore, E.S. Williams, the Russian saying “*initisiyativa nakazuyema*” - initiative is punishable, had serious implications for Soviet-style militaries. The reluctance of Soviet and Warsaw Pact officers to display initiative often led to situations where the officers took no action in the absence of detailed instructions.²⁹⁶

The monitoring activities of political officers and secret police operatives helped to further stifle initiative, innovation, and autonomy. By contrast to ASD militaries, the NSWP did not use mission-type orders. In accordance with a system of *centralized control and centralized execution*, NSWP commanders gave their subordinates *detailed directives* that left no room for initiative. Colonel Mark Victorson describes the nature of this system in his study of reform in the East German Army, *Mission in the East*. According to Victorson, the East German Army “used “stopwatch” standards to measure effectiveness--whatever could be timed was drilled, checked, and rewarded... This attitude toward training originated from a “zero-defects” philosophy in an army where error could be punished by the party as well as by the military and it led to outstanding performance in individual soldier skill training... Since the capacity to understand a commander’s intent or to use originality in handling a mission could not be timed or checked easily and could lead to mistakes, these qualities were not inculcated in soldiers or leaders.”²⁹⁷ Thus, mission-type orders could not be used in a system that did

²⁹⁵ Herbert Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier* (New York: Crane-Russak, 1975) p. 99.

²⁹⁶ E. S. Williams, Air Commodore, “Morale, Motivation, and Leadership in the Soviet Armed Forces,” *Soviet Power: The Continuing Challenge*, James Sherr, ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press pp. 234-235.

²⁹⁷ Victorson, p. 26.

not promote trust, autonomy, and initiative. Moreover, WP officers, who refrained from using initiative and creativity out of fear, came to expect orders that specified exactly how to perform each task.²⁹⁸ In the absence of specific orders, and with communications to a higher headquarters disrupted, most Soviet officers “would be at a loss.”²⁹⁹ Sovietologist Herbert Goldhamer notes that this lack of initiative is not simply due to a fear of taking risks.³⁰⁰ According to Goldhamer, “Senior officers, anxious to have their units make a good showing, surround their subordinate officers with so much attention and so many instructions that they fetter their initiative and inculcate in them the bad habit of awaiting orders.”³⁰¹

Sovietologist Ellen Jones succinctly describes how the Soviet system discouraged military and civilian leaders from demonstrating initiative, innovation, and flexibility. According to Jones, “both the military and civilian manager must operate in an authoritarian, hierarchical system that touts the virtues of innovation and flexibility while rewarding rigidity and subservience.”³⁰²

The Soviet command system gave officers absolute power over their subordinates, which they exercised through an exclusive right to issue orders and the assurance that these orders, regardless of what they might entail, would be followed unquestioningly.³⁰³ Moreover, the system relied on personal power and political and personal loyalty. Senior officers used their positions for their own ends, exchanging

²⁹⁸ Goldhamer, *The Soviet Soldier*, p. 96.

²⁹⁹ Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, p. 402.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.*

³⁰² Ellen Jones, p. 219.

³⁰³ Ulrich, p. 160.

favors with other officers in order to increase their influence and enhance their power within the military.³⁰⁴ Many senior officers thwarted initiative and innovation by using their positions of absolute power to further their own interests at the expense of their subordinates.³⁰⁵

In addition, the Warsaw Pact armed forces did not have an *effective professional NCO corps* to extend the chain of command.³⁰⁶ Instead, NCOs served primarily as specialists who performed technical functions in areas such as logistics, communications, and administration.³⁰⁷ Without professional NCOs in the chain of command, the WP militaries had to rely on second-year conscripts, who acted as squad leaders and in some cases platoon leaders, to maintain discipline and ensure that soldiers carried out orders.³⁰⁸ According to Eliot Cohen, one great weakness of the Soviet Army was its lack of an effective professional NCO corps, “and hence its reliance on second-year conscripts to fulfill many of their functions, a practice fraught with disciplinary hazards.”³⁰⁹

The absence of an effective professional NCO corps forced NSWP officers to fulfill many of the specialized functions performed by NCOs in ASD armed forces. British Air Commodore E. S. Williams pointed out that in the Soviet military system “everything depends on the officers...If the backbone of the British Army is the NCO, the backbone of the Soviet Army is the officer...Simple aircraft refueling and re-

³⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 161.

³⁰⁵ Ulrich, p. 160.

³⁰⁶ While the NSWP states had professional NCOs, they were not part of the chain of command, and they were not part of a professional corps of NCOs.

³⁰⁷ Based on the authors’ interviews with Polish and Hungarian officers in August, 1996.

³⁰⁸ Ibid.

³⁰⁹ Cohen, p. 69.

arming is done by an officer, all tanks and APCs are commanded by officers, and routine jobs about the ship are done by officers.”³¹⁰

In sum, NSWP states developed a system of formal authority to ensure that the Party could maintain control over the armed forces. To maximize party control, the NSWP forces did *not extend* lines of formal authority to their NCO corps and did not allow their officers to exercise *autonomy* in decision making. The NSWP reliance on formal authority reduced the need for officers to depend on functional forms of authority like competence and personal authority to motivate troops.

(2) Functional Authority - Authority of Competence and Authority of Person. Like the ASD militaries, NSWP armed forces understood the need to develop competent officers. NSWP militaries stressed competence in the context of military skills and realized that an officer’s competence helped to motivate troops.³¹¹ In fact, competence served as one of the only means to motivate troops outside of formal authority. According to one Hungarian infantry officer, platoon and company commanders who could “shoot first, shoot best” had fewer problems motivating troops.³¹² Like the ASD, NSWP militaries expected their company grade officers to develop competence in their branch of service. However, NSWP company grade officers were much more specialized than their ASD counterparts.³¹³ The NSWP expected their officers to attain the level of specialized competence that ASD militaries demand from

³¹⁰ Williams, p. 234.

³¹¹ Based on interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers, August, 1996.

³¹² Based on interview with Major Horvath of the HDF, August, 1996.

³¹³ The Soviet system trained junior officers for duties not only in the various services but also in particular branches and specialized components of the armed forces. See Scott and Scott, p. 353.

NCOs who specialize in a particular skill.³¹⁴ The NSWP officer's specialized competence was appropriate for the WP system of centralized control and centralized execution.³¹⁵

In addition, NSWP armed forces depended less on *personal forms of authority* to gain the followership of their soldiers. Because communist leaders in Eastern Europe did not enjoy popular support, they realistically could not expect workers to be loyal or to display initiative in the conduct of their jobs. Likewise, the communist regimes could not expect their supervisors to willingly display the kinds of leadership traits required of leaders in the ASD, such as loyalty, initiative, enthusiasm, and dependability.³¹⁶ Thus, the communist regimes constructed dense overlapping bureaucracies of positional authority like the military's dual-command structure to ensure the loyalty and followership of the state's employees.³¹⁷ The regimes used this system of formal authority to ensure that people did their jobs--without it, a largely apathetic work force could not have met the production goals of the state's planned economy. Similarly, the military's functional mechanisms of control in the NSWP enabled the armed forces to maintain discipline without depending on their officers to display initiative and leadership--the traits that form the basis of "personal authority."

³¹⁴ Ulrich, p. 164.

³¹⁵ Scott and Scott., p. 402.

³¹⁶ US Army FM 22-10 lists the following as leadership traits: initiative, enthusiasm, dependability, alertness, loyalty, endurance, courage, decisiveness., to name a few.

³¹⁷ The dual-command structure refers to the parallel hierarchy of commanders and political officers that existed in WP militaries. Thus, the WP armed forces had an operational chain of command and a political chain of command.

b. Leadership

The concept of leadership, as it is understood in democratic militaries, did not exist in the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact.³¹⁸ Officers in the Warsaw Pact relied on their formal authority to ensure followership in their commands. In addition, the WP militaries maintained a rigid authoritarian system of control - a system that subjugated the role of leadership to an emphasis on “absolute” obedience to formal authority.

The NSWP sacrificed individual rights beyond the constraints necessary for military competence.³¹⁹ Mirroring the communist societies in which they served, the NSWP militaries did not value principles such as individual rights, human dignity, trust, accountability to societal values, respect for civil liberties, and ethical behavior. Leaders did not depend on motivational forms of leadership to gain the willing followership of soldiers, rather they relied on coercion and the fear of punishment to “force” followership.³²⁰ As a result, human rights abuses were common and quality of life issues were of secondary concern.³²¹ According to a former US Defense Attaché in Moscow, Brigadier General Gregory Govan, the Soviet-style armed forces cultivated a system reminiscent of the feudal relationship between a master and his slave, in which the soldiers, like slaves, displayed forbearance toward their officers and suffered from harsh treatment.³²² Indeed, many of the leadership traits western armies look for in their commanders, those which inspire the willful trust, loyalty, and obedience of soldiers,

³¹⁸ There were exceptions to this. The WP, like all armed forces, had charismatic leaders who were able to motivate troops despite the authoritarian system.

³¹⁹ Ulrich, p. 110.

³²⁰ Based on authors’ interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers in August, 1996.

³²¹ Rakowska-Harmstone, *Phase II - Vol I*, p. 304.

³²² Ulrich, p. 152.

would have been punishable under the rigidly authoritarian Soviet-style system.³²³

Essentially, the NSWP militaries used a highly impersonal system, based on the authority of position, to “force” obedience.³²⁴ Ironically, it is interesting to note, Russian military history contains examples of great military leaders who recognized the importance of “inspirational” leadership long before the Soviet era. For example, Alexander Suvarov wrote in the 18th century:

An army is not only a physical power, a mass consisting of weapons of military operations, but it is as well a union of humans endowed with intelligence and heart. Spiritual force plays an important part in all considerations and calculations of the military leader, and consequently for the latter it is insufficient to rule armies as a machine. He must be able to rule the human being to fasten the army to himself, and with his spiritual power over the army acquire conditional authority.³²⁵

Despite the existence of a Soviet-style authoritarian system which emphasized strict followership, NSWP militaries did make an effort to satisfy the most basic needs of the soldier. Unlike commanders in ASD militaries, who considered it part of their responsibility as leaders to take care of the individual needs of soldiers, NSWP commanders relied on their political officers to fulfill this leadership function.³²⁶ In addition to providing political oversight, the political officer was responsible for unit morale. The political officer paid particular attention to problems which were potentially

³²³ Victorson, p. 25.

³²⁴ This was true in most cases, although interviews of Polish and Hungarian officers indicate that some NSWP officers tried to use motivational forms of leadership whenever possible. According to the Poles and Hungarians, Party rhetoric encouraged civilian and military leaders to use motivational forms of leadership, but in reality, the system relied on the impersonal system of authority to force followership.

³²⁵ Walter Pintner, “Russian Military Thought: The Western Model and the Shadow of Suvarov,” *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Peter Paret, ed., pp. 361-362. Also, on p. 356, Pintner notes that Western military theory inspired Suvarov, who Pintner refers to as the greatest of all Russian commanders. Suvarov’s ideas were revolutionary in Russian military thought. His most famous written work, *The Art of Victory*, is a manual of practical advice for junior officers and NCOs. In it, Suvarov emphasizes the importance of the troops’ fighting spirit, and contains instructions on maintaining health and morale.

³²⁶ Ellen Jones, pp. 128-131.

detrimental to good morale and discipline, including poor living and working conditions.³²⁷ According to Soviet military thought, maximizing military performance meant creating living conditions that conformed to the requirements of regulations - that is, heated barracks in winter, hot meals, available medical care, reliable mail service, and access to stores and laundry facilities.³²⁸

NSWP commanders only had to concern themselves with providing their soldiers with a subsistence level of existence--the minimum necessary to ensure military effectiveness.³²⁹ The NSWP did not focus on quality of life issues because the discipline and regimentation of the military environment--strict by Western standards--were acceptable in Warsaw Pact armed forces because such an environment was merely a more rigid version of the regimented civilian lifestyle in communist society.³³⁰ This generalization is illustrated nicely by the advice given to a prospective recruit by a respected Polish senior citizen:

Do not be too perturbed ... the army is only a caricature of the totalitarian system to which , I think, you must have become accustomed already. As you well know, the totalitarian system is based on the principle of a net which is twisted all around us. But a characteristic of any net is that it has openings in which any man of even average intelligence can build a small peaceful nest -- which I heartily hope you will be able to do.³³¹

Citizens of NSWP states were used to life under a communist government which did not trust the people, discouraged personal initiative, rewarded obedience, and denied individual rights.³³² Upon entering the military, NSWP citizens did not have the

³²⁷ Ellen Jones, p. 130.

³²⁸ Ibid.

³²⁹ Ibid., and corroborated by Hungarian and Polish officers interviewed by authors in August, 1996.

³³⁰ Ellen Jones, p. 220.

³³¹ Rakowska-Harmstone, *Phase II - Vol. 2*, p. 112.

³³² Ibid., pp. 219-220. Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers.

same kind of expectations that their counterparts in ASD states did. Thus, NSWP militaries did not value a command climate that encouraged trust, initiative, and willing followership. In addition, without the kind of leadership that encouraged willing followership, morale suffered, and discipline and obedience had to be acquired through “domination.”³³³

c. Discipline, Obedience, and Morale

Soviet scholar Herbert Goldhamer referred to Soviet-style discipline as “exactingness,” -- the *absolute* observance of communist laws, military regulations, and the orders of command personnel.³³⁴ NSWP militaries relied on the “absolute” *authority* of the commander as the primary means of attaining discipline and obedience. The use of stringent, hierarchical and authoritarian discipline attained only the *reluctant* obedience of NSWP soldiers, who were not “attitudinally integrated” into the “Greater Socialist Army.” Strict disciplinary regulations, which governed every aspect of the soldier’s life, complemented the commander’s authority.³³⁵ In accordance with these regulations, commanders compelled NSWP soldiers to conform to harsh disciplinary standards.³³⁶ And the NSWP did not afford its soldiers the same rights and privileges enjoyed by ASD service members.³³⁷ Soviet scholar Ellen Jones compares the normal life of a WP soldier

³³³ Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, Part II, Janowitz lists two modes that organizations use to exercise authority: domination and manipulation. Domination is characterized by “negative means” of motivation such as threat of punishment--the reliance on formal authority to ensure compliance. Manipulation is characterized by “positive means” of motivation such as respect for soldiers rights, and the reliance on principles of leadership to motivate soldiers to comply with rules and regulations.

³³⁴ Goldhamer, p. 142.

³³⁵ Ellen Jones, p. 129; and Goldhamer, p. 214. Warsaw Pact disciplinary regulations were strict by Western (ASD) standards.

³³⁶ Ibid., Disciplinary standards were strict by ASD standards. This fact is corroborated by Polish and Hungarian officers interviewed by the authors in August, 1996.

³³⁷ Ibid., and Goldhamer, p. 142.

to that of a basic-trainee in the United States Army: “Tightly organized training fills most of the conscript’s waking hours. The regimentation, routine, and discipline of the two- or three-year service hitch are similar [in intensity] to the U.S. army’s basic-training course, [which is only six-to-eight weeks in duration].”³³⁸

NSWP militaries were able to maintain “severe” disciplinary standards because their soldiers, conditioned to the harshness of life in a communist society, did not expect the military to meet their individual needs or treat them with dignity.³³⁹ Thus, when compared with their ASD counterparts, NSWP commanders expended little effort in trying to meet the individual needs of soldiers.³⁴⁰ In *Military Concepts and Philosophy*, Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles notes that “in a free [democratic] society, attaining discipline constitutes a greater challenge to the human mind and spirit [than in a totalitarian society].”³⁴¹ Discipline is more difficult to attain in democracies because the leader must respect the soldier’s human dignity and individual rights, and meet the soldier’s needs to a degree acceptable by a liberal democratic society. By contrast, attaining discipline in the militaries of totalitarian states, such as those in the NSWP, required simply the vigorous enforcement of strict disciplinary regulations.

The Communist Party required military commanders to enforce discipline to the “letter of the law.”³⁴² A Warsaw Pact journal stated; “Commanders, officers, and sergeants are sometimes reprimanded because they do not enforce regulations “in the

³³⁸ Ellen Jones, p. 162.

³³⁹ Ibid., p. 220.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 163.

³⁴¹ Henry E. Eccles, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.), *Military Concepts and Philosophy*, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965), p. 56.

³⁴² Goldhamer, p. 143.

minute detail that is demanded.”³⁴³ Because the disciplinary regulations placed an unwieldy number of restrictions on conscript behavior, NSWP commanders had difficulty enforcing the regulations.³⁴⁴ In fact, the strictness of the regulations and preponderance of restrictions on conscript behavior led to frequent disciplinary infractions in most NSWP units.³⁴⁵ Commanders relied heavily on the threat of punishment to enforce the disciplinary regulations, but also tolerated the existence of an “unauthorized” caste system among conscripts, which involved hazing and the use of arbitrary punishments to enforce disciplinary regulations during off-duty hours.³⁴⁶ Commanders allowed this “unauthorized” system of “barracks discipline” because they could not rely solely on their constituted authority to enforce disciplinary regulations.³⁴⁷ In addition, even though regulations prohibited it, commanders commonly used physical punishment to accompany authorized sanctions.³⁴⁸ This helped commanders to enforce discipline by causing soldiers to be afraid to do something wrong.³⁴⁹ Moreover, the NSWP did not afford their soldiers several of the rights enjoyed by their ASD

³⁴³ *KVS*, no. 23, December 1969, pp. 45-50., quoted in Goldhamer, p. 144.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, and Ellen Jones, p. 131.

³⁴⁵ Ellen Jones, p. 131.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.* p. 130. Polish Military sociologist Dr. Henryk Dziewulski describes the “unauthorized” system of hazing in the Polish Armed Forces in his report, “Selected Issues of Civil-Military Relations in Poland,” June, 1996. The Polish system of hazing, known as “the wave” was predominant throughout the 1980s and continues, to a lesser degree, today.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.* The most common forms of misconduct included: disobeying orders, unauthorized absences, alcohol abuse, theft of military property, and fights between draftees. ASD militaries have similar problems, but they occurred more frequently in NSWP militaries.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 135. Ellen Jones states that the use of physical force appears to have declined during the latter decades of Soviet domination as the Warsaw Pact militaries tried to shift their socialization methods away from coercion and toward persuasion. This was corroborated by Hungarian and Polish officers interviewed by the authors in August, 1996. The officers interviewed said that, despite the rhetoric which indicated a shift away from coercive methods, physical punishments and the unauthorized hazing among conscripts continued to exist in the last years of the communist era.

³⁴⁹ Goldhamer stresses the importance of punishment in attaining discipline, quoting from a 1970 Soviet publication: “punishment forces the guilty soldier and his comrades to a deeper appreciation of the

counterparts, such as the right to demand trial by court-martial, the right to remain silent, and the right to council.³⁵⁰

The NSWP system of discipline did not emphasize the importance of *morale*. According to Goldhamer, “Soviet military authorities appreciate the value of solidarity and morale in the armed forces, but nonetheless they show a certain unease in dealing with these intangible, elusive qualities so different from the specificity of regulations...Social cohesion and morale cannot be “ordered” and cannot be “enforced”.”³⁵¹ In NSWP units, the political officer assumed the responsibility for morale and welfare and advised the commander in both areas. In fulfilling his responsibility, the political officer inspected barracks living conditions, organized unit competitions, and organized training, discussions, and lectures on disciplinary and military-legal subjects.³⁵² Moreover, the political officer recommended awards for soldiers, which included passes, leave, money, or promotion, or “moral incentives” such as commendations, certificates, and medals.³⁵³ Despite the efforts of the political officer, morale suffered in most NSWP units due to the enormous pressures of military life. Goldhamer elaborates:

The continuous pressure of a rigorous training process, the severity of discipline, incessant political indoctrination, the pressure to study for and acquire higher specialist ratings, the lack of genuine recreational facilities, and the all-pervasive influence of socialist competition clearly have a depressing effect both on troop morale and on the morale of the officers

³⁵⁰ impermissibility of violations of discipline.” Goldhamer points out that “in the Soviet socialist state, punishment has the aim not only of compelling individuals to observe the law but also of education them.”

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

³⁵² Goldhamer, p. 198. Corroborated by Hungarian and Polish officers interviewed by the authors in August, 1996.

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 129-130. The political officer inspected the barracks to ensure that living conditions met the subsistence-level standard set by regulation.

³⁵³ Ellen Jones, p. 131.

who must administer these programs and who have equally rigorous treatment imposed on them by their superiors and by the Party.³⁵⁴

For example, morale suffered in the Hungarian army during the Soviet era. According to Rakowska-Harmstone, few officers enjoyed the confidence of their men: "In one survey, 48 percent of the servicemen interviewed said that their commanders show no interest in their personal problems."³⁵⁵ In addition, alcoholism and a high suicide rate among conscripts throughout the NSWP exemplified the extent of the morale problems in the Soviet system.³⁵⁶

In the final analysis it is difficult for one to determine the effectiveness of Soviet-style authoritarian discipline because commanders and political officers frequently concealed disciplinary violations from their superiors.³⁵⁷ For example, in one Hungarian unit, hundreds of soldiers went absent without leave (AWOL) for entire weekends and received little or no punishment from their commanders who were unwilling to admit their inability to control their troops.³⁵⁸ Similar problems occurred in the Polish army where soldiers admitted to as many as thirty unauthorized absences but were rarely punished.³⁵⁹

C. SECONDARY FOUNDATIONS OF MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

Armed forces utilize personnel systems -- *recruitment and retention* and *career development* -- to assimilate military roles and to institutionalize forms of authority,

³⁵⁴ Goldhamer, pp. 184-185.

³⁵⁵ Rakowska-Harmstone, *Phase II - Vol 3*, p. 434.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁷ Jones, p. 140.

³⁵⁸ Rakowska-Harmstone, *Phase II - Vol 3*, p. 446.

³⁵⁹ Rakowska-Harmstone, *Phase II - Vol 2*, p. 111; According to Dr. Roman Laba, absenteeism and supervisors' lack of accountability were endemic in the civilian sector as well.

leadership, and discipline, morale, and obedience within the military organization. As secondary foundations of military professionalism, these personnel systems reflect a state's civil-military relations and largely determine the type and quality of professionalism maintained within its armed forces. Section one describes the two secondary foundations of military professionalism with respect to ASD states. Section two describes the two secondary foundations with respect to NSWP states.

1. The Armed Forces of Atlantic-Style Democratic (ASD) States

a. *Recruitment and Retention*

The goal of recruitment and retention is to develop and maintain the manpower needs of the nation's military. ASD militaries attain this goal in accordance with democratic principles and laws in order to satisfy the requirements and expectations of a democratic society, while simultaneously ensuring the highest quality force possible. The inherent tension between a democracy and a professional military, which forms the essence of democratic civil-military relations, significantly complicates the military's recruitment and retention efforts.

ASD militaries must attract people accustomed to life in liberal democratic civilian society to a conservative military institution that limits individual rights and privileges.³⁶⁰ To successfully recruit, the military must satisfy the needs and expectations of prospective soldiers. To meet their needs and expectations, ASD militaries modify their policies and regulations to accommodate current societal norms. For example, in recent years, ASD militaries have: relaxed off-duty dress codes; increased barracks

³⁶⁰ Rudolf Joo notes, in *The democratic control of armed forces...* , p. 54, that "Even in an established democracy, military service requires the acceptance by the individual of a number of personal restrictions."

privileges to permit more privacy and comforts for soldiers; and accelerated the integration of women into combat roles. In addition, ASD militaries attempt to offset the limitations placed on soldiers' rights and privileges by offering incentives for military service. These incentives, which include opportunities for education, advancement, and financial stability, serve to complement traditional reasons for joining the military: prestige, patriotism, and affinity for the military profession.

In addition, the way society views the military affects recruitment. If the military is held in high esteem by society, it will be easier for the military to recruit. To attain such a level of prestige, servicemen and women must conduct themselves in a manner which will leave a positive impression on the civilian members of society. In addition, society must perceive the military as an institution that abides by the rule of law and acts in society's best interest. Moreover, the history of a state's civil-military relations and the strength of its military tradition can also effect society's view of the military. For example, the tragic history of civil-military relations in Germany prior to 1945 caused postwar Germans to view the re-establishment of the military institution in the Federal Republic Germany with skepticism. In contrast, Poland's strong military tradition helped the post-communist Polish Armed Forces to attain a high level of prestige, despite the fact that the people viewed the Polish military with disdain after Jaruzelski's crackdown on Solidarity.³⁶¹

³⁶¹ Jacques Rupnik, "From 'Party-State' to 'Army-State,'" *The New Republic*, January 6 & 13, 1982. Also, Stanislaw Jarmoszko, "Political System Transformation Versus Military Profession Social Value in the Polish Army," Study report for the European Research Group on Military and Society Biennial Conference, Torino, May 26-29, 1994.

In addition to prestige, quality of life and opportunities for advancement help the military to attract and retain good people. In his "Annual Report to the President and Congress," US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry states that:

Readiness depends on attracting top quality people and retaining them after they have developed technical and leadership skills. To do so, the Department of Defense must offer not only challenging and rewarding work, but also an appropriate quality of life, a term used to encompass the entire package of compensation, benefits, and work and living environments for military service personnel.³⁶²

This statement highlights the importance of quality of life programs to ASD militaries, which, in order to attract and retain quality military professionals, must offer military members and their families a quality of life reasonably comparable to that which they could enjoy in the civilian sector. Quality of life programs assist ASD militaries in attracting good people by offering valuable incentives which include: pay and benefits, educational opportunities, career advancement, retirement, housing, health care, community and family support, religious support, and morale, welfare, and recreation. By providing these incentives, ASD militaries are able to meet the expectations of a broad segment of society while simultaneously building a quality force that is widely representative of society.³⁶³

³⁶² William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, March, 1996, p. 35.

³⁶³ The budget process has important implications for recruitment and retention. Smaller defense budgets force cuts in quality of life programs. These cuts negatively impact recruitment and retention efforts in the armed forces. Societal support for the military helps to influence politicians to approve larger defense budgets. ASD militaries attempt to gain societal support by reflecting societal norms and values to the degree possible.

b. Career Development - Promotion/Advancement; Education/Training

ASD militaries have a system of career development that provides opportunities for service members to meet personal expectations while simultaneously meeting the professional needs of the armed forces. For the purpose of this study, career development encompasses the following areas: *promotions*, *career advancement*, and *professional education and training*.

In ASD militaries, the *promotion system* supports the principle of democratic civilian control by ensuring that promotions are conferred on the basis of merit, not political orientation.³⁶⁴ The merit-based system of promotions is strengthened through the use of standard benchmarks to determine the competence of each individual. Standard evaluation procedures help to guarantee the consistent and universal application of the standard benchmarks. In addition, to ensure an impartial, objective, and fair promotion system, ASD militaries rely on centralized promotion boards. Centralized boards reduce cronyism, standardize selection criteria, and facilitate equal opportunity initiatives.³⁶⁵

In addition, centralized systems support *career advancement* in ASD militaries. Centralized career management reduces cronyism and ensures that officers and NCOs continue to develop, then advance along established career paths. Clearly defined, well publicized career paths motivate young military professionals by providing them

³⁶⁴ Amos Perlmutter and Valerie Bennett, *The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 51-55; also Marybeth Ulrich, p. 112.

³⁶⁵ Ulrich, p. 113.

with “road maps” that list what one must accomplish in order to advance to various levels along a particular path. Servicemembers who fail to advance because they are passed-over for promotion are discharged from active military service. This “up-or-out” system ensures that quality people are retained, and that the force structure is appropriately sized at each level in the military’s organizational hierarchy. The competitive nature of the merit-based “up or out” system is reflected in a story by Colin Powell, former Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. As one of fifty-two newly promoted brigadier generals in 1979, Powell attended a briefing by the Army Chief of Staff, General Bernard Rogers, who told the brigadiers: “Let me tell you how keen the competition is at this level...All of you could board an airplane and disappear over the Atlantic tomorrow, and the fifty-two colonels we’d replace you with would be just as good as you are. We would not be able to tell the difference.”³⁶⁶

Moreover, ASD militaries incorporate *professional education* in career paths to prepare each military professional for the new responsibilities that come with each consecutive career phase. Professional military education for officers includes four major educational phases: pre-commissioning, junior officer, mid-grade officer, and senior officer.

In all educational phases, but especially in the precommissioning programs conducted at service academies, civilian universities, and officer training schools, officers and cadets are taught the principles of *democratic military professionalism*. Students learn that soldiers in a democracy must be committed to the

³⁶⁶ Colin Powell, with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 244.

principles of civilian political control of the military and democratic accountability.³⁶⁷

They are also taught that citizen-soldiers do not owe their allegiance to an ethnic “nation,” “fatherland,” a particular political party, or a charismatic leader.³⁶⁸ Soldiers in a democracy are committed to the constitution and the morals, ethics, norms, and values of democratic ideology and society. In addition, they carry out the orders given to them by the democratically elected civilian president or prime minister and others lawfully appointed in the military chain of command.³⁶⁹ They do this for two reasons. First, soldiers serving a democratic government firmly accept the principle of civilian supremacy and believe that their civilian leaders exercise legitimate authority. And second, soldiers are confident that their civilian leaders, as representatives accountable to society, will give orders that are consistent with democratic norms and values.

In addition, students are taught *ethics* to ensure that they have the moral grounding necessary to make appropriate decisions. This is especially important in democratic militaries, where officers exercise considerable autonomy of command. Through ethics training, ASD states strive to prepare officers for situations that may require them to deconflict the force of law, the force of public opinion, the force of conscience, and the use of military force in order to carry out their mission.³⁷⁰ ASD militaries stress integrity above all other military virtues.³⁷¹ General Sir James Glover, former commander in chief of the United Kingdom Land Forces, defines integrity as

³⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 120.

³⁶⁸ Ibid.

³⁶⁹ Ibid.

³⁷⁰ James Glover, “A Soldier and his Conscience,” *The Parameters of Military Ethics*, p. 149.

³⁷¹ Ibid.

“being true to your men, true to your outfit, and above all true to yourself. Integrity of purpose, loyalty upward and loyalty downward, humanity, unselfishness -- these are its components.”³⁷² Glover goes on to add that “without [integrity], the leader is lost.”³⁷³ The importance of ethics in democratic military professionalism is underscored by the Bundeswehr’s *Innere Fuehrung*, which aims “to develop an army of morally self-determining soldiers.”³⁷⁴

ASD states also require officers to take *leadership* courses throughout the professional education process. In these courses, officers learn the leadership principles and techniques that will help them to inspire and motivate soldiers. By learning how to lead, officers learn to cultivate discipline and morale in their commands without relying on their authority and dominating soldiers through fear. Officers at all levels learn that care for troops ranks supreme among leadership principles.

The professional education system in ASD states involves a mixture of *civilian and military* staff to ensure that both officers and civilians are well versed in defense-related issues. Moreover, the complexity of democratic civil-military relations demands that the military education system employ instructors who are well versed in the subject. The presence of civilian instructors in military schools and the training of military instructors in civilian universities enhances the cross-flow of ideas and methods from society.³⁷⁵

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ Ibid.

³⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 148.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 121.

2. The Armed Forces of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) States

a. *Recruitment and Retention*

Recruitment and retention presented much less of a problem for NSWP militaries who were uninhibited by the demands of democratic accountability. In NSWP states, the communist party had complete control over the recruitment and retention of officers through its ability to regulate the political and economic benefits associated with professional military service.

The Communist Party in each of the NSWP states recognized the need for incentives to ensure recruitment and retention of a quality officer corps. As a result, NSWP officers received better pay and more perquisites than their civilian equivalents.³⁷⁶ In addition, the NSWP established military academies which offered civilian degrees along with commissions to boost the prestige of military service.³⁷⁷ Despite efforts to enhance the military's prestige, material benefits such as housing, pay, and generous pensions provided the greatest attraction for military service. These incentives formed the basis for recruitment and retention in the WP armed forces.

By contrast to the U.S. "up or out" policy, which links retention to promotion, the retention policy of NSWP militaries linked retention directly to age.³⁷⁸ The NSWP transferred officers to reserve status when they reached the maximum age for a given rank. This policy allowed lieutenants to serve to age forty and majors to forty-five, and had the effect of diluting the "up or out" principle and, thus, increasing the

³⁷⁶ Ellen Jones, p. 83.

³⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 85.

³⁷⁸ Ellen Jones, p. 89. This resulted in more of an "up and stay" structure.

social heterogeneity and age range of each rank.³⁷⁹ It also helped to retain the relatively large number of officers required to staff the overlapping political-military bureaucracies.

b. Career Development - Promotion/Advancement; Education/Training

In the career development of WP officers, loyalty to the communist party and ideological convictions were more important than military effectiveness. Although the NSWP evaluated both an officers military skills and political reliability, the communist party's influence in the military caused political considerations to take precedence in an officer's selection for promotion or advancement. Marshal Grechko, former commander of the Warsaw Pact, stated that "the *first and foremost* requirement (of officers) is to be ideologically convinced...an active champion of Party policy."³⁸⁰ Thus, political officers could deny promotion to an officer who failed to demonstrate loyalty to the party.

In addition, cronyism played a significant role in the advancement of officers.³⁸¹ The existence of a decentralized promotion system meant that an officer's immediate chain of command could act in self-interest to either approve or reject an officer's promotion. For example, a commander may prevent a qualified officer from advancing in order to retain the officer as long as possible, while, at the same time, enthusiastically recommending the advancement of a poor-performing officer to "get rid of him."³⁸²

³⁷⁹ Ellen Jones, pp. 91-92.

³⁸⁰ Goldhamer, p. 206.

³⁸¹ Confirmed by authors' interviews with Polish and Hungarian officers in August, 1996.

³⁸² Ellen Jones, p. 89.

In addition to being decentralized, the promotion system essentially advanced officers through the rank of lieutenant colonel automatically, according to time in service and the rank authorized for the officers assigned billet.³⁸³ Thus, upwardly mobile senior lieutenants frequently commanded companies, even though the company commander position called for a captain by “position category.”³⁸⁴ Once an officer moved into a position calling for the next higher rank, he then became eligible for promotion.³⁸⁵ The officer’s promotion then depended on his time in service relative to other “promotables” and the number of allocations available for the next higher rank.³⁸⁶ As result, the WP militaries maintained an officer corps which had a disproportionate number of middle grade and senior grade officers. Moreover, the absence of a merit-based promotion system and lack of an “up-or-out” policy for career advancement, left many officers stagnating in levels of responsibility not commensurate with their rank.³⁸⁷

Most NSWP officer *education programs* were congruous with the standardized Soviet network of curricula and methods.³⁸⁸ The education system consisted of three tiers, which included precommissioning, mid-career, and General Staff schools. The NSWP officers received their precommissioning education at local four-year military colleges, known as “higher military schools,” which prepared cadets for service

³⁸³ Based on authors’ interviews in August, 1996 with Polish and Hungarian officers who served in the Socialist Officer Corps. The officers indicated that only “political unreliability” kept an officer from being promoted in due course. An officer became eligible for promotion upon moving into a billet (position) coded for a higher rank.

³⁸⁴ Ellen Jones, p. 89, also corroborated by Polish and Hungarian officers interviewed by the authors in August, 1996.

³⁸⁵ Ibid.

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Based on authors’ interviews with Polish and Hungarian officers in August, 1996.

³⁸⁸ Christopher D. Jones, *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p. 225.

as lieutenants in a specific branch of service, which included ground forces, air forces, air defense, naval forces, political officers, and engineers.³⁸⁹ Upon reaching the rank of captain or major after several years of active duty, officers were eligible to attend one of several mid-career, postgraduate military academies in either their own country or in the Soviet Union.³⁹⁰ NSWP officers who graduated from mid-career academies in the Soviet Union, such as the Frunze Academy or Lenin Academy, were assigned according to a special *nomenklatura*, or list, of positions reserved for graduates of *Soviet* military academies.³⁹¹ The *nomenklatura* system ensured that only politically reliable officers were appointed to key positions.³⁹² The highest level of professional military education, offered exclusively at the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in Moscow, trained WP colonels and generals in operational-strategic combined arms.³⁹³

Officers and cadets in the NSWP armed forces received more specialized training and education than their counterparts in the United States.³⁹⁴ The higher schools taught platoon and company level tactics and the mid-level schools taught joint-combined operations.³⁹⁵ With the exception of the General Staff Academy, and to a lesser extent the mid-level academies, NSWP professional education focused on specific military subjects and did not expose officers to a broad range of topics.

³⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 210.

³⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 212.

³⁹¹ Scott and Scott, p. 371.

³⁹² Ibid.

³⁹³ Christopher D. Jones, p. 219. There were different levels of *nomenklatura* in all communist institutions to ensure reliability throughout the system.

³⁹⁴ Scott and Scott, p. 402.

³⁹⁵ Christopher D. Jones, p. 204.

In addition to coursework in one of three general categories of specialization: command, political, or engineering, all higher school cadets took a series of core courses which included military-political indoctrination.³⁹⁶ Aimed at developing a reliable corps of officers, the military-political indoctrination emphasized the importance of Soviet supremacy in the “international socialist system” and the preeminence of the Party in each state.³⁹⁷ The *nomenklatura* system, which gave preference for advancement to officers who attended mid-level schools in the Soviet Union, served to reinforce Soviet supremacy in the minds of NSWP officers.³⁹⁸ Political officers controlled the indoctrination of officers and censured ideas and values that conflicted with communist ideology.³⁹⁹ Students learned a style of military professionalism that ignored many of the ethical underpinnings of democracies, such as the importance of the individual, freedom, and compassion.⁴⁰⁰

³⁹⁶ Ellen Jones, p. 85.

³⁹⁷ Rakowska-Harmstone, *Phase II - Vol 1*, pp. 41-44.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

³⁹⁹ Ellen Jones, p. 148 states that “only one [set of values] -- that approved by the political leadership -- is communicated.” This applies to all of communist society, not just the military.

⁴⁰⁰ Clay T. Buckingham, “Ethics and the Senior Officer,” *The Parameters of Military Ethics*, Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown, eds. (Washington, D.C., Pergamon-Brassey’s Publishers, 1989), p. 88. Buckingham traces the origins of traditional democratic values to Judeo-Christian heritage.

IV. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM IN POLAND AND HUNGARY, 1996

A. INTRODUCTION

Chapters II and III described different forms of civil-military relations and foundations of military professionalism in ASD and NSWP states. The present chapter seeks to use the ASD and NSWP models from the previous chapters as a framework to analyze civil-military relations and military professionalism in Hungary and Poland in the midst of PFP and possible NATO accession.

This thesis is based on the notion that the development of a new form of military professionalism in post-communist Hungary and Poland must coincide with the reform of formal civil-military arrangements to ensure that their militaries are effective instruments of national security *in a democracy*.⁴⁰¹ Both Hungary and Poland initiated reforms of their formal civil-military relations and the professionalism of their armed forces in the early 1990s. Today, East-Central European states remain in a *transitory* stage of development, in which elements of the old authoritarian regimes and the new democratic system coexist.⁴⁰² Conflicting laws, institutions, policy-making mechanisms, political cultures, and social and cultural norms and values are endemic in societies making the transition from one-party communist rule to democracy.⁴⁰³ In his recent study on democratization, *The Third Wave--Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Samuel Huntington notes that states like Poland and Hungary must overcome the

⁴⁰¹ Ulrich, "Democratization and the Post-Communist Militaries."

⁴⁰² Joo, p. 20.

⁴⁰³ Ibid.

following “transition problems” to consolidate their democratic political systems. They must: abolish authoritarian agencies such as the secret police; sever Party-government ties; dismiss pro-authoritarian officials; establish democratic constitutional and electoral systems; reform the military; and repeal or modify laws that are unsuitable for democracy.⁴⁰⁴ According to Huntington, countries “in transition” must also tackle “contextual problems,” stemming from the nature of their particular society, economy, culture, and history.⁴⁰⁵ In addition, once the new democracies of Eastern Europe consolidate and stabilize, they need to recognize certain “systemic problems” inherent in a democratic system: the inability to reach political consensus, susceptibility to demagoguery, and domination of vested economic interests.⁴⁰⁶

B. DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

To overcome the “transition problems” and make a complete and successful shift to democracy, Hungary and Poland must first ensure democratic political control of the military. Democratic political control helps to prevent the armed forces from using their monopoly of force to intervene on behalf of a particular political party. The turmoil that followed the collapse of communism provided an opportunity for the military to intervene to keep the Communist Party in power, and thus, endanger the democratization

⁴⁰⁴ Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave- Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) p. 209.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid., According to Huntington these problems include: communal conflict, regional and ethnic antagonisms, poverty, socioeconomic inequality, inflation, external debt, and low rates of economic growth.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 210. Also on pages 258-270, Huntington contends that a developed democratic political culture helps a state to deal with these systemic problems more effectively. A good definition of democratic political culture is found in the NATO Draft General Report, “Democratization in Eastern Europe: An Interim Assessment,” NATO Website, May, 1994; The report states that “Democracy is a set of values that has to be acquired and nurtured.... A “democratic culture” involves the respect for others, the ability to distinguish between personal opinion and political programmes, the acceptance of the need to relinquish as well as assume power, a capacity for rational debate and, finally, a spirit of compromise.”

process. The new rulers in Hungary and Poland averted this problem by successfully separating the military from the structures of the Communist Party through a process of de-politicization of the armed forces.⁴⁰⁷ In addition, both countries dismantled the secret police and reformed their security services.⁴⁰⁸ In the gradual democratization process that followed, Hungary and Poland worked to subordinate their militaries to a democratic multi-party system.⁴⁰⁹ Like their communist predecessors, the democratically elected leaders of Eastern Europe understand that civil supremacy prevents the abuse of military power.⁴¹⁰ According to Dr. Jeffrey Simon, “the absence of any clear command authority and of civilian control over the military is a recipe for disaster.”⁴¹¹ S.E. Finer states that the military is more likely to disregard civilian supremacy and intervene: when the military owes its *primary loyalty to the state* rather than to the government in power;⁴¹² when military leaders, as defense experts, refuse to accept the decisions of civilian leaders

⁴⁰⁷ Joo, p. 33. According to Dr. Joo, depoliticization included: “abolishing the communist party’s monopoly and privileges in the armed forces; disbanding Party organizations and committees in the military and eliminating the posts of full-time Party workers in the armed forces; forbidding all discrimination within the armed forces, based on political or ideological criteria, directed against religious believers and non-communists.”

⁴⁰⁸ Amy Knight, *Spies Without Cloaks* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 247-249.

⁴⁰⁹ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 232; also Jeffrey Simon, “Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion,” *McNair Paper 39*, April, 1995, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., pp. 154-155.

⁴¹⁰ The state must prevent civilian politicians and military officers from misusing the military’s monopoly of force to attain political goals or resolve partisan political disputes, see Danopolous and Zirker, p. xii, xiv. In addition, Dr. Joo states the continuing potential danger of military intervention into politics: “With an increasing part of society in economic difficulty, the desire for order and prosperity could also lead a growing segment of society to look for a “strong man,” a savior in uniform. This is not a concrete and imminent danger, but it remains a potential threat.” Joo, p.33.

⁴¹¹ Jeffrey Simon, “Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion,” *McNair Paper 39*, April, 1995, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., p.154.

⁴¹² This leads to situational conflicts when military leaders disagree with the civilian commander-in-chief over the “national interest.” In other words, problems arise when the military sees itself as the ultimate guardian of the state and “definer of the national interest.” For example, Professor Roman Laba states that a danger for Poland lies in the potential for the military to see itself as the ultimate guardian of the state, as the Catholic Church sees itself as the ultimate guardian of society.

with respect to defense matters; and when the state's civilian leaders abuse their authority by using the military to coerce their domestic opposition.⁴¹³

To guard against the military's intervention and ensure democratic political control, Poland and Hungary must order their civil-military relations to include the following formal arrangements: First, clear legal and *constitutional provisions* that define the basic relationship between the state and the armed forces; Second, a *legislature* with significant power in defense and security matters; Third, a civilian *ministry of defense* that provides civilian supervision and administrative oversight of the military.⁴¹⁴

1. Constitutional Provisions

In the post-Communist era, Hungary and Poland have established democratic constitutional provisions to define the role of the armed forces. In both countries, the military defends the Republic from external aggressors. According to *The Basic Principles National Defence in the Republic of Hungary*, “[Hungary’s] policy of national defense is of a defensive character, we do not regard any country as an enemy, nor do we have an enemy image.”⁴¹⁵ Likewise, Polish security policy calls for the “inviolability of existing international borders, abandonment of territorial demands, respect for sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs.”⁴¹⁶

⁴¹³ Finer, pp. 22-23.

⁴¹⁴ Joo, Simon, and other experts in the field agree on the importance of these three areas.

⁴¹⁵ *The Basic Principles of National Defence in the Republic of Hungary*, Ministry of Defence, Budapest, 1993.

⁴¹⁶ *Polish Armed Forces Guide '95*, Ministry of National Defense, Warsaw, 1995, p.16; Also, a Polish MOD brochure entitled “Poland’s Security Policy,” translated in FBIS-EEU-96-131 (1 Jan 96), which states that the basic principles of Polish policy on domestic and foreign security are defined by two documents adopted by the Committee for National Defense on 2 November 1992: “Premises of Polish Security Policy,” and “Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland.”

In addition, Poland and Hungary created legal and institutional mechanisms that define the relationship between the armed forces and the civilian branches of government.⁴¹⁷ Constitutional provisions, service acts and defense laws subordinate the military to the President of the Republic, the parliament, and a civilian Ministry of Defense. Moreover, provisions allow for the formation of presidential advisory bodies, such as a National Security Council (NSC), to enhance executive oversight of the military.⁴¹⁸ Despite conflicts that resulted from confusion over ambiguous verbiage in previous versions of the constitutions, service acts and defense laws, both countries are committed to the principle of democratic civil control of the military.⁴¹⁹

2. The Role of the Legislature

Parliament ensures civil supremacy by exercising oversight and control of the budget and the deployment of the armed forces in emergency and war.⁴²⁰ Polish and Hungarian Parliaments delegate responsibility for oversight of the military to Defense Committees.⁴²¹ According to Dr. Jeffrey Simon, the Hungarian National Assembly exercises legislative oversight of the military through budgetary controls, the Basic Principles of National Defense, the Defense Bill, and the power to deploy the armed

⁴¹⁷ For example, Poland's Minister of National Defense Act clarified the chain of command between the Ministry of Defense and the President with respect to the military.

⁴¹⁸ Based on authors' interview with Dr. Jeffrey Simon, Senior Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., May, 1996.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid. Jeffrey Simon states that Hungary and Poland's constitutions need to address fundamental civil-military problems that still exist, notably presidential and governmental powers in peacetime and in war must be clarified.

⁴²⁰ Simon, p. 15.

⁴²¹ The Hungarian Defense Committee consists of 19 members of Parliament who represent all major political parties in the Assembly. It also includes the former Minister of Defense and two retired generals. See Janos Szabo, "Fostering Democratic Civil-Military Relations" Zrinyi Miklos Military Academy Paper, June, 1996. Budapest.

forces.⁴²² And despite earlier problems, Poland's Parliament has assumed effective oversight of the defense budget, overall direction of defense policy, the structure of the armed forces, and the deployment of the military during times of crisis.⁴²³

3. Ministry of Defense (MOD)

The ministry of defense is the third leg in a “triad” of mechanisms designed to ensure civilian control. To exert effective civilian oversight, civilian defense ministries should control the preparation of the military budget, access to intelligence, strategic planning, force sizing and structure, procurement and acquisitions, deployments, and promotions.⁴²⁴ In the early 1990s, Hungary and Poland promulgated defense acts that subordinated their armed forces to a civilian Minister of Defense.⁴²⁵ However, a shortage

⁴²² Ibid., p.104. According to Col. Szurgyi, USDAO in Budapest, the armed forces must consult the Defense Committee on all matters that involve over 1000 men.

⁴²³ Simon, p. 154; The Polish Armed Forces Guide '95, pp.32-33; Paweł Swieboda, "In NATO's Waiting Room," *Transition*, 19 April 1996, p. 52; and the "Woodrow Wilson Center Meeting Report: East European Studies," Jan-Feb 1996. In this report Professor Andrew Michta stated that there were three occasions in Poland during the post-Communist era in which civil-military relations were at the center of government crises: "In 1992 and 1994, ministers of defense were dismissed amidst controversy over civilian oversight and the army's involvement in politics; and in February 1995, rumors in the press that General Tadeusz Wilecki, the chief of the General Staff, was being called to Warsaw to serve as prime minister undermined parliamentary support for the government of Waldemar Pawlak. Finally, an argument over whether the chief of the general staff should be subordinated directly to the president or remain subordinated to the defense minister became a focal point of President Lech Wałęsa's struggle with the parliament in 1995." In an interview conducted by the authors in May, 1996, Dr. Jeffrey Simon, Senior Fellow at the National Defense University, Washington D.C., stated that many of the problems have been resolved since the end of 1995 as a result of a "revolution in Defense Reform."

⁴²⁴ Simon, pp.153-154.

⁴²⁵ Joo states that the Defense Act of 1993 "stipulates a complex system of checks and balances whereby the Cabinet, Parliament, and the President all individually have a say in matters of defense policy. According to Professor Janos Szabo, The Hungarian Minister of Defense approves the command structure and operating procedures of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF), directs procurement, determines the principles of human resource management, and responsible for initiating disciplinary procedures against general officers and colonels in the HDF. In addition, he exercises jurisdiction in relation to military educational institutes and appoints military attaches. He ensures compliance with the decisions of civilian political authorities. The chain of command flows from the President of the Republic to the Defense Minister, to the Commander of the HDF.

According to a 1996 report by Col. Dr. Adam Kolodziejczyk, Director of the Military Institute for Sociological Research in Poland, the Polish Minister of Defense manages the development of the armed forces, training and preparation, administration, personnel and social affairs, and reserve manpower. The

of civilian defense experts and general political instability has slowed the process of “civilianizing” the MODs in Eastern Europe and, in fact, caused a certain degree of “re-militarization” of the defense ministries.⁴²⁶ Former Deputy Hungarian Defense Minister Dr. Joo, comments on the problem: “the process of “civilianizing” the [MODs] is on the whole falling short of the initial hopes of those politicians who wanted a more dynamic transformation of defense management.”⁴²⁷ The inclination of the General Staffs to resist relinquishing their power to inexperienced civilians is certainly understandable. Clausewitz himself stated that “a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of general policy.”⁴²⁸ In Poland and Hungary, an unwillingness of the General Staffs to accept subordination to inexperienced civilian authority and the presence of recently retired military officers in key positions in the MODs has undermined the civilianization process.⁴²⁹ For example, some officers in the Polish General Staff have indicated their resentment toward civilian authority by making sarcastic comments like “Civilian officials would also like to control how straight a single soldier fires a shot.”⁴³⁰ According to Finer, military leaders must refrain from the temptation to intervene despite

chain of command flows from the President to the Minister of Defense to the Chief of the General Staff. In both countries, the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

⁴²⁶ Joo, p. 32. In both countries, the previously all-military Defense Ministry has been divided into two separate components: a civilian-led, civil-military component, responsible for the formulation of defense policy, administration, finances, and staffing; and a General Staff, responsible for operational command.

⁴²⁷ Joo, p. 31.

⁴²⁸ Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Chapter six, Book eight, p. 608.

⁴²⁹ Based on the authors’ interview with Dr. Jeffrey Simon, May, 1996. However, Dr. Simon also pointed out that recent (and announced) personnel changes in top positions within the General Staffs and MODs bode both countries well in the recent and coming months with respect to MOD-General Staff reform. For example, Poland has taken significant steps in 1996 to strengthen the MOD vis a vis the General Staff. One significant change was the creation of a new financial division at the MOD and liquidation of its duplicate at the General Staff in late January, 1996.

⁴³⁰ Polityka, Warsaw, “All Power into the Hands of MON? Squaring the Four-Cornered Cap,” 2 Mar, 1996, as translated in FBIS-EEU-96-045 (2 Mar 1996), pp. 3-4, 6-7.

their disenchantment with the lack of civilian competence in defense matters.⁴³¹ To help correct this problem, both countries have implemented educational programs to develop civilian expertise in defense matters.⁴³²

In addition, Hungary and Poland recognize the need to improve the working relationship between the General Staff and the civilian MOD.⁴³³ Efforts are underway in both countries to improve the working relationship between the MOD and General Staff, particularly in the areas of strategic defense planning and defense resource management.⁴³⁴ In Poland, conflict arising from different interpretations of the law regarding, among other things, the powers of the MOD and General Staff has been formally resolved by the introduction of new "Organizational Regulations" signed by the Minister of National Defense, Stanislaw Dobrzanski in November, 1996.⁴³⁵ However, the tension between the Polish General Staff and the MOD remains a significant problem for Poland's civil-military relations.⁴³⁶ Roman Kulczycki, consultant to the Prime Minister and professor at the National Defense Academy in Poland, recently commented

⁴³¹ Finer, pp. 22-23.

⁴³² Based on the authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish MOD officials in August, 1996. For example, Poland has instituted a National Security Program at Warsaw University to educate future civilian managers and policymakers in defense issues. In addition, both countries are recipients of the Expanded IMET (EIMET) program administered by the US Defense Security Assistance Agency.

⁴³³ Based on authors' interviews with Dr. Jeffrey Simon in May, 1996 and with Polish and Hungarian officers in August, 1996.

⁴³⁴ This is being done with the help of NATO countries. For example, the Defense Resource Management Study Program (DRMS) of the US Office of the Secretary of Defense helps the MODs develop effective defense resource and budget systems, which require General Staff input.

⁴³⁵ *Polska Zbrojna*, "A New Code of the Defense Ministry; The 'Organizational Regulations of MON' Enter into Force," Warsaw, 22-24 Nov 96, as translated in FBIS-EEU-96-228 (24 Nov 1996), pp. 1, 3. The regulations were drafted by a team headed by Deputy Minister Andrzej Karkoszka in order to expound on the general provisions set forth in the Law on the Office of the Defense Minister passed by parliament in December, 1995. See *Polska Zbrojna*, Warsaw, "Reforming the Ministry," 15 Jul 96, as translated in FBIS-EEU-96-137 (15 July, 1996), pp. 1, 3.

⁴³⁶ Based on conversations with Dr. Donald Abenheim -- in consultation with Dr. Jeffrey Simon, Nov 96.

on one symptom of the problem, "Not everyone must travel en masse to the West in order to join the Polish Republic to NATO and lose time in droves attending foreign language courses. It would be good if, instead of such tourism, at least some politicians and military [officers] would attend to building Poland's national defense system."⁴³⁷ In Hungary, tension also exists between the ministry's political leadership and the army's professional leadership. However, the Hungarian Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Ferenc Vegh dismisses this tension as "a natural development in an evolutionary process," adding that "The differences of views between the ministry and the army mostly originate from different approaches to the same circle of problems."⁴³⁸

Much of the tension between the civilian and military leadership in both countries stems from downsizing and restructuring of the defense ministry staff and the armed forces.⁴³⁹ Restructuring of the defense ministries in Poland and Hungary has meant the dismissal and early retirement of a number of senior military and civilian staffers.⁴⁴⁰ In addition, personnel strength reductions and inadequate defense budgets have created morale problems in the HDF and PAF, particularly in the officer corps.⁴⁴¹

⁴³⁷ *Polska Zbrojna*, "On Effective Control of National Defense," interview with Roman Kulcyzcki translated by FBIS-EEU-96-197 (9 Sep 96), pp. 1-2.

⁴³⁸ *Nepszabadsag*, Budapest, "We Even Need More Uniforms," Interview with Lieutenant General Ferenc Vegh, as translated by FBIS-EEU-96-197 (8 Oct 96), pp. 1, 8.

⁴³⁹ Ibid.; also *Polska Zbrojna*, "Reforms Yes, but without Haste," 12-14 Apr 1996, interview with Polish Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski, as translated by FBIS-EEU-96-074 (16 Apr 1996), pp. 1, 3.

⁴⁴⁰ *Polska Zbrojna*, Warsaw, "Reforming the Ministry," FBIS-EEU-96-137, pp. 1,3; and *MTI*, Budapest, "General Staff's Reorganization Plans Viewed," FBIS-EEU-96-033-A (9 Feb 96).

⁴⁴¹ Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers in August, 1996. Morale problems primarily effect the professional officer corps. They no longer hold a "privileged" status in society and the restructuring of the armed forces has severely limited their career opportunities.

C. DEMOCRATIC CITIZEN-SOLDIER

In addition to the formal mechanisms provided by constitutional provisions, empowered democratic legislatures, and civilian-controlled MODs, society's participation in the democratic process enhances democratic political control. The citizens of a democracy influence political decisions that effect the military through their political representation in the legislature and their individual right to vote. This creates a tendency for society to impose its liberal values and norms on the military through the political process. On the other hand, the military must retain its "conservative" values and norms to be effective. The state reconciles the competing demands of liberal society and the requirements of a conservative military by ensuring that the members of the armed forces embody the ideal of the *democratic citizen-soldier*.

Today, Polish and Hungarian military reformers recognize the need to re-build their armed forces around the concept of the democratic citizen-soldier. However, the legacy of the communist citizen soldier complicates the military's efforts toward this end for two reasons. First, Eastern Europeans associate the communist citizen soldier with the former Soviet-controlled militaries that provided the means for internal and external oppression. Thus, Eastern Europeans learned to distrust an institution that, in their view, did not owe its loyalty so much to the people or the nation as to the Party and the Soviet Union.⁴⁴² And Second, the fact that communist and democratic citizen soldiers embodied disparate values and forms of professionalism further complicates efforts to reform the armed forces. Despite their failure to gain the "attitudinal integration" of most Eastern

⁴⁴² Victorson, p. 10.

European soldiers, NSWP leaders continually tried to shape them into the *ideal* New Socialist Man who obeyed the Party, believed in the Marxist-Leninist world view, and scorned bourgeois ideology.⁴⁴³ By contrast, the *ideal* democratic citizen-soldier embodies democratic principles based on respect for the individual.

Determined to overcome their communist legacy, Poland and Hungary are trying to re-build the image and prestige of the military by developing a legal-political culture that accepts the idea of the “citizen in uniform.”⁴⁴⁴ In addition, Polish and Hungarian armed forces are inculcating their officers and soldiers with the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier.

As noted in chapter two, the ideal democratic citizen-soldier is a soldier who: First, is representative of society; Second, serves the nation primarily out of a sense of duty and civic responsibility; Third, respects democratic civilian control of the military and remains non-partisan; and Fourth, retains the rights of a democratic citizen, limited only to the extent required to perform his military duties. The following analysis reveals how Hungary and Poland are introducing the ideal of the citizen-soldier into their armed forces.

1. Democratic Citizen-Soldiers are Representative of Society

The officers in the Hungarian and Polish armed forces, stripped of their ties to the Communist Party and Soviet military, no longer hold the privileged social status that

⁴⁴³ Jones, p. 149. Even though most soldiers refused to be “attitudinally integrated,” they were still “functionally integrated” into the Soviet military system.

⁴⁴⁴ Joo, p. 55, and Simon, pp. 154-155. As pointed out later in this chapter, the Polish military enjoys a much higher level of prestige than the Hungarian military today.

isolated them from the mainstream of society under Soviet domination.⁴⁴⁵ The successful separation of the officer corps from the Communist Party helped to remove the apparatus that once held the armed forces above the rest of society. In addition, the loss of their Communist Party perquisites closed the socioeconomic gap between the officer corps and society. For example, in the Soviet era, officers enjoyed special rights and privileges which included: higher pay and better housing, priority status with respect to receiving goods and services, and robust retirement benefits, to name a few. Today, Hungarian and Polish officers feel “more appreciated” and “closer to the people” because they are no longer linked with the oppressive apparatus of the “old system” and they no longer receive the perquisites which gave them a privileged status in society.⁴⁴⁶

The severance of Communist Party ties and the elimination of special Party privileges for officers are the first steps that the Hungarian and Polish militaries have taken to eliminate the barrier that prevents military officers from being representative of society. This requirement fulfilled, Poland and Hungary are now attempting to re-socialize the military and society to enable soldiers and civilian citizens to understand the dynamics of the relationship between the military and a society in a democratic system.⁴⁴⁷ Although the soldiers and societies of Poland and Hungary shared national aspirations and Western cultural attraction during the communist period, they have never had a

⁴⁴⁵ Based on authors' interviews with Polish and Hungarian officers in August, 1996. The officers indicated that they are now viewed as normal members of society -- experiencing the same socioeconomic hardships.

⁴⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁷ For example, in Hungary and Poland, the armed forces publish weekly magazines, such as Hungary's *Honved*, which are available to the public and have articles on democratic political control and democratic civil-military relations issues.

democratic political culture.⁴⁴⁸ For example, Rakowska-Harmstone describes the Polish political culture as “highly individualistic yet contentious..., pluralistic and egalitarian, but class-conscious and nostalgic for authority figures” -- a political culture reflected in the political history of Poland’s interwar Second Republic, characterized by a weak parliamentary system with a high turnover of coalition governments and the “de-facto” dictatorship of Jozef Pilsudski.⁴⁴⁹ She adds that, “On the whole, the basic features of Polish political culture [were] totally incompatible with Marxism-Leninism.... This incongruity, reinforced by [Polish] nationalism and religion, [was] at the source of the political instability which plagued communist Poland throughout...its existence.⁴⁵⁰ As the fledgling Polish and Hungarian democracies begin to institutionalize democratic political culture, their societies will increasingly impose their growing demands on the military.⁴⁵¹ As discussed in chapter two, democratic societies, as a minimum, demand that the military reflect democratic principles. As the military embraces democratic norms and values, it becomes more closely tied to civil society. When the citizen enters the military, a soldier retains many of the rights of a citizen, and thus he remains “representative” of

⁴⁴⁸ Rakowska-Harmstone, *Phase II -Vol. 1*, pp. 327-328.

⁴⁴⁹ Rakowska-Harmstone, *Phase II - Vol. 2*, pp. 24-25.

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁴⁵¹ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 265; In addition, according to Hungarian Col Janos Szabo, pressure groups are surfacing to force the military to change its policies. Groups such as the “Alba Circle,” who support conscientious objectors and anti-conscription are trying to influence defense policy.

In Poland, according to Col Adam Kolodziejczyk, Director of the Polish Military Institute for Sociological Research, a longitudinal study shows that in 1990, Polish military professionals held more conservative values than society, but in 1993, the military professionals and society held similar values. Col Kolodziejczyk attributes this to a liberalization of values in the military. In another study, “Selected Issues of Civil-Military Relations in Poland,” June, 1996, Col Henryk Dziewulski discusses media’s impact on the military’s relationship with society. By exposing social problems within the military, the media forces the military to publicly interact with society on a daily basis.

the democratic citizen. The military does not strip him of his identity as a democratic citizen, nor does it place him in a privileged position above society.

2. Democratic Citizen-Soldiers Serve out of a Sense of Duty and Civic Responsibility

As citizens in Hungary and Poland gain a greater awareness of democratic principles, individual rights, and the dynamics of the relationship between the military and society, they will also begin to understand the importance of the democratic citizen-soldier. As part of this understanding, people must appreciate that the rights afforded them by a democratic system does not exempt them from civic and military obligations. People must also realize that the military plays a legitimate and necessary role as the defender of their democratic way of life.

Today, many Hungarians and Poles are striving to comprehend their newly-acquired democratic rights and responsibilities. However, the lack of a democratic tradition in these countries initially makes it difficult for the people to fully grasp the new ideology.⁴⁵² George Schoepflin, a professor of Slavonic and East European studies at the University of London aptly describes the problem:

The democratic experiment in Central and Eastern Europe is beginning to resemble the imposition of communism: in as much as communism was an attempt to introduce a proletarian revolution without a working class, what is now happening is the introduction of democracy without democrats.⁴⁵³

⁴⁵² Based on authors' interviews with Polish and Hungarian officers in August, 1996.

⁴⁵³ George Schoepflin, "Postcommunism: The Problems of Democratic Construction," *Daedalus*, Summer, 1994, p. 129.

Since the dawn of the Enlightenment, East Central Europeans have struggled with the basic paradox in ECE politics; the incompatibility of its endorsement of Western civilization, political ideas, and institutions, and the reality of the region's social, economic and ethnic problems.⁴⁵⁴

For example, the Polish Constitution of 1791 proclaimed that the principles of Constitutional democracy applied to all of the people of Poland. In reality, though, only a small percentage of Poles were able to enjoy the individual rights and political freedoms set forth in the Constitution.⁴⁵⁵ With serfdom firmly in place, only the *szlachta*, or Polish aristocracy were considered "citizens" eligible to benefit from the Enlightenment ideas of liberty, equality, and freedom.⁴⁵⁶ Similarly, Hungarian revolutionaries, influenced by the European Revolutions of 1848, embraced the Enlightenment ideas as an affront to the Hapsburg Imperial bureaucracy.⁴⁵⁷ However, the revolutionaries' undermined their own efforts to spread the Western democratic values when they refused to challenge the privileged status of the Hungarian nobility.⁴⁵⁸

In addition, ethno-nationalism served to undermine reformist attempts to inculcate liberal democratic values into ECE political culture. For example, the new borders drawn at the Paris Peace Conference exacerbated ethnic disputes because ethnic boundaries did not nearly correspond with political boundaries, as they did in Western Europe. Moreover, East Central Europeans tended to view themselves in "national" terms rather

⁴⁵⁴ Jacques Rupnik, *The Other Europe* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989), p. 13.

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 14.

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid.

than in “individual” terms.⁴⁵⁹ In many cases, the collective rights of the nation were placed before the rights of the individual. Both the Declaration of Independence of the Hungarian nation and the Manifesto of the Pan Slavic Congress of 1848 emphasized the importance of the “nation” in terms equal to or beyond the status of the individual.⁴⁶⁰

The ECE political paradox continued into the twentieth century, when during the interwar period, Western style democracy again failed to take root in ECE. In 1919, Woodrow Wilson’s call for self-determination and the spread of liberal democracy, emboldened the new ECE states to draft Western style Constitutions. Based on the model of the French Third Republic, the new constitutions created inherently weak political structures and relationships by making the legislative branches of government stronger than the executive--a condition which directly contributed to the political instability of the interwar period.⁴⁶¹ Jacques Rupnik discusses some of the reasons why democracy failed in ECE in *The Other Europe*:

There were a number of reasons why the democratic experiment proved unsuccessful. Prominent among them the problem of introducing a political system based on values and institutions derived from the French Revolution in archaic, predominantly peasant countries. In the absence of genuine land reform, what could words such as freedom, equality and fraternity mean to the Hungarian or Romanian peasant? The old stable patriarchal system was breaking down without sufficient provisions for integration of large sections of society into the new democratic system. They—the peasantry but also many members of the intelligentsia—became vulnerable to the appeal of right-wing radical demagogues.⁴⁶²

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁶¹ Ibid., p. 16.

⁴⁶² Ibid.

In short, ECE political history is best described as an amalgam of conflicting and competing ideas, values, and social development. Such a problematic political and social landscape makes it difficult for the states like Hungary and Poland to infuse Western liberal democracy into their societies today; thus, also making it difficult for the people to understand their rights and obligations as citizens.⁴⁶³ Ideally, as Eastern European societies develop a democratic culture, their citizens should begin to feel obliged to serve in the military out of a sense of duty and civic responsibility when called upon to do so.⁴⁶⁴

Simply an understanding of what it means to be a democratic citizen is often not sufficient to impel a citizen to serve in the military. An additional impetus to serve comes from how the citizen views the military institution. If society is confident in the military and sees it as a prestigious, legitimate institution, the citizen will more willing to serve in its ranks.⁴⁶⁵ Since 1989, Poland and Hungary have attempted to restore the prestige of their armed forces and citizen confidence in the military institution. The disparate histories of the military's relationship with society in Hungary and Poland require one to discuss each state separately.

Hungary had a strong military tradition until 1945. Professor Ivan Volgyes states that prior to the Second World War, "the Hungarian military was for centuries the most highly regarded stratum of Hungarian society. The swashbuckling Hussar, usually the son

⁴⁶³ NATO Draft General Report, "Democratization in Eastern Europe: An Interim Assessment," NATO Website, May, 1994, p. 4.

⁴⁶⁴ The authors' are not suggesting that all citizens of a democracy feel an obligation to serve at any time in the military. Quite to the contrary, citizens in countries with an Anglo-Saxon heritage tend to abhor being compelled to serve in the military during peacetime. As noted in the previous chapter, some ASD states have eliminated conscription, in part, for this reason.

⁴⁶⁵ Based on readings of Simon, Joo, and interviews with Polish and Hungarian officers in August, 1996.

of a noble family, fulfilled a highly visible and extremely well regarded social-political function throughout Hungarian history.”⁴⁶⁶ The officer corps retained its status during the interwar period despite the fact that the Austro-Hungarian armies lost the First World War. However, the people did not blame the army for the defeat, instead, Hungarians rallied around the armed forces in appreciation of their valiant efforts on the battlefield.⁴⁶⁷ The prestige of the Hungarian army deteriorated in the last years of the Second World War as much of the Hungarian officer corps, faced with the choice of “subjugation” to Stalin or “independence” with Hitler, chose to fight for the latter. This decision, combined with the disastrous loss of an entire Hungarian army on the Eastern Front during the battles for Stalingrad eroded public support for the military institution.⁴⁶⁸ Moreover, the inability of the Hungarian army to repulse the Red Army in 1945 caused a further decline in popular support for the armed forces. After the war, the Russians considered the “fascist, bourgeois officer corps” a threat to the new Hungarian-communist state, and banished many officers to the gulag.⁴⁶⁹ By the late 1940s, “the Hungarian army had reached the abyss, an abyss of scorn, poor morale, and low social status.”⁴⁷⁰ Throughout the Soviet-era the army had problems re-gaining its prestige, especially after many officers and soldiers refused to fight the Soviets during the 1956 uprising.⁴⁷¹ Thus, by the 1990s Hungarian society viewed the military as the institution that had lost two world wars, had failed to support the people’s revolt in 1956, and who,

⁴⁶⁶ Ivan Volgyes, “The Military and Political Socialization,” p. 147.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 147.

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁷¹ Based on authors’ interview with Col. Szurgyi, USDAO, Budapest, August, 1996.

as the “guardians of the regime,” had helped the Soviet Union maintain their grip on Eastern Europe”.⁴⁷²

Today, Hungary is attempting to improve the prestige of the military to make it a viable and effective institution in the new Hungarian democracy. For example, the Hungarian MOD’s new Social Relations and Cultural Department analyzes and monitors public opinion and strives to create a positive image for the Hungarian Defense Forces.⁴⁷³ In addition, the MOD established a press office and a “Correspondent’s Club” to help educate the media on defense matters.⁴⁷⁴ Moreover, the need to improve prestige and inculcate the people with a sense of duty and civic responsibility is codified in the “Basic Principles of National Defense in the Republic of Hungary:”

The shaping and development of appropriate attitudes of awareness, emotion and psychology are indispensable for...preparing society for national defense. The awareness of belonging to the nation, the will and determination to defend the homeland and the *democratic legal order* must be reinforced. The broadest sections of society must be made to accept their national defense and civil defense obligations. Preparations to reach a certain level of awareness must extend to all spheres of public life. In shaping this it is indispensable to *strengthen the openness, social relations and social control* of the armed forces...⁴⁷⁵ (emphasis added by authors).

According to Hungarian officers interviewed by the authors, these initiatives have helped to improve the prestige of the Hungarian Defense Forces and foster a sense of duty among the citizenry.⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁷² Ibid., also, Joo, p. 53.

⁴⁷³ Col. Szabo, “Fostering Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” p. 12.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁷⁵ “The Basic Principles of National Defense in the Republic of Hungary,” Ministry of Defense, Budapest, 1993.

⁴⁷⁶ Based on authors’ interviews with Hungarian officers in August, 1996.

By contrast, Poland's military enjoys a rich pre-communist modern tradition that spans two previous Republics and both World Wars. Punctuated by King Jan Sobieski's defeat of the Turkish armies outside of Vienna in 1683, Marshal Jozef Pilsudski's defeat of the Soviets outside of Warsaw in 1920, and the struggles for independence during the first and second World Wars, the military's precommunist tradition remains a symbol of Polish nationalism.⁴⁷⁷

Throughout most of the communist era, the Polish army enjoyed prestige due to its "glorious tradition" in Polish history, its role in post-war reconstruction, and its *perceived* restraint in carrying out internal police functions.⁴⁷⁸ Even after the army's involvement in the suppression of rioting workers in 1956 and 1970, the Polish people believed in the "myth" that their army would not move against them.⁴⁷⁹ The army's

⁴⁷⁷ Raymond Taras, *Consolidating Democracy in Poland* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 23-28; and Norman Davies, *Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland* (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1984).

⁴⁷⁸ Based on a study report by Stanislaw Jarmoszko of the Military Institute for Sociological Research, Poland, entitled "Political System Transformation versus Military Profession Social Value in the Polish Army," presented at the IV Biennial Conference of the European Research Group on Military and Society, Torino, May 26th-29th, 1994.

⁴⁷⁹ Roman Laba, *The Roots of Solidarity* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 88-92; Dr. Roman Laba states that Poles were generally ignorant about the actual mechanisms of repression that existed within the military. Moreover, Poles did not understand, nor did they want to believe, that their army could be used against them. Thus, Polish society was taken-in by the "authoritarian myth" that the army would not act against it and would always "be with the people." According to Dr. Laba, Poles viewed the army as a conscript army; they were largely unaware of the expansive professional components of the military and the paramilitary forces used to enforce and carry out the military's role in internal repression. As a result, Polish society often placed the blame for repression on the police and failed to recognize the army's role in it. In *Warsaw Pact: The Question of Cohesion, Phase II - Vol 1*, p. 337, Dr. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone refers to the ratio of the combined total of professional cadre and special security troops to conscripts as the "ratio of distrust." She explains that the ratio increased as the level of distrust in the conscript forces increased. In other words, more professional cadre and special security troops were used to ensure that repression would be carried out, despite the less reliable conscript elements. She notes that Poland had the second highest "ratio of distrust" of the NSWP states (only East Germany (GDR) had a higher ratio). Both Poland and the GDR had a ratio of distrust greater than one. In other words, the number of professional cadre plus special security troops was greater than the number of conscripts. However, the fact that the Polish people still viewed the military as a conscript force (thus, representative of society) only helped to reinforce their belief in the "myth" that the army would not move against Polish citizens.

idealized historical image, society's view of the military as a conscript force, and deliberate attempts by the regime to absolve General Jaruzelski and other top commanders of involvement in the suppression of workers in 1970, helped the "myth" to persist.⁴⁸⁰ In *The Roots of Solidarity*, Roman Laba states that this "myth" "received a powerful stimulus in the 1976 crisis when it was widely reported that General Jaruzelski had said at an emergency meeting of the Politburo that 'Polish soldiers will not fire on Polish workers.'"⁴⁸¹ Polish society's belief that the army could not move against it persisted until Jaruzelski's crackdown on Solidarity in 1981.⁴⁸² In fact, an opinion poll conducted just prior to the imposition of martial law indicated that the Polish army ranked third -- only behind the Catholic Church and Solidarity, and far ahead of the Party, in terms of public confidence.⁴⁸³ However, the year of martial law shattered the military's mystique in the minds of Poles.⁴⁸⁴ Prior to 1981, Poles viewed the Polish Peoples Army as the inheritors of Poland's proud insurrectionary-patriotic tradition and its symbol - the white eagle.⁴⁸⁵ After the imposition of martial law, Poles came to realize that the "white eagle" was indeed "red." In his book *Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics*, Andrew Michta describes the situation at the end of the 1980s:

⁴⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 89. Laba describes the misinformation campaign that followed the changeover of regimes in the wake of the crisis of Dec '70 - Jan '71 to protect the armed forces from public disapproval. The new regime of Edward Gierek absolved Jaruzelski and other top military commanders, claiming that Gomulka had ordered the suppression of workers without the military leadership's cooperation. Laba adds that the "violence was blamed on the police, and...it was widely reported that General Jaruzelski and [other top military figures] had even been placed under house arrest until Gierek came to power."

⁴⁸¹ Ibid. Dr. Laba explains that Jaruzelski's comments were never substantiated, but the story's dissemination certainly helped to elevate the "myth" in the minds of Poles and Western defense analysts.

⁴⁸² Ibid.

⁴⁸³ Jacques Rupnik, "From 'Party-State' to 'Army-State,'" *The New Republic*, January 6 & 13, 1982, pp. 17-20.

⁴⁸⁴ Andrew A. Michta, *Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988* (Stanford University, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1990), p. 209.

⁴⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 207.

For almost a decade now, the army has held the party together and preserved its dominant position in the country's politics, but it has paid for this achievement with its prestige. The army that kept its distance from internal party struggles and took no responsibility for the party's inefficiency and corruption, used to be, in the eyes of Poles, a guardian of the country's past and its hope for the future. The generals who are now wearing the suits of party apparatchiks are no longer trusted by their countrymen.⁴⁸⁶

In addition, the army's loss of prestige contributed to morale problems, and Polish officers viewed themselves in a poor light. Underground publications during the 1980s described the officer corps as full of self-doubt and riven with guilt over its role in the country's postwar history.⁴⁸⁷ Moreover, the officers resented their association with the increasingly unpopular regime.⁴⁸⁸ In fact, most officers supported the opposition candidates in the parliamentary elections in 1989.⁴⁸⁹

Since 1991, the prestige of the army has largely been restored through the Polish Republic's break with communist traditions, and its revival of precommunist military symbols, including: national monuments to honor military heroes like Jozef Pilsudski; national holidays, such as Polish Armed Forces Day -- the anniversary of Pilsudski's "miracle on the Vistula;" and traditional uniforms, ceremonies, regimental histories and colors.⁴⁹⁰ And, like Hungary, Poland has established a public relations service to

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 210.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 194.

⁴⁸⁸ Supported in a study report by Stanislaw Jarmoszko of the Military Institute for Sociological Research, Poland, entitled "Political System Transformation versus Military Profession Social Value in the Polish Army" presented at the IV Biennial Conference of the European Research Group on Military and Society, Torino, May 26th-29th, 1994.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁰ Based on authors' interview with Col Zdzislaw Harezlak, Vice-Director, Department of Social Relations, Polish Ministry of Defense, in August, 1996. Also, "Remembering Pilsudski's Miracle," *The Voice*, Poland's English-Language newspaper, August 25, 1996; Polish Armed Forces Guide '95, pp. 142-160; and Andrew Michta, "Woodrow Wilson Center Meeting Report: East European Studies," Jan-Feb 1996.

“popularize” the armed forces and to develop public awareness with respect to defense-related issues.⁴⁹¹ Moreover, the Polish military’s participation in recent international peacekeeping missions, to include Kuwait, Bosnia, and Haiti, and its involvement with NATO in Partnership for Peace contribute to its continued prestige.⁴⁹² According to Professor Michta, “Poles rank the military among their most trusted institutions...[and] the army remains the foremost representative of national sovereignty and independence, still major public concerns.”⁴⁹³

In short, both Hungary and Poland have improved the public image of their armed forces.⁴⁹⁴ At the same time, they have attempted to foster a sense of duty and civic responsibility among members of society. These efforts will come to fruition as Hungary and Poland develop a democratic culture. And as noted above, Hungarian and Polish society must develop a sense of duty and civic responsibility, and the military must bolster its prestige to galvanize the relationship between the armed forces and society. Thus, producing two of the conditions necessary for the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier to flourish.

3. Democratic Citizen-Soldiers Respect Democratic Civilian Control and Remain Non-Partisan

In addition, Hungary and Poland must ensure that its officers and soldiers respect democratic civilian control and remain non-partisan as a pre-condition for establishing

⁴⁹¹ *Polish Armed Forces Guide '95*, pp. 131-136.

⁴⁹² Poland has been involved in peacekeeping activities since 1953, according to *Polish Armed Forces Guide '95*, pp. 109-115.

⁴⁹³ Professor Andrew A. Michta remarks in “Woodrow Wilson Center Meeting Report: East European Studies,” Jan-Feb 1996; (meeting held in November, 1995).

⁴⁹⁴ This conclusion is supported by Hungarian and Polish officers and Dr. Joo and Dr. Simon; Also, in Simon, p. 157, Dr. Jeffrey Simon states that “All four Visegrad states have made notable progress in restoring military prestige to their respective armed forces.” See Simon, p.157.

the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier.⁴⁹⁵ To achieve this, Hungary and Poland must order their civil-military relations to satisfy three conditions: First, the military must realize that it is not the ultimate guardian of the state's social/political order, nor is it the exclusive definer of the national interest; Second, the states must assign to the military a credible and honorable role in national defense and accomplishing state goals; and Third, the states must prevent civilian politicians and military officers from misusing the military's monopoly of force to attain political goals or resolve partisan political disputes.⁴⁹⁶

According to Finer, military leaders' "purported care for the national interest" is one of the main reasons that the military might encroach on civilian authority.⁴⁹⁷ Three episodes from American history provide examples of military encroachment on civilian authority to protect the "national interest:" MacArthur's dispute with Truman over the conduct of the Korean War in 1952; the Joint Chiefs of Staff statement to Congress that maligned President Eisenhower's position on the extent of the Soviet threat in the mid-1950s; and General Singlaub's public denunciation of President Carter's plan to withdraw forces from the Korean Peninsula in 1978.⁴⁹⁸ In each case, the generals' believed that civilian decision makers misconstrued the national interest. As specialists in their field, the generals felt that they alone possessed the competence to determine the

⁴⁹⁵ In "The Poland-NATO Report" of September, 1995, Polish representatives of the Euro-Atlantic Association called for Poland to commit to the "rigorous observance of the principle of non-involvement in politics of the armed forces at all levels of the military hierarchy," in Poland's drive for NATO membership.

⁴⁹⁶ Danopolous and Zirker, p.xii, xiv; Also, Joo, p. 5.

⁴⁹⁷ Finer, p. 23.

⁴⁹⁸ Johnson and Metz, p. 5.

appropriate course of action.⁴⁹⁹ Democratic political control demands that military leaders subordinate themselves to the legally constituted authority of the executive branch of government. Civil-military relations suffer when military leaders see themselves as servants of the state, rather than of the government in power.⁵⁰⁰ For example, in interwar Germany, General von Seeckt believed that the Reichswehr owed primary allegiance to the German Reich, and not the transient politicians of the Weimar Republic. This attitude, combined with the army's desire to regain its pre-war status, brought the army into collision with the Republic and helped to enable the National Socialists to co-opt the German Army and assure Hitler's ascendancy to absolute power.⁵⁰¹

Hungarian and Polish leaders should be aware of the historical cases that demonstrate how the military can sometimes display loyalty to the state rather than the government. This is especially important when one considers the extent to which the military dominated politics in the interwar period and the Soviet era. Horthy, Pilsudski, and the Hungarian and Polish communists provided a legacy of military involvement in politics. Through the process of separating the armed forces from its ties to the communist party, Hungary and Poland have convinced most members of the armed forces that they are not the ultimate guardians of the state's social/political order. However, depoliticization has yet to fully permeate the chain of command. Polish General Stanislaw Koziej recently commented that: "Because of the insufficiently crystallized and effective system of formulating and determining the country's defense

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid., p.22.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid., p.44.

requirements, and perhaps also because of being accustomed to traditional ways of doing things, some members of the military still consider it right to solve all military matters by themselves.”⁵⁰² Poland’s civil society must also be convinced of the importance of the principle of civilian control of the military. Polish political advisor Roman Kulczycki reflects the uneasy disposition of Poles toward civilian control of the military in a recent interview, in which he states: “The introduction of the rules of a democratic state, including civilian control over the military, *which is not quite acceptable to the mentality of Poles*, shifts the responsibility for the defense of Poland onto politicians (emphasis added by authors).”⁵⁰³ Thus, despite the introduction of formal legal documents which provide for civilian control of the military, the attitudes of soldiers and civilian citizens have yet to be completely reformed. Moreover, the legacy of the army’s historical role in Polish society does not help efforts to institutionalize the principle of civilian control.⁵⁰⁴

The second condition to ensure the military’s respect for civilian control requires that the state assign to the military a credible and honorable role in the defense of the state and the accomplishment of state goals. Today, the Hungarian and Polish armed forces fulfill a credible role as protectors of state sovereignty and territory. And an honorable role as defenders of the nation--the unique ethnic, cultural, and religious identity of Poles and Magyars.⁵⁰⁵ In addition, the armed forces are helping to accomplish

⁵⁰² Paweł Świeboda, “In NATO’s Waiting Room,” *Transition*, 19 April 1996, p. 53.

⁵⁰³ Polska Zbrojna, Warsaw, “On Effective Control of National Defense,” Interview with Roman Kulczycki, consultant to the prime minister and professor at the National Defense Academy, translated by FBIS-EEU-96-197 (9 Sep 1996), pp. 1-2.

⁵⁰⁴ Based on comments made by Professor Roman Laba, November, 1996 at the Naval Postgraduate School.

⁵⁰⁵ The Polish Armed Forces Guide ‘95 and Hungarian Defense and Service Acts outline the contemporary role of the Polish and Hungarian armed forces. In addition, interviews with officers from these countries substantiate the claim that the military plays a credible and honorable role today. Also, for a complete

state goals by their pivotal role in Poland and Hungary's efforts to obtain NATO membership.

And finally, the state must ensure that service members remain non-partisan to obviate the loss of democratic political control. The legacy of loyalty to one party in the communist system is unhelpful in the Polish and Hungarian endeavor to shape a non-partisan officer corps. De-politicization initiatives have assisted in re-educating service members to help them understand the proper role of a professional officer corps in a democracy. This role requires members of the armed forces to remain neutral and non-partisan so that the military officer can serve successive governments.⁵⁰⁶ Polish and Hungarian initiatives to ensure a non-partisan officer corps include: the introduction of service laws that prohibit membership in any political party; the dismantling of the MPA, the elimination of political officers and secret police apparatuses within the military; the purging or retiring of officers who could potentially endanger the democratization process; and the reorientation of military forces to military missions.⁵⁰⁷

However, Eastern European reformers need to realize that being "apolitical," or "non-partisan" does not mean the total isolation of the military from civilian decision and policy-making processes. Military officers who embody the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier are "apolitical" in the sense that they respect democratic civilian control of the military, refrain from intervening in partisan political disputes, and do not use the

discussion on the difference between a "state" and a "nation," see Walker Conner, *Ethno-Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 91-114.

⁵⁰⁶ Joo, p. 21.

⁵⁰⁷ Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers, August, 1996. Also in Andrew A. Michta, *East Central Europe After the Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s*, (New York, Greenwood Press, 1992), pp. 90-97 and 150-155.

military's monopoly of force to attain political goals or conduct a coup d'etat.⁵⁰⁸ In subordinating military objectives to policy, senior military figures in the ASD help shape national defense policy and ensure that the military institution is properly armed and trained to conduct the missions assigned to it by civilian authorities.⁵⁰⁹

4. Democratic Citizen-Soldiers Retain their Rights

In addition to de-politicization, Hungary and Poland must give the soldier the rights of a democratic citizen, limited only to the extent required to perform his military duties. The previous chapter noted that democratic states need to strike a balance between the needs of the military and the demands of society to minimize the tension inherent in democratic civil-military relations. This balance will maximize military security and the least sacrifice of individual rights and democratic norms and values. Today, political and military reformers in Hungary and Poland appreciate the need to preserve soldiers democratic rights but also recognize the requirement to limit some of those rights to ensure military effectiveness. Former Hungarian Deputy Defense Minister Rudolf Joo recognizes the need to limit soldiers' freedoms and rights, but adds that "the limitations

⁵⁰⁸ The General Staffs of Hungary and Poland should be especially aware of the information presented here in light of their collusion with the Communist Party.

⁵⁰⁹ In Chapter six, Book eight of *On War*, Clausewitz recognizes the role of military officers in shaping national military policy. First, he emphasizes that the military point of view is always subordinate to the political point of view because "war is an instrument of policy." Then he adds the following (p. 607): "The assertion that a major military development, or the plan for one, should be a matter for *purely military* opinion is unacceptable.... Nor indeed is it sensible to summon soldiers, as many governments do when they are planning a war, and ask them for *purely military advice*." In other words, senior military figures should offer, if not *precisely* political advice, at least *politically-informed* advice, concerning the use of the military. Professor Daniel Moran notes that the emergence of the western conception of the "nation in arms" created a greater need for military strategists to understand the political, social, and economic environment because war ceased to be *purely military* in nature. Professor Moran adds that the uncertainty of the post-cold war international order requires contemporary senior military figures to be especially cognizant of the extra-military environment, even in peacetime. (Based on authors' interview with Professor Moran, National Security Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California, November, 1996).

must be codified, and they should not lead to abuse of power by superiors or to any subjective limitation of individual rights.”⁵¹⁰

In their endeavor to instill the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier in the military and society, Hungary and Poland promulgated service laws that protect soldiers rights and promote the concept of the “citizen in uniform.”⁵¹¹ “The Basic Principles of National Defense in the Republic of Hungary” states:

The soldier as a uniformed citizen is entitled to fundamental rights that are due other citizens by virtue of the constitution and European norms. The restriction of such rights is to the least extent possible and in the circumstances absolutely required by the particular features of the service.⁵¹²

Service laws and regulations that govern the Polish and Hungarian armed forces protect the soldier’s basic individual freedoms and rights afforded them as citizens. These include: personal freedoms such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech, the right to assembly, freedom of artistic expression, and the right to vote.⁵¹³ In addition, soldiers are protected by Western-inspired military justice systems that are transparent to the public and provide to soldiers the rights of “complaint, appeal, and judicial redress.”⁵¹⁴

Hungary and Poland fashioned their service laws and regulations after those of the ASD in general, and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular, to create their own brand of democratic citizen-soldier.⁵¹⁵ Today, the Hungarian and Polish armed forces use

⁵¹⁰ Joo, p. 54.

⁵¹¹ Based on authors’ interviews with Hungarian and Polish Military Liaison Team members of the US JCTP.

⁵¹² “The Basic Principles of National Defense in the Republic of Hungary,” Section V.

⁵¹³ *Reform of the Armed Forces*, Hungarian Ministry of Defense, 1995; also interviews of Hungarian and Polish officers conducted by the authors in August, 1996.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid., also, *NATO Partnership for Peace Guide*, U.S. DOD Publication, March, 1996, p.23.

⁵¹⁵ Based on authors’ interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers.

the German leadership style *Innere Fuehrung* and other Western forms of democratic military professionalism as models to guide their effort to forge democratic citizen-soldiers. Polish Colonel Adam Kolodziejczyk, Director of the Military Institute for Sociological Research in Poland, notes that the German conception of the “Staatsbuerger in Uniform” provides a cogent example for the Polish military as it strives to galvanize its relationship with society.⁵¹⁶

In short, today, Hungary and Poland strive to operationalize the democratic “citizen in uniform” ideal in their post-communist armed forces by attempting to ensure that the soldier is representative of society; serves the nation-state out of a sense of duty and civic responsibility; respects democratic civilian control and remains non-partisan; and retains the rights of democratic citizen, limited only to the extent required to perform his military duties.

D. FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

As noted in the introduction of this thesis, shifts in political systems necessarily result in changed patterns of civil-military relations.⁵¹⁷ For example, a communist political system is characterized by communist civil-military relations, and a democratic political system is characterized by democratic civil-military relations. When states change from one political system to another, they must also reorder their civil-military relations to ensure the military plays a role that is congruous with the principles, norms and values of the new political system.⁵¹⁸ In addition, a change in the political system

⁵¹⁶ Based on interviews with Col. Kolodziejczyk, Col. Dziewulski, and Lt. Col Jarmuszko at the National Defense Academy in Warsaw-Rembertow, Poland, August, 1996.

⁵¹⁷ Ulrich, p. 131.

⁵¹⁸ Ulrich, p. 132; also Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 2; and Victorson, pp. 3-4.

transforms the nature of the military's relationship with society. To ensure that the military's role is congruous with changes in the political system and society, the state must change the mechanisms of political control, develop a new concept of the "citizen-soldier," and create a new form of military professionalism.

As Hungary and Poland convert from a communist to a democratic political system, they must also change from a communist to democratic form of civil-military relations. Thus, Hungary and Poland must create mechanisms of democratic political (civilian) control; inculcate society and the military with the concept of the democratic citizen-soldier; and institutionalize democratic military professionalism within the armed forces.

Building armies of democratic citizen-soldiers that possess the qualities necessary to perform effectively in combat, requires the HDF and PAF to institutionalize a new form of military professionalism. As the democratic culture in Poland and Hungary inspirits individuals to display initiative and creativity, the armed forces can harness these traits by creating the Clausewitzian command climate that encourages soldiers to display them. In sum, democratic military professionalism will allow Poland and Hungary to build armies of democratic citizen-soldiers who possess qualities that will enable them to display the "genius" necessary to surmount the "frictions" of war. The remainder of this chapter examines Poland and Hungary with respect to the three "primary foundations" of military professionalism: *authority; leadership; discipline, morale, and obedience* and two "auxiliary foundations" of military professionalism: *recruitment and retention, and career development*.

1. Primary Foundations of Military Professionalism in Hungary and Poland

a. Authority

(1) Formal Authority-Authority of Legitimacy and Authority of Position. In the Soviet era, the communist governments of Hungary and Poland did not come to power through legitimate means, but rather through the coercive mechanisms of Soviet occupation.⁵¹⁹ As one-party authoritarian governments, the regimes never gained “procedural legitimacy” through the direct participation of the people.⁵²⁰ Except for brief periods in the Soviet era when certain Party leaders may have gained “performance legitimacy” by improving the quality of life of their people, the communist governments of Hungary and Poland primarily depended on coercive measures to ensure deference to authority.⁵²¹

In order for the new democratic governments to gain “procedural legitimacy,” they must build a new political-social contract with the people that will empower the government with the “authority of procedural legitimacy.”⁵²² This contract must be based on democratic, rather than authoritarian, values and principles. In order for these governments to build a new relationship with their people, they must ensure that legal-rational authority is established through democratic processes, to include the direct participation and consent of the people. The legitimacy of ASD governments does not depend on the ability of a particular political leader or party in office to satisfy the

⁵¹⁹ Paul G. Lewis, “Obstacles to the establishment of political legitimacy in Communist Poland,” pp. 125-147; and Zoltan D. Barany, *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-90*, p. 18.

⁵²⁰ Huntington, *The Third Wave*, p. 259.

⁵²¹ Barany, *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-1990*, pp. 17-23.

⁵²² The authors developed the ideas presented here based on the readings of Huntington, Janowitz, Lewis, Michta, Barany, Peabody, Ulrich, and others.

demands of society. As noted in the previous chapter, the procedures and processes of the democratic system allows ASD governments to remain legitimate despite fluctuations in the popularity of a particular president/prime minister or party in power at any given time.

Today, the fledgling Hungarian and Polish democracies enjoy procedural legitimacy derived from a system of political pluralism and a new political-social contract that is codified in democratic constitutional provisions.⁵²³ However, the absence of a *mature* democratic culture and institutionalized democratic political behavior combined with current economic deprivations and the loss of services as a result of the demise of the socialist welfare state undermines procedural legitimacy and makes it difficult to for the government to gain performance legitimacy.⁵²⁴ According to Professor George Schoepflin, “the Central European countries have a reasonably good chance in the long run of moving towards a social structure where the traditional segment is gradually weakened over time and a *de facto* alliance between the liberal and communist segments will construct a social and political base sufficient for a reasonably secure democracy.”⁵²⁵

⁵²³ Political pluralism is a condition for the government to be representative of the diversity of public opinion. It requires: free and fair elections at regular intervals in conditions of complete openness; citizens must be free to establish political parties freely; the parties must be allowed to campaign without fear of intimidation. (This definition extracted from the NATO Draft General Report “Democratization in Eastern Europe: An Interim Assessment,” May, 1994).

⁵²⁴ Huntington, *The Third Wave*; also “Address of the Polish Prime Minister to the Sejm, 19 Jan 1995,” *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, British Broadcasting Corporation, 21 Jan 95; Schoepflin, “The Problems of Democratic Construction;” Also NATO Draft General Report, “Democratization in Eastern Europe: An Interim Assessment,” May, 1994; and remarks of Andrew Michta in “Woodrow Wilson Center Meeting Report: East European Studies,” Jan-Feb 1996.

⁵²⁵ Schoepflin, “Postcommunism: The Problems of Democratic Construction,” p. 139.

The “contextual problems” of democratization described above have spread discontent among large segments of Hungarian and Polish societies.⁵²⁶ The inability of the new democratically elected governments to address the contextual problems, and thus, gain performance legitimacy places great stress on the democratic constitutional provisions and processes that form the basis for procedural legitimacy. Thus, unlike mature democracies, the developing democracies in Hungary and Poland may find it more difficult to protect their procedural legitimacy when the popularity of a particular leader or party declines. Developing democratic societies face a greater challenge because their political representatives lack the mature parliamentary “democratic culture” necessary to solve problems through rational debate and compromise.⁵²⁷

Having established their legitimate right to rule, the governments of Hungary and Poland are re-building the hierarchy of *positional authority* in government institutions, to include the military. This process is complicated by the fact that the Hungarian and Polish militaries have an overabundance of field-grade officers which creates an “inverted pyramid” rank structure in the officer corps.⁵²⁸ Thus, there are

⁵²⁶ Based on interviews with Polish and Hungarian officers, soldiers, and citizens, August, 1996; also “Address of the Polish Prime Minister to the Sejm, Jan 1995.”

⁵²⁷ The NATO Draft General Report: “Democratization in Eastern Europe: An Interim Assessment,” notes the following: “For a democracy to flourish, the population, and even more so, its representatives, must acquire certain spontaneous attitudes. These attitudes are partly technical, where they concern parliamentary debating procedures, amendments to legislation, the preparation of parliamentary work, and partly behavior related. There is a need for a kind of parliamentary “democratic culture” which requires respect for others, a distinction between personal opinions and political programs, the acceptance of the need to relinquish, as well as assume power, a capacity for rational debate, and a spirit of compromise. Such qualities are not innate, they have to be acquired; the learning of certain techniques can help. The availability to parliaments of independent sources of information and competent staff is also an important factor for effective democracy.”

⁵²⁸ Based on interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers in August, 1996. In other words, there are far more field-grade officers than company grade officers.

more field-grade officers than positions available, forcing many officers to work in positions not commensurate with their rank. For example, the Hungarian army has lieutenant colonels filling positions meant for company-grade officers. In the process of downsizing and restructuring, the Polish and Hungarian armed forces are reluctant to “RIF” field-grade officers as they eliminate their positions.⁵²⁹

In addition to the restructuring of the officer corps, Hungary and Poland are attempting to widen the scope of positional authority. In the Soviet era, the NSWP did not widely delegate authority and, thus, did not allow officers at the lower echelons to exercise autonomy of command. By contrast to ASD militaries, the NSWP did not use *mission-type orders*, instead, commanders used a system of *centralized control and centralized execution* which discouraged initiative.⁵³⁰ Polish Army Colonel Adam Kolodziejczyk uses the phrase “the division decided what a squad would do” to describe the remarkable degree of centralization in NSWP armed forces.⁵³¹

Today, the legacy of centralized command and centralized execution makes it difficult for Hungarian and Polish armed forces to adjust to the widened scope of positional authority required by the ASD system of centralized control and decentralized execution. Many Hungarian and Polish officers, used to the centralized-centralized command system still expect detailed directives from higher authorities and

⁵²⁹ Based on interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers, and Col Szurgyi, USDAO in Hungary. Note: “RIF” means “reduction in force;” Some officers indicated that there is a sort of “welfare system” in the military, in the sense that the military feels a responsibility to take care of its senior officers. The armed forces do not want to throw their veteran field-grade officers “into the street” during a time when there are few opportunities for employment in the civilian sector.

⁵³⁰ Corroborated by Hungarian and Polish officers during interviews with the authors in August, 1996.

⁵³¹ Interviewed by the authors in August, 1996.

are reluctant to take action without them.⁵³² In addition, the legacy of distrust created by the MPA and secret police apparatuses make it difficult for post-communist militaries to adjust to the ASD command system which requires trust to function.

Hungarian and Polish militaries will be able to fully transition to a centralized-decentralized system as society develops a mature democratic culture that inspirts citizens to display initiative, creativity, and originality; and as the military creates a command climate based on trust that encourages the same traits in its soldiers. In addition, a centralized-decentralized system is well suited for an army of democratic citizen-soldiers who thrive in an environment that promotes flexibility.

A command system based on centralized control and decentralized execution requires the integration of a hierarchy of *professional NCOs* into the chain of command to interpret and execute mission-type orders. The NCO corps extends the lines of *positional authority* to the lowest levels of command. In addition, NCOs enhance unit effectiveness by spending most of their time among the troops, supervising details involved in accomplishing the mission and caring for the needs of soldiers. By contrast, the NSWP did not have an effective professional NCO corps to augment the chain of command. Instead, the NSWP relied on second-year conscripts to fulfill squad and platoon leader duties, maintain discipline and ensure soldiers carried out their orders.⁵³³

Today, Hungarian and Polish armed forces are attempting to transform their Soviet-style, “specialist NCO corps” into an ASD-style “professional

⁵³² Based on authors’ interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers in August, 1996.

⁵³³ Ibid.

NCO corps” that is fully integrated into the chain of command.⁵³⁴ However, the Soviet legacy and the current lack of defense funding makes it difficult for Hungary and Poland to fully institute a professional NCO corps.⁵³⁵ For example, as noted earlier, the Russians decimated the Hungarian officer and NCO corps after the Second World War. But, prior to the war, many considered the Hungarian NCO corps “a model for European armies” to emulate. Today, through PFP and the JCTP, Hungary is tapping Western expertise to reestablish its once-proud NCO tradition.⁵³⁶ In fact, the Hungarian military has distributed “study papers” on the pre-war NCO corps to familiarize today’s soldiers with Hungary’s NCO heritage.⁵³⁷ Similarly, Poland has adopted a non-commissioned officer training program to build a corps of professional NCOs.⁵³⁸ In addition, both countries use professional “contract NCOs” as an interim measure to achieve NATO compatibility and professionalize their NCO corps.⁵³⁹

In sum, Hungary and Poland are widening the scope of positional authority in the armed forces by adopting a centralized-decentralized command system, and extending the lines of positional authority by building a professional NCO corps. In addition, Hungarian and Polish armed forces recognize the need to shed the authoritarian legacy of reliance on formal authority and emphasize functional types of authority based on Western notions of leadership.

⁵³⁴ Ibid.

⁵³⁵ Ibid.; also Andrew Michta remarks in “Woodrow Wilson Report, Jan-Feb 96.”

⁵³⁶ *Partnership for Peace Guide*, US Department of Defense (DOD) Publication, March, 1996, p. 2.

⁵³⁷ Based on authors’ interviews with Hungarian officers in August, 1996.

⁵³⁸ *Partnership for Peace Guide*, p. 22.

⁵³⁹ After completing his obligation as a conscript, soldiers may sign-on as “contract NCOs” (minimum contract terms are 2 years in Hungary and 5 years in Poland), at which time they receive professional NCO training and serve their terms as professional NCOs.

(2) Functional Authority - Authority of Competence and Authority of Person. ASD militaries emphasize competence at each level of the military hierarchy and consider it a leadership principle because a competent leader inspires the trust and confidence of his subordinates.⁵⁴⁰ Today, Hungarian and Polish armed forces continue to stress competence as a means to motivate troops and accomplish the mission. As the militaries institutionalize democratic military professionalism, officers will increasingly appreciate the need to display leadership in order to gain personal authority. Obtaining personal authority will help obviate the need for them to rely on formal authority to motivate and discipline their troops. The successful development of personal authority is especially important for post-communist armed forces that no longer maintain the authoritarian dual command structures and strict disciplinary regulations of the Soviet era.⁵⁴¹ The legacy of officers' reliance on formal authority and their unfamiliarity with the Western conception of leadership challenges them to develop the qualities necessary to attain personal authority.⁵⁴²

b. Leadership

In a democracy, military leadership is based on respect for individual rights, human dignity, trust, and accountability to societal values--principles that form the essence of democratic ideology.⁵⁴³ ASD militaries aim to inspire their soldiers to *want* to do their job by requiring that officers and NCOs use positive motivational techniques of

⁵⁴⁰ *The Armed Forces Officer*, p. 28.

⁵⁴¹ Based on authors' interviews with instructors from the Polish Defense Academy and Miklos Zrinyi Staff College, August, 1996.

⁵⁴² *Ibid.*

⁵⁴³ Ulrich, p. 116.

leadership that do not violate the individual rights and human dignity of soldiers. By exercising “positive leadership” and attending to individual needs, superiors earn the confidence, respect, and cooperation of their soldiers. By contrast, NSWP militaries often sacrificed individual rights beyond the constraints necessary for military competence.⁵⁴⁴

The NSWP used a highly impersonal system, based on formal authority to “force” obedience. As a result, the authoritarian system fostered a command climate in which human rights abuses were common and quality of life issues were of secondary concern.

Today, Hungarian and Polish officers strive to comprehend and implement the ASD style of leadership. However, neither country’s military professional education programs have incorporated an *extensive* training regimen required to prepare officers to meet the challenge of leading democratic citizen-soldiers.⁵⁴⁵ However, according to Hungarian Colonel Janos Szabo, Hungary plans to open a National Defense Academy in 1997 that will offer courses in human resource management and lectures aimed at developing “westernized” approaches to problem solving.⁵⁴⁶ The process of building armies of democratic citizen-soldiers frustrates officers’ efforts to motivate soldiers. The elimination of authoritarian practices and the increase in soldiers’ rights, when combined with officers’ lack of familiarity with the ASD leadership style creates discipline problems. One Polish officer reveals his frustration: “Today, company commanders have difficulty enforcing discipline because they only have the carrot, but not the stick.

⁵⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 110.

⁵⁴⁵ Based on authors’ interviews with instructors at the Polish Defense Academy and Hungary’s Miklos Zrinyi Staff College. Also expressed by Hungarian Brigadier General Andras Havril in interview for article in *Magyar Nemzet*, Budapest, “The New Structure Must Be Built From Below,” as translated in FBIS-EEU-96-192 (30 Sep 1996), p. 5.

⁵⁴⁶ Szabo, “Fostering Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” 1996.

Soldiers have many more rights than before, and commanders have less authority.”⁵⁴⁷ In a recent interview, an HDF division commander, Brigadier General Andras Havril, stated: “New relations have emerged between troops and the commanders...; we must learn the right way to institute disciplinary measures, the right way to deal with absenteeism, and a whole series of other tasks....For this, we need retraining and the development of a new...leadership system.”⁵⁴⁸ Clearly, the officers of both armed forces recognize the need for western-style leadership to maintain disciplined units in armies governed by the laws and principles of a democracy.

In order for Hungarian and Polish service members’ to fully internalize the principles of leadership, they must come to understand the relationship between a democratic society and the military. As noted earlier, democratic societies expect military commanders to exercise the kind of leadership that complies with national values and emphasizes the “human element.”⁵⁴⁹ As Hungarian and Polish society develops a mature democratic culture, they will most likely demand that the military use leadership techniques consistent with democratic norms and values. The HDF’s and PAF’s use of the Bundeswehr’s leadership style, *Innere Fuehrung*, as a model for re-professionalizing their armed forces should help them develop leadership techniques in keeping with the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier. The complete institutionalization of ASD-style leadership will enable the HDF and PAF to build disciplined units comprised of soldiers who possess high morale and willingly obey their superiors.

⁵⁴⁷ Based on authors’ interviews with Polish officers in August, 1996.

⁵⁴⁸ *Magyar Nemzet*, Budapest, “The New Structure Must Be Built From Below,” as translated in FBIS-EEU-96-192 (30 Sep 1996), p. 5.

⁵⁴⁹ *US Army FM 100-5*, Chapter 14.

c. Discipline, Obedience, and Morale

In the ASD, discipline is primarily the product of morale and leadership and is supported by the formal authority vested in the officer corps, NCO corps, and the military justice system. The goal of military discipline in the armed forces of a democracy is to predispose soldiers to *willingly obey* the legitimate authority of the military and the state. By using positive means to meet the expectations and individual needs of the soldier, the officer bolsters morale, inspires trust and confidence in his ability as a leader, encourages self-discipline, and thus, creates an atmosphere in which the soldier willingly obeys.

By contrast, NSWP militaries used the Soviet-style of discipline, known as “exactingness,” to compel their soldiers to conform to harsh disciplinary standards.⁵⁵⁰ Many NSWP officers gained obedience, albeit the *reluctant obedience* of their soldiers by relying on their “absolute authority” and using negative reinforcement, domination, and fear.⁵⁵¹ As discussed earlier, the failure of the Soviets to gain the attitudinal integration of Eastern European units frustrated officer’s efforts to secure the willing obedience of Hungarian and Polish soldiers. The strictness of the regulations and the preponderance of restrictions on conscript behavior led to frequent disciplinary infractions in most units.⁵⁵² Common discipline problems included: Absent without leave (AWOL), drunkenness, slovenly appearance, unauthorized reading and smoking, imitating Western lifestyles, and lack of ideological trustworthiness, to name a few.⁵⁵³ In addition, commanders allowed

⁵⁵⁰ Goldhamer, p.142.

⁵⁵¹ Rakowska-Harmstone, *Phase II - Vol 1*, pp. 298-305.

⁵⁵² Jones, p. 131.

⁵⁵³ Rakowska-Harmstone, *Phase II - Vol II*, p. 111.

unauthorized caste systems because it simplified the problems of maintaining control of large groups of postadolescent males.⁵⁵⁴ Moreover, the NSWP did not afford their soldiers the right to demand trial by court-martial, the right to remain silent, and the right to counsel.⁵⁵⁵

In the post-communist era, the Hungarian and Polish armies have eliminated the old authoritarian system and replaced it with less stringent mechanisms of control that protect soldiers' individual rights in accordance with democratic principles. For example, The new Hungarian Service Law "provides conscripts with an expanded protection of interests and human rights. The conscript has the right to leave the base in the event that he has no service obligations and the right to wear civilian clothes off-duty."⁵⁵⁶ In addition, soldiers now have the ability to legally file complaints and redress grievances.⁵⁵⁷ Soldiers in Poland can even lodge direct complaints via telephone to a newly established Complaints and Intervention Bureau in the MOD.⁵⁵⁸

The introduction of relaxed disciplinary codes and practices, and more rights for soldiers resulted in improved morale and a decline in the number of violations among conscripts.⁵⁵⁹ For example, military sociologists in Poland indicate that absence without leave (AWOL) and barracks violence have declined since 1989.⁵⁶⁰ Today, the

⁵⁵⁴ Jones, p. 130.

⁵⁵⁵ Goldhamer, p. 134.

⁵⁵⁶ *National Defense '96*, Hungarian Ministry of Defense Publication, Budapest, p. 31.

⁵⁵⁷ Based on interviews with Polish officers in the MOD.

⁵⁵⁸ Ibid. Result of "Karkoszka Committee" reform regulations passed in 1996; *Polska Zbrojna*, Warsaw, "Reforming the Ministry," translated in FBIS-EEU-96-137 (15 Jul 1996).

⁵⁵⁹ Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers in August, 1996. By contrast, morale for professional officers and NCOs suffers due to low pay, inadequate housing, and limited career opportunities as a result of force reductions.

⁵⁶⁰ Based on authors' interview with Col dr. Adam Kolodziejczyk and Col dr. Henryk Dziewulski of the Military Institute for Sociological Research, Poland, in August 1996.

major discipline problem lies in the off-post behavior of conscripts. Like young soldiers in ASD militaries, the conscripts often “get into trouble” as a result of expanded off-duty privileges.⁵⁶¹

In addition, an illegal system of hazing among conscripts continues to exist despite its decline in recent years. A study on social issues in the Polish army describes how the system works in Poland (Hungary’s system is similar):

A kind of informal, hierarchical structure of status within the group exists, which gives to older conscripts the unofficial control over the younger ones. Time becomes the only measure and criterion of ones position within the small group. So, everybody has some prescribed obligations and privileges as well as specific, ritual patterns of behavior - due to actual position of his cohort in the sequence of changing “waves” of newcomers. The highest position belongs to “grandfathers” - the oldest within the group, the middle position is given to the “vices” and the lowest position to the nubies, known as “cats.” “Cats” have no rights except for clearing barracks and giving every service to their “grandfathers” (when there are no officers present). The “grandfathers” are untouchable, have the unrestricted right to have “whims,” and have total control over the “cats.” Special rituals support this structure as well as painful patterns of coercion and punishment for disobedience to the informal rules of the “wave.”⁵⁶²

The integration of professional NCOs into the chain of command will help curb hazing and eliminate unauthorized caste systems. NCOs provide the proximate leadership necessary to enforce standards of conduct consistent with the foundations of democratic military professionalism. In addition, professional NCOs instill discipline and build morale by providing the continuity of leadership that bridges the gap between the commander and the soldier.

⁵⁶¹ Based on authors’ interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers, August, 1996.

⁵⁶² Colonel dr. Henryk Dziewulski, “Selected Issues of Civil-Military Relations in Poland,” Military Institute for Sociological Research, Warsaw, June, 1996; This agrees with Rakowska-Harmstone’s discussion on hazing, Phase II, Vol II, p.111.

2. Secondary Foundations of Military Professionalism in Hungary and Poland

a. *Recruitment and Retention*

Like ASD militaries, the HDF and PAF must satisfy the needs and expectations of prospective professional soldiers to successfully recruit. The HDF and PAF also recognize the need to offset the limitations placed on soldiers' rights and privileges by offering incentives for military service. These incentives, which include opportunities for financial stability, quality of life, education, and advancement serve to complement traditional reasons for joining and staying in the military: prestige, patriotism, and affinity for the military profession.

The stagnant economies and meager defense budgets of the post-communist era prevents the HDF and PAF from offering financial and quality of life incentives to aid in the recruitment and retention of personnel.⁵⁶³ Low wages, long working hours, and deteriorating living conditions undermine efforts to attract and retain people.⁵⁶⁴ For example, in Hungary, 20 percent of the officer's families, and 45 percent of NCOs live below the official subsistence level.⁵⁶⁵ Recent public opinion surveys indicate that the HDF could increase the number of volunteer soldiers by 23 percent if salaries were higher.⁵⁶⁶ In addition, the Polish MOD performed a comparative study of yearly outlays per soldier that revealed the extent to which the Visegrad countries lagged behind

⁵⁶³ *Polka Zbrojna*, Warsaw, "I Will Respect and Protect the Polish Armed Forces," 22-26 Dec 95, interview with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski, as translated in FBIS-EEU-95-250 (29 Dec 1995), pp. 1-2; and *Magyar Hirlap*, Budapest, "Who Threatens Hungary," Interview with Defense Minister Gyorgi Keleti, 7 May 96, as translated in FBIS-EEU-96-090 (7 May, 1996), p. 10.

⁵⁶⁴ Szabo, "Fostering Democratic Civil-Military Relations," pp. 1-4

⁵⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁶ *Ibid.* According to Col Szurgyi, USDAO in Budapest, conscripts receive only one-third the income of an unemployed civilian.

NATO countries. In 1992, Poland spent \$6,745 per soldier and Hungary \$10,587 per soldier, whereas France spent \$54,176 per soldier and Germany \$53,703 per soldier.⁵⁶⁷

These statistics indicate the degree to which Hungary and Poland lack the necessary resources to modernize their forces and to provide financial and quality of life incentives to recruit and retain professional soldiers.⁵⁶⁸

In addition, the overabundance of middle and senior grade officers and the downsizing of the armed forces diminishes the possibility for advancement. Some prospective officers shy away from military service because they see limited career potential in the military as long the "log jam" continues to exist at the higher levels of the officer corps.⁵⁶⁹ Moreover, the lack of clearly defined, well publicized career paths discourage young people by making them feel insecure about a career in the military.⁵⁷⁰

Dr. Jeffrey Simon recently stressed the importance of career opportunity to the recruitment of officers: "To make the military a legitimate career, young officers need a career path where the horizons are broadened."⁵⁷¹

Educational opportunities provide one of the only effective incentives for military service. Officers who attend state-funded military colleges receive an education on par with civilian colleges.⁵⁷² Students at the pre-commissioning colleges in Poland and Hungary take courses in foreign languages, the humanities, and military science, and mid-grade officers can earn post-graduate technical degrees.⁵⁷³ The opportunity for

⁵⁶⁷ *Polish Armed Forces Guide '95*, p. 52.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁵⁶⁹ Based on interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers, August, 1996.

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷¹ Interviewed by authors in May, 1996.

⁵⁷² Szabo, pp. 2-3.

⁵⁷³ *Ibid.*, also *Polish Armed Forces '95*.

advanced education attracts prospective young officers who view military service as a means to prepare them for future employment in the market economy.⁵⁷⁴

Despite their common inability to provide many of the incentives for recruitment and retention, the PAF and HDF differ in their ability to attract people on the basis of the military's prestige. According to Dr. Andrew Michta, the Polish military today is a respected occupation that enjoys broad social support. By contrast, the Hungarian armed forces is held in very low esteem by society.⁵⁷⁵ According to a 1996 report published by Poland's Military Institute for Sociological Research, 64 percent of the adult population and 32 percent of the youth surveyed in a recent study view the military in a favorable light. In the same survey, people showed more confidence in the military institution than any other major institution or organization in the country.⁵⁷⁶ Remarkably, the military ranked above the Office of the President, the Legislature, civilian government institutions and even the Catholic Church.⁵⁷⁷ In addition, the HDF and PAF efforts to institutionalize the concept of the democratic citizen-soldier, and favorable public opinion about the military's participation in NATO peacekeeping missions and PFP exercises, bolsters support for the armed forces. Moreover, the advent of a free press and the requirement for the military to be transparent to society forces the military to carefully cultivate its public image.⁵⁷⁸ As a result, the Hungarian and Polish MODs have opened public relations offices to "educate the media in defense matters" and

⁵⁷⁴ Based on authors' interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers, August, 1996.

⁵⁷⁵ Michta remarks in "Woodrow Wilson Center Report, Jan-Feb 1996."

⁵⁷⁶ Dziewulski, "Selected Issues of Civil-Military Relations in Poland," p. 10.

⁵⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁷⁸ Based on interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers, August, 1996.

“popularize military knowledge.”⁵⁷⁹ Failure to do so will erode social support and damage recruiting efforts.

Significant improvements in the Hungarian and Polish economies and the maturation of democratic culture will raise the expectations of prospective recruits who will have become accustomed to a higher standard of living and the rights and privileges in a democracy. To successfully recruit, the military must then satisfy the higher expectations of prospective soldiers by providing an improved quality of life for soldiers. The ability of the HDF and PAF to attract and retain people who live in a free, prosperous society will be especially critical if Hungary and Poland shift to an all-volunteer force.⁵⁸⁰ To further enhance their recruitment and retention efforts, Hungary and Poland must revamp their career development and personnel management systems to provide attractive career opportunities for service members.

b. Career Development - Promotion/Advancement; Education/Training

During the Soviet era, loyalty to the communist party, ideological reliability, and cronyism formed the basis for promotion and advancement in the NSWP.⁵⁸¹ The existence of a decentralized promotion system meant that an officer's immediate chain of command could act in self-interest to either approve or reject an officer's promotion. In addition, automatic promotions through the rank of lieutenant

⁵⁷⁹ Szabo, p. 12; Also *Polish Armed Forces Guide '95*, p. 131.

⁵⁸⁰ Interviews revealed that Poland and Hungary are currently debating whether or not to create an AVF. Currently, the HDF and PAF are raising the percentage of professionals in their ranks which will increase the need to offer viable incentives to attract officers and NCOs.

⁵⁸¹ Based on interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers, August, 1996.

colonel and the lack of an “up-or-out” policy created a disproportionate number of higher ranking officers, many of whom held positions not commensurate with their rank.⁵⁸²

The legacy of the WP system of promotions and advancement poses a significant challenge for HDF and PAF reformers striving to re-structure patterns of career development. Today, the HDF and PAF have attempted to institute a centralized, merit-based promotion system that will reduce cronyism, standardize selection criterion, and facilitate equal opportunity initiatives.⁵⁸³ However, the HDF and PAF lack automated systems to effectively manage centralized selections.⁵⁸⁴ Despite the removal of political criteria for advancement, the promotion system remains vulnerable to cronyism and selfish commanders. For example, the HDF continues the practice of automatically promoting most officers through the rank of lieutenant colonel, which exacerbates force structure problems in the officer corps.⁵⁸⁵ In addition, rampant favoritism continues to undermine efforts to institute a system based on merit.⁵⁸⁶ In the PAF promotion system, unit commanders determine who is eligible for promotion, then submit that list to higher headquarters.⁵⁸⁷ At the service level, administrators rank-order the list of officers according to time in service and military education level. Officers are then promoted from this list based on available slots for each grade.⁵⁸⁸

Authors’ note: In both the HDF and PAF, eligibility for automatic promotion is determined in the following manner: To be eligible for promotion, an officer

⁵⁸² Ibid.

⁵⁸³ Ulrich, p. 113.

⁵⁸⁴ Based on interviews and observations of the authors.

⁵⁸⁵ Based on interviews with Hungarian MOD officials.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁷ Based on interviews with Polish MOD officials.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid.

must occupy a billet coded to allow promotion to a higher rank. For example, in most cases, a lieutenant will be automatically promoted to captain if he occupies a captain's billet and he has enough time in service. Once that lieutenant is promoted to captain, he has the potential to remain in that job or an equivalent captain-level position until he is either moved to a major's billet, in which case he will be eligible for promotion in the manner described above, or he reaches the age limit for a captain, at which time he must retire.

One of the main obstacles preventing the implementation of an appropriately sized force structure that retains only the best qualified individuals lies in the continued use of an "up-and-stay" structure and the lack of clearly defined career paths in the HDF and PAF officer corps. Based on age limits, the "up-and-stay" structure allows those officers passed-over for promotion to remain in the service until they reach the maximum age for a given rank. For example, the PAF permits captains to remain in service until the age of 45, and majors until age 48.⁵⁸⁹ However, both Hungary and Poland introduced the mandatory retirement age of 55 to help reduce the number of colonels and generals and improve opportunities for upward mobility.⁵⁹⁰

Moreover, the HDF and PAF incorporate professional education in career paths to prepare each military professional for the new responsibilities that come with each consecutive career phase. As part of military downsizing, the HDF and PAF have restructured their professional military education systems to reflect their role in the new

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁰ Szabo, p. 3, Interviews with Polish officers.

democratic republics of Hungary and Poland.⁵⁹¹ Today, the HDF and PAF strive to produce officers with well-rounded education's, similar to those of ASD officers. However, the Soviet legacy of specialized education and today's small defense budgets make it difficult for the HDF and PAF to radically alter the basic structure of the education and training system.

The Hungarian officer training system is characterized by the following structures. First, pre-commissioning institutions, which include military high schools, civilian universities, and three four-year military colleges, which offer instruction in specialized areas.⁵⁹² The Lajos Kossuth academy conducts commanders training, the Janos Bolyai Academy conducts engineer training, and the Aviation Academy conducts aviation training.⁵⁹³ In addition, officers receive advanced professional military education training and post-graduate degrees at the Miklos Zrinyi Staff College. In 1997, the HDF will open the National Defense University which will conduct General Staff courses, offer doctoral programs, and educate civilians in defense matters.⁵⁹⁴

The PAF has restructured its professional education system in a similar fashion. It reduced the number of schools and consolidated many of the programs. Currently, four High Officers' Schools provide precommissioning education, seven specialized training centers provide branch-specific training, and four military universities provide advanced command and staff training and postgraduate education.⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁹¹ Based on interviews and official publications of the HDF and PAF.

⁵⁹² Eighty percent of officers attend the military colleges, 10-15 percent attend the high schools, and the rest join the military from civilian universities.

⁵⁹³ Based on interviews with Hungarian MOD officials, and the MOD publication *Reform of the Armed Forces, 1995*.

⁵⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁵ *Polish Armed Forces Guide, '95*, pp. 116-124.

In addition, Deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka instituted a program to educate civilians in defense matters. The program, which commences in 1997, will be taught by the faculty of National Security at Warsaw University with the help of NATO, the US, and a German foundation.⁵⁹⁶ This program is the first step toward preparing civilian defense experts to be integrated into the faculties of military schools and universities, as well as into the MOD and other government institutions.⁵⁹⁷ The presence of civilian instructors in military schools and the training of military instructors in civilian universities will enhance the cross-flow of ideas and methods from society.⁵⁹⁸ Moreover, the PAF and HDF widened the scope of language training to include more courses in English and other European languages.⁵⁹⁹

In addition, the HDF and PAF recognize the need to include courses in democratic civil-military relations, leadership and ethics in their professional military education curricula. Instruction in democratic civil-military relations will reinforce the point that democratic citizen-soldiers must be committed to the constitution, civilian control of the military, and morals, ethics, norms, and values consistent with democratic ideology and society. Ethics training is especially important for the HDF and PAF as they develop a system of centralized control and decentralized execution which demands officers to exercise considerable autonomy of command.⁶⁰⁰ Given latitude to make their own decisions, ethics training prepares officers for situations that may require them to

⁵⁹⁶ Based on authors' interviews with MOD officials in Poland, August, 1996.

⁵⁹⁷ Based on authors' interviews with MOD officials in Poland, August, 1996.

⁵⁹⁸ Ulrich, p.121.

⁵⁹⁹ *Polish Armed Forces Guide '95*, p. 118; also interviews with Hungarian and Polish officers.

⁶⁰⁰ Inculcating Western-style ethics principles should not pose a problem for the Poles and Hungarians, who never "attitudinally" integrated into the Soviet mindset.

deconflict the force of law, the force of public opinion, the force of conscience, and the use of military force in order to carry out their mission.⁶⁰¹

⁶⁰¹ Glover, p. 149.

V. CONCLUSION

As Hungary and Poland convert from a communist to a democratic political system, they must also change from a communist to democratic form of civil-military relations. Thus, Hungary and Poland must create mechanisms of democratic political (civilian) control; introduce society and the military to the concept of the democratic citizen-soldier; and institutionalize democratic military professionalism within the armed forces.

Today, Hungary and Poland have reordered their formal civil-military relations to ensure democratic (civilian) control by creating legal and institutional mechanisms that define the relationship between the armed forces and the civilian branches of government. Constitutional provisions, service acts and defense laws subordinate the military to the President of the Republic, the parliament, and civilian MODs. Parliament strives to ensure civil supremacy by exercising oversight and control of the budget and the deployment of the armed forces in emergency and war. In addition, civilian defense ministries are gaining control of the military budgets, access to intelligence, strategic planning, force sizing and structure, procurement and acquisitions, and deployments and promotions. However, both countries need to improve the working relationship between the General Staff and the MOD, especially in Poland, where some members of the General Staff still refuse to cooperate with civilian leaders in the MOD.

Additionally, Hungary and Poland are trying to rebuild the image and prestige of their militaries by developing a legal-political culture that accepts the idea of the "citizen-in uniform." The HDF and PAF are inculcating their officers and soldiers with the

concept of the democratic citizen-soldier. Today, many Hungarians and Poles are striving to comprehend their newly-acquired rights and responsibilities. However, the lack of a democratic tradition in these countries makes it difficult for the people to fully grasp the new democratic ideology. In their endeavor to instill the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier in the military and society, Hungary and Poland promulgated service laws and developed Western-inspired military justice systems that protect soldiers' rights and promote the concept of the "citizen-in-uniform."

Moreover, building armies of democratic citizen-soldiers that possess the qualities necessary to perform effectively in combat requires the HDF and PAF to institutionalize a new form of military professionalism. Hungary and Poland are struggling to transform from the NSWP to the ASD model of (1) authority; (2) leadership; (3) discipline, obedience, and morale; (4) recruitment and retention; and (5) career development.

Today, the legacy of centralized command and centralized execution makes it difficult for Hungarian and Polish armed forces to adjust to the widened scope of positional authority required by the ASD system of centralized control and decentralized execution. Many Hungarian and Polish officers, used to the centralized-centralized command system still expect detailed directives from higher authorities and are reluctant to take action without them. In addition, the HDF and PAF are attempting to transform their Soviet-style "specialist NCO corps" into an ASD-style "professional NCO corps" that is fully integrated into the chain of command. However, the Soviet legacy and the current lack of defense funding makes it difficult for Hungary and Poland to fully institute a professional NCO corps.

In addition, Hungarian and Polish officers strive to comprehend and implement the ASD-style of leadership. However, neither country's military professional education programs have incorporated an extensive training regimen required to prepare officers to meet the challenge of leading democratic citizen-soldiers. The complete institutionalization of ASD-style leadership will enable the HDF and PAF to build disciplined units comprised of soldiers who possess high morale and obey their superiors.

In the post-communist era, the Hungarian and Polish armies have also eliminated the old authoritarian system and replaced it with less stringent institutions of discipline and obedience that attempt to protect soldiers individual rights in accordance with democratic principles. The introduction of relaxed disciplinary codes and practices, and more rights for soldiers resulted in improved morale and a decline in the number of violations. Today, the major discipline problem lies in the off-post behavior of conscripts. What's more, an illegal system of hazing continues to exist despite its decline in recent years. The integration of professional NCOs into the chain of command will help curb hazing and eliminate unauthorized caste systems. Professional NCOs instill discipline and build morale by providing the continuity of leadership that bridges the gap between the commander and the soldier.

In terms of the secondary foundations of military professionalism, the stagnant economies and meager defense budgets of the post-communist era prevents the HDF and PAF from offering financial and quality of life incentives to aid in the recruitment and retention of personnel. Further, the legacy of the WP system of promotions and advancement poses a significant challenge for HDF and PAF reformers striving to re-

structure patterns of career development. Despite the removal of political criteria for advancement, the promotion system remains vulnerable to cronyism and selfish commanders. Moreover, one of the main obstacles preventing the implementation of an appropriately sized force structure that retains only the best qualified individuals lies in the continued use of an “up-and-stay” structure and the lack of clearly defined career paths in the HDF and PAF officer corps. Based on age limits, the “up-and-stay” structure allows those officers passed-over for promotion to remain in the service until they reach the maximum age for a given rank.

Finally, the HDF and PAF recognize the need to include courses in democratic civil-military relations, leadership and ethics in their professional military education curricula. Instruction in democratic civil-military relations will reinforce the point that democratic citizen-soldiers must be committed to the constitution, civilian control of the military, and morals, ethics, norms, and values consistent with democratic ideology and society.

Today, Hungary and Poland appear to be committed to building armies of democratic citizen-soldiers who respect democratic political control and embody the foundations of democratic military professionalism. Infusing democratic military professionalism and the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier throughout the ranks of the HDF and PAF will help to ensure that Hungary and Poland make a complete transition to democracy and achieve “human interoperability” with NATO. However, overcoming the legacy of communist military professionalism poses a formidable challenge for service members used to operating under the Soviet system. Thus, this thesis recommends that

U.S. and NATO programs help the HDF and PAF to institutionalize the ideal of the democratic citizen-soldier and democratic military professionalism to ensure the military's proper role in society. Without democratic military professionalism, the new armies of democratic citizen-soldiers in East Central Europe will not have the leadership, discipline, and morale necessary to be effective and reliable partners in the integrated military structures that form the basis of NATO's "New Strategic Concept."⁶⁰²

⁶⁰² The "New Strategic Concept" was outlined at the November, 1991 meeting of the North Atlantic Council. (NATO Fact Sheet, US Dept. of State, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, August 28, 1996)

APPENDIX. U.S. AND NATO PROGRAMS

A. INTRODUCTION

From the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, The United States has been firmly committed to supporting the efforts of ECE states to democratize, shift to a market economy, and move closer to the Western security arena. The 1996 U.S. *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* outlines how American goals in the region are tied to its overall strategy of promoting democratic enlargement throughout the world:

The new Democracies in Central and Eastern Europe are [of great strategic importance] to the great democratic powers of Western Europe, their importance to our security and their potential markets. Eventual integration into European security and economic organizations, such as NATO and the EU, will help lock in and preserve the impressive progress in instituting democratic and market-economic reforms that these nations have made.⁶⁰³

In addition, as NATO expansion nears, Poland and Hungary will most likely be among the first new member states. To gain membership, Poland and Hungary must demonstrate their commitment to the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.⁶⁰⁴ Moreover they must reform their institutions, to include the military, in accordance with Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states:

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.....⁶⁰⁵

⁶⁰³ *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, February 1996, p. 32.

⁶⁰⁴ The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, D.C., 4th April 1949.

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

As a part of their efforts to comply with this requirement, prospective NATO members must develop civil-military institutions in accordance with the principles of democracy.

To advance democratization in ECE, the United States and NATO conduct programs to help the former Warsaw Pact (FWP) states build armed forces that will be effective and interoperable with NATO, and will fulfill a proper role in a democracy.⁶⁰⁶ Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, US Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (NAC) recently stressed the importance of ECE military reform: "The creation of armed forces fully embedded in the democratic process is an indispensable element in the transition of partner countries -- and it is indispensable for NATO membership."⁶⁰⁷ To meet the objectives of reform, the Western programs must help the ECE armed forces to develop *democratic military professionalism* with respect to the foundations examined in this thesis. Democratic military professionalism is an indispensable part of any armed forces "fully embedded in the democratic process."

The NATO and U.S. programs offer the best hope for the US and NATO to directly influence the *professionalization* of the ECE armed forces. As discussed in this thesis, the NSWP form of military professionalism is *incompatible* with the armed forces of a democracy. To build highly professional armies in a democracy, the ECE armed forces must institutionalize the kind of military professionalism practiced in the armed forces of ASD states. Thus, **US and NATO reformers must ensure that a top priority**

⁶⁰⁶ Former Warsaw Pact (FWP) states include the states of Central and Eastern Europe that were non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) members and the independent republics of the former Soviet Union.

⁶⁰⁷ Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, Address at Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland, May 6, 1996, US Dept. of State Dispatch, May 27, 1996.

of their programs is to help the ECE armed forces institute *democratic military professionalism*.

B. OVERVIEW OF MAJOR PROGRAMS

1. Partnership for Peace (PFP)

Partnership for Peace is a NATO program to promote military cooperation among NATO countries, former members of the Warsaw Pact, and other countries in Europe and Central Asia.⁶⁰⁸ US Secretary of Defense William J. Perry states:

PFP is one of the most significant institutions of the post-Cold War era. Like the Marshall Plan in the 1940s, PFP today is creating a network of people and institutions across all of Europe working together to preserve freedom, promote democracy and free markets, and cooperate internationally -- all of which are critical to expanding the zone of stability in Europe in our day.⁶⁰⁹

PFP activities include meetings between Defense Ministers, officer exchanges at schools and planning headquarters, and joint peacekeeping exercises.⁶¹⁰ As the primary conduit for membership in NATO, PFP member states agree to pursue the following objectives in cooperation with NATO:⁶¹¹

- facilitation of transparency in defense planning and budgeting processes.
- ensuring democratic control of defense forces.

⁶⁰⁸ PFP started in January 1994 under the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which includes the NATO allies, the newly free independent states of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and the former Soviet Union. PFP is open to states participating in NACC and other members of the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). (Information provided in the US Department of State Fact Sheet on the NACC, August 28, 1996)

⁶⁰⁹ William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress, March 1996*, p. xiii.

⁶¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. xii.

⁶¹¹ *Partnership for Peace*, March 1996, US Department of Defense Pamphlet, p. 3. As of March, 1996, the following 27 countries were PFP members: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Austria, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

- maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the OSCE.
- the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the ability to undertake missions in the field of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed.
- the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

To help advance the PFP objectives, the US introduced the “Warsaw Initiative” -- one-hundred million dollars in financial assistance to help partner states participate in PFP exercises and achieve NATO interoperability.⁶¹²

2. Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP)

The JCTP is a US program operated and administered by the United States European Command (USEUCOM) to help the emerging ECE democracies to:⁶¹³

- Develop non-political military forces owing loyalty to a lawful constitution, and accountable to civilian leadership
- Restructure military forces for legitimate defense needs
- Enhance public respect for the military within society
- Develop an enhanced understanding of US values and way of life

The program is operationalized through the use of a Military Liaison Team (MLT), composed of four US members in the host-nation, to coordinate the contact events.⁶¹⁴ Four major types of contact events are coordinated by the MLT: Traveling Contact Team (TCT) events, Familiarization Tours (FAMTOURs), Conferences, and

⁶¹² Information paper from Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy; FY 96 (first year) fund allocated in two parts: 1) \$60 million in Foreign Military Funds (FMF); and 2) \$40 million in Department of Defense (DOD) Funds. The FMF portion supports equipment transfers and training for partner nations. The DOD portion supports partner participation in joint (PFP or “in the spirit of PFP”) exercises and other DOD programs that support interoperability. Congress re-approved The Warsaw Initiative for FY 97.

⁶¹³ Information Paper on JCTP prepared by Greg Hoffman, CDR, US Navy, Joint Staff, J-5, European Division, Pentagon, Washington D.C., dated 21 February, 1996.

⁶¹⁴ The MLT, headed by a Colonel or Navy Captain, consists of a multi-service mix of active duty and reserve personnel. The team is assigned on a long-term (usually 6 months) temporary duty basis, and is usually supplemented by English-speaking members of the host nation military.

Exchanges.⁶¹⁵ TCTs consist of *US military or civilian personnel* with expertise in a particular functional area, such as civil-military relations, judicial development, logistics, public affairs, and personnel management. TCTs deploy for short duration to *share* their expertise with host nation counterparts. By contrast, FAMTOURs are short visits by *host nation personnel* to US facilities in Europe or the United States to *observe* a specific type of training.⁶¹⁶ Conferences provide a useful forum for the exchange of ideas in subjects that involve several ECE countries, such as military law. And exchanges, which include individual officer/NCO exchanges and unit exchanges, expose members of the host-nation military to US military professionalism, doctrine, and training.⁶¹⁷

In addition, US National Guard and Reserve units contribute to the JCTP through the State Partnership Program (SPP) -- a program which associates US states with PFP countries. It promotes the development of long-term institutional and personal relationships and allows the ECE armed forces to interface with more Americans.⁶¹⁸

The JCTP is fully integrated into each ambassador's country plan, and supports each country's plan to meet Partnership for Peace (PFP) objectives.⁶¹⁹ The JCTP's legal mandate prohibits providing training, equipment, or a service to foreign nationals and limits its areas of focus to "nonlethal assistance," which includes areas such as personnel management, education and training, resource management, chaplaincy, military in a

⁶¹⁵ Information Paper on JCTP prepared by Greg Hoffman, CDR, US Navy, Joint Staff, J-5, European Division, Pentagon, Washington D.C., dated 21 February, 1996.

⁶¹⁶ LTC John A. Gagnon, USEUCOM ECJ5-J, remarks at JCTP Conference, Patch Kaserne, Germany, attended by authors 20 August, 1996.

⁶¹⁷ HQ, USEUCOM, ECJ5-J, LTC John A. Gagnon, "Background Paper on the Joint Contact Team Program," 29 Nov 95.

⁶¹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶¹⁹ Each PFP member country has its own Individual Partner Plan (IPP) for meeting PFP objectives.

democracy, communications, public affairs, military police, quality of life issues, military legal system, civil affairs, humanitarian assistance, and military medicine.⁶²⁰ In addition, each host nation develops their own specific focus areas.⁶²¹

Despite the legal restrictions on its scope of activities, the JCTP has helped states to reform their armed forces.⁶²² The former program director stated that from his personal observations, “the ideas [delivered by the TCTs] are taking root and flourishing [in the countries].”⁶²³ He added that the JCTPs ability to show the vitality of ethics and the relationships between officers and soldiers in the armed forces of a democracy is one of the most important benefits of the program.⁶²⁴

3. International Military Education and Training (IMET)⁶²⁵

IMET is an instrument of national security and foreign policy -- a key component of US security assistance that provides US training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. IMET enjoys a legal mandate that permits it to perform a vital role in the professional *education* of civilian and military leaders of the ECE states.⁶²⁶

⁶²⁰ DOD funded programs are restricted under Title 10, US Code of Law. This restriction was emphasized to the authors by individuals on the Interagency Working Group (IWG) for US-East European Defense and Military Relations interviewed by the authors in Washington D.C., May, 1996; List of nonlethal subject areas based on USEUCOM ECJ5-J Joint Contact Team Program Briefing Slides, FY 95.

⁶²¹ As of August, 1996, Poland's focus areas include: Interoperability with US and NATO forces; Logistics; Airspace Management; Military Health Care; Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS); and Military Education. Hungary's were: Defense Planning and Budgeting; Defense Policy/Strategy; Defense Structures; Democratic Control of Forces; Education and Training; Defense Procurement Programs; and C3I interoperability with NATO, and others. These topic lists were received by the authors from the MLT in Hungary and Poland in August, 1996.

⁶²² Based on authors' interview with COL Lee Alloway, USAF, USEUCOM, ECJ5-J, at Patch Kaserne, Germany on 21 August, 1996.

⁶²³ Remarks by COL Lee Alloway, USAF, at the JCTP Quarterly Conference, Patch Kaserne, Germany, 20 August, 1996.

⁶²⁴ Ibid.

⁶²⁵ Information on IMET extracted from: Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), Washington, D.C., *International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) Fiscal Year 1996 Program Summary*

⁶²⁶ Based on authors' interview with Keith Webster, Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), in Washington D.C., May, 1996.

IMET exposes students to the US professional military establishment and the American way of life, including US regard for democratic values and respect for individual and human rights. Students are also exposed to the manner in which the US military functions under civilian control and how the military interacts with society.

In addition, IMET has expanded its role to meet the following objectives with respect to the emerging post-Cold War democracies:⁶²⁷

- Foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military;
- Develop military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights;
- Introduce military and civilian participants to the elements of American democracy and how they reflect the US commitment to the basic principles of internationally recognized human rights;
- Modify existing civil-military mechanisms used by democracies to meet a country's own unique circumstances and help resolve civil-military conflicts.

4. George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies

Established as an element of the US European Command (USEUCOM) in November 1992, the Marshall Center educates mid- to senior-grade military and civilian officials of ECE and former Soviet countries on defense planning, organization, and management in democratic societies.⁶²⁸ In addition, the center hosts conferences and seminars on democratization topics and provides specialized training for US Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) and linguists.⁶²⁹ Moreover, through its Partnership Support Program (PSP), the Center organizes *in-country* conferences, seminars, and workshops to

⁶²⁷ Referred to as Expanded IMET (E-IMET)

⁶²⁸ Information Paper on Marshall Center prepared by Greg Hoffman, CDR, US Navy, Joint Staff, J-5, European Division, Pentagon, Washington D.C., dated 21 February, 1996.

⁶²⁹ Ibid.

help meet the individual needs of PFP states with respect to the development of democratic civil-military relations.⁶³⁰

⁶³⁰ *Partnership for Peace*, US DOD publication, March 1996, p. 25.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

“A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement - February 1996,” U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996.

“A New Code of the Defense Ministry; The ‘Organizational Regulations of MON’ Enter Into Force,” *Polska Zbrojna*, Warsaw, 22-24 Nov 96, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU) 96-228, 24 Nov 1996.

Abenheim, Donald, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Armed Forces Information Service, *The Armed Forces Officer*, U.S. Department of Defense Publication GEN-36A, 1988.

“Address of the Polish Prime Minister to the Sejm 19 Jan 1995,” *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, British Broadcasting Corporation, 21 Jan 95.

Baldersheim, Harald, Michal Illner, Audun Offerdal, Lawrence Rose, and Pawel Swianiewicz, eds., *Local Democracy and the Processes of Transformation in East-Central Europe*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996.

Barany, Zoltan D., *Soldiers and Politics in Eastern Europe, 1945-90*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

Buck, James H. and Lawrence J. Korb, eds., *Military Leadership*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1981.

Carnovale, Marco, ed., *European Security and Institutions After the Cold War*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995.

Cohen, Eliot A., *Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service*, London: Cornell University Press, 1985.

Colton, Timothy J., *Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

Conner, Walker, *Ethno-Nationalism*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Crocker, Lawrence P., Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army (ret), *The Army Officers Guide*, 44th Edition, Harrisburg, Pa: Stackpole Books, 1988.

Danopolous, Constantine P., and Daniel Zirker eds., *Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States*, Boulder Co: Westview Press, 1996.

Davies, Norman, *God's Playground: Poland*, 2 Volumes, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

Davies, Norman, *Heart of Europe: A Short History of Poland*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984.

Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), "International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) Fiscal Year 1996 Program Summary," Washington, D.C., 1996.

Delbruck, Hans, *History of the Art of War: Within the Framework of Political History, Volume 1*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975.

De Tocqueville, Alexis, *Democracy in America*, vol. II, book III, New York: Langley, 1840.

Dobrzanski, Stanislaw, Polish Defense Minister, interview by Antoni Witkowski and Ryszard Choroszy, "Reforms Yes, But Without Haste," Warsaw *Polska Zbrojna*, 12-14 Apr 1996, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU) 96-074, 16 Apr 1996.

Dupuy, R. Ernest, and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History*, 4th ed., New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993.

Dziewulski, Henryk, Colonel, Polish Armed Forces, "Selected Issues of Civil-Military Relations in Poland," Warsaw: Military Institute for Sociological Research, June, 1996.

Eccles, Henry E., Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret), *Military Concepts and Philosophy*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965.

Euro-Atlantic Association, "The Poland-NATO Report," September, 1995.

Finer, S. E., *The Man on Horseback*, Boulder: Westview Press, 2nd, enlarged edition, 1988.

Gilbert, Felix, ed., *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, New York, Oxford Press, 1975.

Gitz, Bradley R., *Armed Forces and Political Power in Eastern Europe*, New York: Greenwood Press, 1992.

Goldhamer, Herbert, *The Soviet Soldier*, New York: Crane, Russak, 1975.

Grabowska, Monika, "Remembering Pilsudski's Miracle," *The Voice*, Poland's English-Language newspaper, August 25, 1996.

Hagerman, Edward, *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command*, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1988.

Havril, Andras, Brigadier General, Hungarian division commander, interview by Frigyes Varju, Budapest *Magyar Nemzet*, 30 Sep 1996, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU) 96-192, 30 Sep 1996.

Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 22-10 Leadership*, Washington D.C.: Department of the Army Publication.

Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5: Operations*, Washington D.C.: Department of the Army Publication, 14 June 1993.

Headquarters, U.S. European Command, ECJ5-J, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Gagnon, U.S. Army, "Background Paper on the Joint Contact Team Program," 29 Nov 95.

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, *U.S. Marine Corps FMFM 1 Warfighting*, Headquarters, US Marine Corps Publication Center, PCN 139 000050 00, 1989.

Henzler, Marek, "All Power Into the Hands of MON? Squaring the Four-Cornered Cap," *Warsaw Polityka*, 2 Mar 1996, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU) 96-045, 2 Mar 1996.

Herspring, Dale R. and Ivan Volgyes, eds., *Civil Military Relations in Communist Systems*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1978.

Hoensch, Jorg K., *A Modern History of Hungary, 1867-1986*, New York: Longman, 1984.

Hungarian Ministry of Defense, "The Basic Principles of National Defence in the Republic of Hungary," 1993.

Hungarian Ministry of Defense, "Reform of the Armed Forces," 1995.

Hungarian Ministry of Defense, "National Defense '96," 1996.

Hunter, Robert E., Ambassador, U.S. Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council, "Address at Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland - May 6, 1996," US Department of State Dispatch, May 27, 1996.

Huntington, Samuel P., *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma, 1991.

Huntington, Samuel P., *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957.

Janos, Andrew C., *The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825-1945*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.

Janowitz, Morris, "From Institutional to Occupational: The Need for Conceptual Continuity," *Armed Forces and Society*, No. 4, Fall 1977.

Janowitz, Morris, "The Citizen-Soldier and National Service," *Air University Review*, No. 31, November-December 1979.

Janowitz, Morris, *The Professional Soldier*, Glencoe Ill: Free Press, 1960.

Jarmoszko, Stanislaw, "Political System Transformation versus Military Profession Social Value in the Polish Army," European Research Group on Military and Society, Biennial Conference Report, Torino, May 26-29, 1994.

Johnson, Douglas V. II, and Steven Metz, *American Civil-Military Relations: New Issues, Enduring Problems*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, April 24, 1995.

Jones, Christopher D., *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981.

Jones, Ellen, *Red Army and Society*, Boston: Allen and Unwin Publishers, 1985.

Joo, Rudolf, "The Democratic Control of the Armed Forces," *Challiot Paper 23*, Paris: Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, February, 1996.

Knight, Amy, *Spies Without Cloaks: The KGB's Successors*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Kohn, Richard H., ed., *The United States Military under the Constitution of the United States, 1789-1989*, New York: New York University Press, 1991.

Kowalewski, Marian, Colonel, director of International Security Department at the Polish Ministry of National Defense, "Poland's Security Policy," translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU) 96-131, 1 Jan 1996.

Kulczycki, Roman, consultant to the Polish prime minister and professor at the National Defense Academy, interviewed by Wladzimierz Kaleta of *Polska Zbrojna*, "Poland: Democratic Control Over Army, Defense," 9 Sep 1996, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU) 96-197, 9 Sep 1996.

Kun, Joseph C., *Hungarian Foreign Policy*, London: Praeger, 1993.

Laba, Roman, *The Roots of Solidarity*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991.

Lewis, Paul G., "Obstacles to the Establishment of Political Legitimacy in Communist Poland," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. XII, 1982.

Malecki, Stanislaw and Piotr Pabisiak-Karwowski, experts at the Legal Department of the Polish National Defense Ministry, "Statute for MON, Tasks for the Minister," translated in Foreign Information Broadcast Service-Eastern Europe (FBIS-EEU) 96-161, 16 Aug 1996.

Martin, Michel Louis and Ellen Stern McCrate, eds., *The Military, Militarism, and the Polity*, New York: The Free Press, 1984.

Matthews, Lloyd J. and Dale E. Brown, eds., *The Challenge of Military Leadership*, New York: Pergamon-Brassey's Publishers, 1989.

Mathews, Lloyd J. and Dale E. Brown, eds., *The Parameters of Military Ethics*, Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's Publishers, 1989.

Michta, Andrew A., *East Central Europe After The Warsaw Pact: Security Dilemmas in the 1990s*, New York: Greenwood Press, 1992.

Michta, Andrew A., *Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988*, Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1990.

NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty," Washington, D.C., 4th April 1949.

NATO Draft General Report "Democratization in Eastern Europe: An Interim Assessment," May, 1994.

NATO Handbook, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995.

Odom, William E., *The Soviet Volunteers: Modernization and Bureaucracy in a Public Mass Organization*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973, p. 308.

Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, "Warsaw Initiative Information Paper," Washington, D.C., 1996.

Osiatynski, Wiktor, "A Letter From Poland," *East European Constitutional Review*, Spring 1995, Vol 4, No. 2, Chicago: Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe.

Paret, Peter, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Peabody, Robert L., *Organizational Authority*, New York: Atherton Press, 1964.

Perlmutter, Amos, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

Perlmutter, Amos and Valerie Bennett, *The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.

Perry, William J., Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, March, 1996.

Polish Ministry of National Defense, "Polish Armed Forces Guide '95," Warsaw, 1995.

Powell, Colin, with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey*, New York: Random House, 1995.

Puryear, Edgar F. Jr., *19 Stars: A Study in Military Character and Leadership*, 2nd Edition Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1981.

Rakowska-Harmstone, Theresa, Christopher D. Jones, John Jaworsky, Ivan Sylvain, and Zoltan Barany, *Warsaw Pact: Question of Cohesion Phase II*, Volumes 1-3, Ottawa: Department of Defense, Canada, 1984.

Reddaway, W. F., J.H. Penson, O. Halecki, R. Dyboski, eds., *The Cambridge History of Poland: From Augustus II to Pilsudski*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951.

Rothschild, Joseph, *Pilsudski's Coup D'Etat*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.

Rupnik, Jacques, "From 'Party-State' to 'Army-State,'" *The New Republic*, January 6&13, 1982.

Rupnik, Jacques, *The Other Europe*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1989.

Schoenbohm, Joerg, *Two Armies and One Fatherland: the end of the Nationale Volksarmee*, Providence, Rhode Island: Berghahn Books, 1996.

Schoepflin, George, "Postcommunism: The Problems of Democratic Construction," *Daedalus*, Summer, 1994.

Scott, David J., Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, "The Air Force Special Operations Command Identity Crisis: An Assessment and Opinion," *Air War College Paper*, April, 1996.

Scott, Harriet Fast and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, London: Arms and Armour Press, 1984.

Sherr, James, ed., *Soviet Power: The Continuing Challenge*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987.

Simon, Jeffrey, "Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion," *McNair Paper 39*, Washington, D.C: National Defense University, April, 1995.

Sugar, Peter F. ed., *A History of Hungary*, Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1990.

Swieboda, Pawel, "In NATO's Waiting Room," *Transition*, 19 April 1996.

Szabo, Janos, "Fostering Democratic Civil-Military Relations," *Zrinyi Miklos Military Academy Paper*, Budapest, June, 1996.

Taras, Raymond, *Consolidating Democracy in Poland*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995.

Tsouras, Peter, *Changing Orders: The Evolution of the World's Armies, 1945 to the Present*, New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1994.

Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson, "Democratization and the Post-Communist Militaries: U.S. Support for Democratization in the Czech and Russian Militaries," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1996.

U.S. Department of Defense, "Partnership for Peace Guide," March, 1996.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, "NATO Fact Sheet," August 28, 1996.

U.S. Joint Staff, J-5 European Division, Commander Greg Hoffman, U.S. Navy, Information Papers on Joint Contact Team Program and George C. Marshall Center, 21 February, 1996.

van Creveld, Martin, *The Training of Officers*, New York: The Free Press, 1990.

van Doorn, Jacques, *The Soldier and Social Change*, London: Sage Publications, 1975.

Vegh, Ferenc, Lieutenant General, Chief of General Staff, Hungarian Defense Forces, interviewed by Peter Matyuc, Budapest *Nepszabadsag*, 8 Oct 1996, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-East Europe (FBIS-EEU) 96-197, 8 Oct 1996.

Victorson, Mark E., Colonel, U.S. Army, *U.S. Army, Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States*, Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, Newport Paper No. 7, June 1994.

Virginia Tech Corps of Cadets, *Guide for New Cadets*, August, 1982.

von Clausewitz, Karl, *On War*, (edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret), Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Wakin, Malham M., ed., *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2nd edition, 1986.

Weber, Max, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 1947.

Woodrow Wilson Center, "Meeting Report: East European Studies," Jan-Feb 1996.

Wuchte, Thomas A., Major, U.S. Army, "NCOs: A model for the world," (Observations from Peace Shield 1996, a multinational peacekeeping exercise in L'viv, Ukraine), *Army Times*, July 22, 1996.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
8725 John J. Kingman Rd. Ste 0944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218
2. Dudley Knox Library 2
Naval Postgraduate School
411 Dyer Rd.
Monterey, CA 93943-5101
3. Dr. Frank Petho 1
Chairman, National Security Affairs (NS/Te)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
4. Professor Donald Abenheim (Code NS/Ab) 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
5. Professor Roman Laba (Code NS/Lb) 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
6. Professor Daniel Moran (Code NS/MD) 1
Naval Post Graduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
7. Professor Mikhail Tsyplkin (Code NS/Ts) 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
8. Professor Paul Stockton (Code NS/St) 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
9. Professor Dana Eyre (Code NS/Ey) 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
10. The Honorable H. Allen Holmes 1
Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC
The Pentagon, RM 2E258
Washington, DC 20301-2500

11. The Honorable Franklin D. Kramer 2
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Pentagon, RM 4E838
Washington, DC 20301-2400
12. GEN Henry H. Shelton 1
Commander in Chief
US Special Operations Command
Macdill AFB, FL 33608-6001
13. GEN George Joulwan 1
Commander in Chief
US European Command
UNIT 30400, Box 1000
APO AE 09128
14. MG Allen 1
USEUCOM Plans and Policy Directorate (ECJ5)
UNIT 30400, Box 1000
APO AE 09128
15. COL Byrd 2
USEUCOM Plans and Policy Directorate
Joint Contact Team Program (ECJ5-J)
UNIT 30400, Box 1000
APO AE 09128
16. BG Geoffrey C. Lambert 1
Commander
Special Operations Command, Europe (ECSO)
UNIT 30400, Box 1000
APO AE 09128
17. COL Timothy S. Heinemann 1
J-3, Special Operations Command, Europe (ECSO)
UNIT 30400, Box 1000
APO AE 09128
18. LT GEN Peter J. Schoomaker 1
Commander
US Army Special Operations Command
Ft Bragg, NC 28307-5000

19.	RADM Thomas R. Richards	1
	Commander	
	Naval Special Warfare Command	
	San Diego, CA 92155	
20.	MG James L. Hobson	1
	Commander	
	Air Force Special Operations Command	
	Hurlburt Field, FL 32544	
21.	MG Michael A. Canavan	1
	Commander	
	Joint Special Operations Command	
	Ft. Bragg, NC 28307	
22.	COL Les Fuller	2
	Commander	
	10th Special Forces Group (Abn)	
	Ft Carson, CO 80913	
23.	COL David E. McCracken	1
	Commander	
	3d Special Forces Group (Abn)	
	Ft Bragg, NC 28307	
24.	COL Donald W. Richardson	1
	Acting Commander	
	Special Operations Command, Atlantic Command	
	Norfolk, VA 23511	
25.	COL Lance Booth	1
	Commander	
	1st Special Warfare Training Group	
	Ft Bragg, NC 28307	
26.	CAC-Commander	2
	Foreign Military Studies Office	
	ATZL-SAS: ATTN: Dr. Jacob Kipp	
	Building 404, Lowe Drive	
	Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027	
27.	USAFSOS/EDOJ	1
	344 Tully Street	
	Hurlburt FLD, FL 32544-5826	

28.	The Director	1
	Central Intelligence Agency	
	Office of Training and Education	
	Washington, DC 20505	
29.	Commander	1
	4th Psychological Operations Group	
	Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000	
30.	Commander	1
	6th Psyops Battalion	
	Strategic Studies Detachment	
	ATTN: Dr. E. Jeffrey Griffith	
	Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000	
31.	The JCS Staff	1
	J-5, European Division	
	ATTN: COL Thomas G. Bowden	
	Pentagon, RM 2D956	
	Washington, DC 20318-3000	
32.	The JCS Staff	1
	J-3, EUCOM Division	
	ATTN: COL Mark P. Lennon	
	Pentagon, RM 2B885J	
	Washington, DC 20318-3000	
33.	The JCS Staff	1
	J-3, Special Operations Division	
	Pentagon, RM 2C840	
	Washington, DC 20318-3000	
34.	USAF Institute for National Security Studies	2
	USAF Academy	
	2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 5D33	
	Colorado Springs, CO 80840	
35.	Jennifer Duncan (Code CC/JD)	5
	Center for Special Operations	
	Naval Postgraduate School	
	Monterey, CA 93943-5000	
36.	Library	5
	Army War College	
	Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013	

37. Library 1
Naval War College
Newport, RI 02840

38. Strategic Studies Group (SSG) 1
Naval War College
Newport, RI 02840

39. Department of Military Strategy 1
National War College (NWMS)
Ft Leslie J. McNair
Washington, DC 20319-6111

40. US Army Command and General Staff College 1
ATTN: Library
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

41. Library 1
Air War College
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6428

42. US Army Center for Military History 1
1099 14th St NW
Washington, DC 20005-3402

43. US Military Academy 1
ATTN: Library
West Point, NY 10996

44. Harvard University 1
JFK School of Government
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

45. Hoover Institution for War, Revolution and Peace 1
Palo Alto, California 94306

46. Marquat Memorial Library 1
US Army John F Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
Rm. C287, Bldg 3915
Ft Bragg, NC 28307-5000

47. USASOC 1
Director of History and Museums
ATTN: AOHS-Dr. Stewart
Ft Bragg, NC 28307-5200

48. Commander 2
USASOC, ATTN: Mr. Tony Norman
Ft Bragg, NC 28307

49. United States Special Operations Command 1
Joint Special Operations Forces Institute
Ft Bragg, NC 28307-5000

50. American Embassy Warsaw 4
ATTN: COL Jon L. Lentz
Defense Attaché, UNIT 1340
APO AE 09213-1340

51. American Embassy Budapest 4
ATTN: COL Arpad Szurgyi
Defense Attaché, UNIT 320
APO AE 09213-5270

52. Colonel Janos SZABO DSc. 1
Zrinyi Miklos Military Adademy
1581 Budapest POB. 15.
HUNGARY

53. Colonel Adam Kolodziejczyk 1
Wojskowy Instytut
Badan Socjologicznych
00-910 WARSZAWA - REMBERTOW 72
POLAND

54. Dr. Jeffrey Simon 1
Institute For National Strategic Studies
National Defense University
Washington, DC 20319

55. Dr. Rudolf Joo. 1
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
College of Strategic Studies and Defense Economics
Gernacker Str. 2
82467 Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany

56. James P. Danoy 1
DIA/Policy Support
Rm. 2A540, The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20340-1040

57. Pamela Sanford Sloan 1
DIAC
Washington, DC, 20301-6111

58. Chief 1
Bureau of European Affairs
US Department of State
Washington, DC 20520

59. Bradley A. Freden 1
EUR/NCE
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC 20520

60. Kenneth Jodoin 1
HQDA (DAMO-SSM)
Pentagon, Room 3B545
Washington, DC 20310-0400

61. Henry B. Richmond III 1
HQDA (DAMO-SSM)
Pentagon, Room 3B545
Washington, DC 20310-0400

62. Defense Security Assistance Agency 1
Plans Directorate, Programs Division
ATTN: Keith Webster
Crystal Gateway North, Suite 303
1111 Jefferson Davis Hwy
Arlington, VA 22202

63. Office of the Secretary of Defense 1
ISA-European Division ATTN: Jim Townsend
Pentagon, Room 4C765
Washington, DC 20301-2400

64. LTC (P) Bruce A. Hoover 1
US Army War College, Student Detachment
Carlisle, PA 17013

65. LTC David J. Scott. 1
HQAFSOC/XPP
Air Force Special Operations Command
Hurlburt Field, FL 32544

